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Abstract 
Breaking away from the positivist trend dominating the literature on Moldova’s foreign 
relations, this thesis analyses the means through which national identity discourses 
impact on Moldovan societal representation of foreign policy. It contends that national 
identity perpetuates a Cold War inspired view of foreign affairs. This construction is 
defined by two main elements, the representation of the civilizational and geopolitical 
cleavage between East and West and the lack of agency awarded to the Moldovan self.  
This is achieved through an in-depth study of the national identity debate in Moldova. 
It focuses on both the two main national identity discourses in Moldova, Romanianism 
and Moldovanism. For this analysis, I employ a post-structuralist approach, 
conceptualising national identity as a discourse that helps us make sense of the world. 
Through this function and its persistence across Moldovan articulations, national 
identity plays a key role in representations of foreign affairs in Moldova. More 
specifically, the opposition between Romanianism and Moldovanism reproduces the 
East-West geopolitical and civilizational cleavage, whilst the representation of 
Moldovan inferiority, historical debt and the Great Power Complex reiterates 
Moldova’s passivity and lack of agency. Through this Cold War representation of 
international affairs, national identity offers both the resources and the limits within 
which official Moldovan foreign policy articulations function. In this way, national 
identity is crucial in understanding the mechanisms through which foreign policy is 
legitimated and, especially, the validity and credibility of certain arguments and the 
unlikelihood of others.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Whilst it is certainly true that all states pursue what they perceive as a rational foreign 
policy, the parameter of what constitutes rational choice is a flexible and elusive 
concept’ (Prizel 1998: 1) 
 
With the war in Ukraine in 2014, the foreign policy choices of the former Soviet 
states have come under even closer scrutiny. This thesis follows this trend and focuses 
on foreign policy representations in Moldova, the smallest of the post-communist 
states on the border of Europe. My main argument is that in the Moldovan case 
national identity produces and reproduces a representation of foreign affairs very 
similar to the geopolitical, Cold War view. This is outlined through two main 
characteristics, firstly the oppositional relationship between East and West, as 
geopolitical and civilizational spaces, and, secondly, the lack of agency of the Moldovan 
actor within this system. This interpretation stems from the way in which my 
interviewees have characterised geopolitics as the main element defining Moldovan 
fate and, implicitly, Moldovan foreign affairs. Consequently, the main focus of this 
analysis are societal discourses, as articulated by political and cultural elites or put 
across in newspapers.  For this analysis, I employ a constructivist and post-structuralist 
approach, focused on national identity as a discourse that helps us make sense of the 
world.  
With this in mind, this introduction begins with a discussion of the relevance of 
the thesis from the perspective of the literature on Moldova. It highlights some of the 
issues that are explained through the post-structuralist approach to analysing 
Moldovan representations of foreign affairs. Drawing from the literature on 
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nationalism and foreign policy in Moldova, I stress the importance of this thesis in 
covering the important gap between positivist and national identity-based 
explanations of Moldovan foreign affairs. This is followed by an overview of Moldovan 
historical context and a summary of the content of each of the five chapters in the 
thesis. The historical presentation sets the basis for the discussion on national identity 
in Moldova; the country’s shifting fate and occupiers are some of the most important 
elements in contemporary national identity discourses. Meanwhile, the chapter 
summary offers both a synopsis of the main arguments of the thesis, whilst also 
highlighting its contribution to the literature on national identity in Moldova.  
 
I.1. Relevance 
The literature on Moldovan foreign affairs is dominated by instrumentalist and 
economic analyses. Most of the writings are focused on the specifics of Moldova’s 
relations with Romania, Russia and, especially, the European Union (EU) (e.g. Sarov 
and Ojog 2009). Two main topics have dominated this body of literature. The first is 
the management of the border between Romania and Moldova, from 2007 the border 
of the European Union. These studies focus on the Moldovans’ freedom of movement 
and the impact of Romania’s 2007 EU accession on border management and on 
Moldovan-Romanian relations (Dura 2006, 2007; Ilieş et al. 2008; Skvortova 2006; 
Popescu 2006; Pop 2009; Burdelnii n.; IPP 2002). The second set of investigations are 
those of EU-Moldova relations and usually assessments of the EU’s Neighbourhood 
Policy in Moldova (e.g. Gheorghiu 2005; Wrobel 2005; Bosse 2010; Niemann and de 
Wekker 2010).  
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Conversely, another body of literature focuses specifically on the Moldovan 
government’s actions and foreign policy options. In this way, it is the most relevant for 
the purposes of this thesis and its focus on Moldovan, not European or Romanian, 
discourses. This set of analyses has been inspired by the shifts in foreign policy in 
Moldova in 2005 and 2009 and the contrasting foreign policy orientations of the main 
parties in Moldova (pro-Eastern/multi-vector versus pro-Western). These studies take 
a positivist approach and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Moldova’s 
different foreign policy options (e.g. Pop et al. 2005; Radeke et al. 2013; Cenusă 2014; 
Clipa 2014). One study that departs from this outlook is Korosteleva’s (2010) analysis 
of EU-Moldova relations. She goes beyond the conventional governance framework 
and highlights the salience of culture in understanding Moldova’s approach to its 
relations with the EU. The thesis reinforces her findings and expands their outlook to 
Moldova’s relations to Russia and Romania; my analysis also goes beyond her 
conclusions, as I explain the persistence of cultural factors in Moldovan society 
through the means of national identity.  
Nevertheless, this focus on rational choice and economic calculations is 
contradicted to a great extent by analyses of the connection between national identity 
and foreign policy in Moldova. These suggest that there are clear links between a 
political party’s stance on the issue of national identity and its foreign policy 
orientation (e.g. King 2003; Zgureanu-Guragata 2008; Cărăuş 2003), making national 
identity a sine qua non element of this analysis. There are two main national identity 
discourses in Moldova: Romanianism, arguing that the people of Moldova are 
Romanian, and Moldovanism, providing that they are Moldovan, different from 
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Romanians. The literature links the former with a pro-European foreign policy and the 
latter with a pro-Russian/multi-vector one (King 2003).   
Thus, the literature on foreign policy in Moldova is divided between an identity-
based argument and a rational evaluation of economic and other benefits. On a 
superficial level, these bodies of literature seem to contradict each other, but the 
reality of Moldovan thinking on foreign affairs is a lot more nuanced, with a multitude 
of elements and considerations coming into play. In order to close the gap between 
the two approaches, this thesis studies how national identity constructs the framework 
within which foreign policy discourses function. Thus, it does not analyse foreign 
policy, but national identity representations of foreign affairs. It conceptualises both 
foreign policy and national identity as discourses that enable us to make sense of the 
world. Thus, it does not deny the value of economic articulations; it treats them as one 
of the elements of foreign policy, yet outside the scope of this thesis. More 
importantly, this methodological approach allows the thesis to augment Cărăuş (2003) 
and King’s (2003) analyses; it achieves this by expanding the focus of research from the 
simple connection between national identity discourses and their respective foreign 
policy orientation to the wider significance of national identity for foreign policy 
articulations across Moldovan society. More specifically, it analyses national identity’s 
impact on representations of the structure within which foreign affairs are conducted 
and the distribution of agency amongst its main actors. Based on this, I infer that 
national identity in Moldova reproduces the East-West geopolitical cleavage and 
Moldova’s lack of agency on the international scene. 
Foreign policy analysis is the key approach to studying foreign policy; it focuses 
on decision making, the government and other decision-makers and the conditions 
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and processes that affect foreign policy. Its interst in looking inside the box 
represented by the state contrasts with the classical systemic theories of International 
Relations, such as neo-realist, neo-liberalism (Syder et al. 1962). As such, foreign policy 
analysis is not a theory of international relations, but as with this study it focuses on 
the state and the individual levels of analysis.  Methodologically, foreign policy analysis 
is a complex approach, encompassing a series of perspectives, such as rational choice, 
human psychology, organisational studies or constructivism (e.g. Allison and Zelikow 
1971; Boekle et al. 2001).  
Applying this theoretical framework to the literature on Moldovan national 
identity, I note that rational choice is the underpinning for the economic analyses of 
Moldovan foreign policy, as presented above. Meanwhile, constructivism links in with 
the literature arguing that national identity in Moldova defines its foreign policy 
orientation. Nevertheless, in offering an alternative to these analyses, this project does 
not study foreign policy per se and, as such, cannot be included in the wider category 
of foreign policy analysis. For the purpose of this study, I take an approach inspired by 
Hopf (2002). Hence, I do not study how foreign policy is made or the actors involved in 
this process. I analyse the societal discourses that have the potential to influence 
foreign policy; they achieve this either by offering it symbolic resources it can build 
upon or by setting the limits of credibility and appeal across Moldovan society. Thus, 
the thesis’ importance lies both in its methodological novelty for the analysis of 
representations of foreign affairs in Moldova and in widening the domain of research 
on this topic, from the conventional analysis of foreign policy, to societal discourses. 
Additionally, it augments rational and economic studies on Moldovan foreign policy, 
highlighting the alternative modes of legitimation for these ‘rational’ discourses.   
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In terms of practical relevance, this approach offers an explanation for the 
presence of elements of national identity in articulations and the legitimation process 
of foreign policy discourses in Moldova. For instance, Communist Vladimir Voronin 
explained his party’s foreign policy discourse for the 2014 election by arguing that 
Moldova had been pro-Russian since the times of Ştefan cel Mare (Moldovan prince, 
1457-1504). Furthermore, this approach highlights the means through which foreign 
policy discourses are promoted and legitimated to the Moldovan masses. The fact that 
the wider Moldovan public candidly admits to not being informed well enough about 
their foreign policy options, with 11% and 12% thinking they are very well informed 
regarding the EU and, respectively, the Euro-Asian Union (IPP 2014: 60), suggests that 
their foreign policy choices are also motivated by reasons that go beyond a rational 
analysis of costs and benefits. One of these alternative rationales is national identity 
and this lack of knowledge may explain political actors’ impetus to employ national 
identity arguments to convince the masses. Thus, national identity has good 
explanatory power in making sense of both grassroots foreign policy options and of 
political articulations. All these points are expanded on in the conclusion, where the 
discussion on relevance is corroborated with the findings of the thesis.  
 
I.2. Historical context  
But before delving into the detail of the thesis, this section aims to present a succinct 
history of Moldova, pinpointing the main events that have shaped the identity debate. 
What currently is the territory of the Republic of Moldova has been, throughout its 
history part of the principality of Moldova, Tsarist Russia, Greater Romania and the 
Soviet Union and these shifts have shaped the identity of the Moldovan people (King 
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2000). This section does not aspire to present a comprehensive and detailed history or 
the debates surrounding different historical events, as these are discussed within the 
different identity discourses in Section 3.4.  
This strip of land was the Eastern part of the Moldovan Principality from 1359 to 
1812; the principality encompassed both the territory of the current day Republic of 
Moldova and that of the Romanian region of Moldova, with its capital, Iași. One of the 
three great Romanian principalities, along with Wallachia and Transylvania, Moldova 
reached its pinnacle during the reign of Ştefan cel Mare [Stephen the Great] (1457-
1504), who reigned from the Carpathians to the Nistru River and the Black Sea. As an 
important turning point, the principality of Moldova moved under Ottoman suzerainty 
in 1484 after Ştefan cel Mare’s defeat at Cetatea Alba. From this point on, the Porte 
plays a crucial role in the fate of the region. Meanwhile, a multiplicity of other 
Moldovan princes also made a mark on Moldovan history, for a series of reasons; one 
of the most important princes in this period is Dimitrie Cantemir. He is mentioned both 
for his alliance with Russia concluded at Łutsk in 1711, marking an important point in 
Moldovan-Russian relations, and for his extensive academic work, including Descriptio 
Moldavie [The Description of Moldova], one of the key works of medieval Moldovan 
geography, politics and ethnography. Thus, up until the 19th century, Moldova’s history 
is linked to its relations with the two main powers of the region, Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, but also other actors, e.g. Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, etc. 
Nevertheless, the centuries following the rule of Ştefan were characterised by 
multiple conflicts and a haemorrhage of territories from the Moldovan Principality; 
concurrently Turkish power over these lands led to the imposition of foreign, Greek 
princes, at the helm of both Moldova and Wallachia. The pinnacle of Moldovan 
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problems was the Treaty of Bucharest, ending the 1806-1812 Russo-Turkic War. As an 
effect of the treaty, the territory of the current day Republic of Moldova came under 
Russian control. Renamed Bessarabia by the Russians, in order to differentiate it from 
Moldova and legitimise their occupation, this territory expanded all the way to the 
Black sea, incorporating territories currently part of Ukraine, such as the Budjak. As a 
region (gubernya from 1871) of the Tsarist Empire, Moldova was the site of various 
Russification policies, such as the promotion of the Russian language and the removal 
of Romanian/Moldovan from official use. This was augmented through the forced 
migration of the autochthonous population to other regions of the empire, while 
foreign ethnic groups were encouraged to settle here. Nevertheless, Russian 
historiography of the age recognised the population on this territory as Romanian (van 
Meurs 1998).  
Unlike the other Romanian regions under Habsburg and, then, Austro-Hungarian 
occupation, such as Bukovina or Transylvania (see Hitchins 2002), the origins of a 
resistance movement in Bessarabia did not develop until 1905, after the revolution in 
St Petersburg (King 1994, 2000); moreover, van Meurs (1998: 41) argues that 
‘indications for a national consciousness in Bessarabia before the beginning of the 20th 
century are minimal, even among intellectuals’. In this context, it is only as late as 
1916, that the Romanian nationalist movement gained some power across Moldova. 
Together with the military it played an important role in the decisions of the Moldovan 
Assembly, Sfatul Tării, for Moldova to become independent, in late 1917, and unite 
within the borders of Greater Romania, on 27 March 1918. Meanwhile, Romanian 
troops had entered the territory of Bessarabia at the beginning of 1918, in order to 
ensure stability in the region following the Russian Revolution; their pressure is argued 
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to have been crucial in understanding the Sfatul Tarii’s decision (King 2000: 35). The 
Romanians kept the Russian name, Bessarabia, for this region within Greater Romania. 
Highlighting the shifting nature of symbols in Moldova, Bessarabia is now commonly 
used in Moldova by Romanianists, whilst Moldovanists criticise it for being a Romanian 
construct and challenging Moldovan persistence on this territory (Comunistul 
24.02.2011). 
During the interwar period, in its own nationalising project, Bucharest promoted 
Romanian culture and the use of the Romanian language in Bessarabia (King 2000; 
Bîrlădeanu 2008; Cuşco 2008). Nevertheless, even during these two decades, the 
Romanian elites marginalised Bessarabia, which had become ‘an underdeveloped 
corner of Greater Romania, just as it had been the Siberia of the West in the Russian 
Empire’ (King 1994: 348; Livezeanu 2000). In the meantime, the Soviet Union 
reorganised the territory on the left bank of the Prut River as the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in 1924 and commenced its nation 
building project and promoting the idea of an independent Moldovan state (Berg and 
van Meurs 2002). 
The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939, establishing Nazi 
Germany’s and the Soviet Union’s areas of interest in central and Eastern Europe and 
the events of the Second World War brought Moldova back under Russian/Soviet 
control, from 28 June 1940.  Under the name of the Soviet Socialist Republic of 
Moldova (MSSR), the new country comprised both the territory between the Prut and 
Dniester, i.e. Bessarabia, and that on the Eastern bank of the Dniester (the Moldovan 
MASSR), that had previously not been part of Romania. The years of the Second World 
War and those immediately following saw Soviet deportations, largely for political and 
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nationalising purposes, and famine across Moldova, with hundreds of thousands of 
casualties. During this period and up to the 1980s, Soviet policies in the area were 
aimed at constructing a Moldovan national identity, subsumed beneath a ‘civic’ Soviet 
identity. It was based on the differences in between Romanians and Moldovans, 
especially in regards to language and history (King 1996, 2000; Schrad 2004; 
Parmentier 2004).  Still, by the 1980s, the success of the Moldovanist project was 
contested by Moldovan elites and the issue of cultural legitimation quickly became one 
of the motors that would lead to Moldovan independence in 1991 (Cash 2008). 
Nevertheless, Moldovan elite’s ambition to maximise rent seeking opportunities and, 
ultimately, Moscow’s agreement with the heads of the republican communist parties 
were crucial to Moldova gaining independence. Thus, Moldova, throughout its history 
has experienced two separate (and opposed?) attempts to create a sense of 
nationhood, one Romanian and one Soviet – Moldovan1. 
In terms of national identity, Moldova is considered a site of failed nation-
building projects (Cash 2007) with two main national discourses co-existing in 
Moldovan society (King 1994, 2000). The first, Romanianism, holds that the people of 
Moldova are Romanian, focusing on both the perceived linguistic identity and the 
historical experience of being part of the three main Romanian medieval principalities 
and of Greater Romania, 1918-1940 (King 2000). During the 1980s Romanianism 
gained strength as a reaction to Soviet policies and gave momentum to the movement 
of national rebirth. Yet, with the promotion of Romanianism came the possibility of 
reunification with Romania which left national minorities uneasy. This culminated with 
the war in Transnistria and the autonomy of the Găgăuz territory in the beginning of 
                                                          
1 The example of the Tsarist Empire’s policies is not brought forward as a nationalising project, but as a 
process of Russification which may have altered the identity of the people of Moldova.  
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the 1990s (Crowther 1998; King 1994). Even before Moldova gained its independence, 
the territory east of the Nistru River seceded, proclaiming itself the Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic or more simply Transnistria. Its independence has 
not been recognised, except by other secessionist republics in the former Soviet Union, 
such as Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and the conflict evolved into full blown war in 1992. 
A ceasefire was signed in the summer of 1992 and currently the conflict is considered 
to be ‘frozen’, with the Transnistrian government in Tiraspol being de facto 
independent. At the same time, the Găgăuz people, a Turkic Christian-Orthodox 
minority, were pacified by Chişinău with the creation of the autonomous Găgăuz Yeri 
(Berg and van Meurs 2002; see also Crowther 1998). The minorities’ violent reaction to 
the Romanianist policies is an important argument in Moldovanist articulations, as 
noted in the in-depth discussion of the national identity discourses (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Following these events, the year 1994 was marked by two important turning points: 
President Mircea Snegur’s ‘Casa Noastră’ [Our Home] speech and the adoption of a 
new Moldovan Constitution. With these, the Moldovanist project came back to the 
fore. Moldovanism provides that the people of Moldova are different from Romanians 
and speak Moldovan language (Ciscel 2006); moreover, they also portray Romania and 
Romanianism as threatening Moldovan independence. Drawing from the policies of 
the Tsarist period, the origins of the Moldovanist project lie in the national and 
linguistic project of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 1924-1940 
(King 1999) adapted to fit the developments and requirements of each age (van Meurs 
1998). Building on the history of the medieval Moldovan principality and the existence 
of a Moldovan autonomous or, even, independent state (1917-1918, arguably 1924-
1940 and 1944-1991), this discourse accentuates the differences between Romanians 
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and Moldovans and, to a certain extent, strengthens Moldovan-Russian links (Roper 
2005).  
The year 2001 brought a Moldovanist party, the Moldovan Communists to 
power. Taking advantage of a loophole in the law banning the former Communist 
Party, the new political organisation named themselves the Party of the Communists 
or Communists’ Party (PCRM). The party is not communist but more of a nationalist, 
populist and left of centre political group (see March 2005; Suhan 2006). Unlike ethnic 
Romanianism, contemporary Moldovanism is a defender of Moldovan statehood. It 
also encompasses an important civic element focused around the rights of ethnic 
minorities and the position of the Russian language in Moldovan society (March 2007). 
Additionally, during their time in government, the Communists have promoted the 
idea of a separate Moldovan history, both in text-books (Ihrig 2006) and in their 
speeches (Danero Iglesias 2013a, 2013b). The Communists dominated the Moldovan 
political life up until the, so-called, Twitter Revolution of 7 April 2009 (Table I.1). Table 
I.1 details the election results from 2001 to 2014 for all parties passing the electoral 
threshold; the left most column attempts to offer a rough guide of a party’s national 
identity orientation2. It highlight the Communist’s dominance of the Moldovan political 
scene. Nevertheless, it also underscores the shifting fates of Moldovan parties.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 For instance, the PPCD changed their views on national identity from being a unionist party in 2001 to 
a Moldovanist position after 2005. 
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National 
Identity  
Party 2001 2005 April 2009 
July 
2009 
2010 2014 
Threshold 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 
Moldovanist PCRM 50% 46% 49.5% 45% 39% 17% 
 Socialists - - - - - 21% 
 Social-Democrats - -  - - - 
 
Electoral Bloc 
‘Motherland’ 
- - - - - - 
 PPCD 8% 9% - - - - 
 PDM - Electoral Bloc 
Democratic 
Moldova 
29% 
- 12% 13% 16% 
 
Party of Rebirth 
and Conciliation 
- Our Moldova 
Alliance 10%  
7% - - 
 Braghiş Alliance 13% 
 PLDM - - 12% 17% 29% 20% 
Romanianist PL - - 13% 15% 10% 10% 
Table I.1 Moldovan Election Results 2001-2014 
Thousands of Moldovans protested on the streets of Chişinău in April 2009 against 
what they perceived to be electoral fraud in the parliamentary election. The peaceful 
protests evolved into a riot and clashes with the police, who were accused of a series 
of abuses of human rights leading to the death of one of the agitators. In response to 
this violence, a recount of the votes was called, followed by snap election in July 2009. 
As a result, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) came to power, with a majority 
in the Moldovan Parliament. AIE consists of three parties: the centrist Liberal-
Democrat Party (PLDM), the centre-left Democrat Party (PDM) and the centre-right 
Liberal Party (PL). From 2009 to 2010 AIE also encompassed the Our Moldova Alliance; 
nevertheless, they failed to reach the electoral threshold in 2010 and were 
consequently absorbed into the PLDM. The change in regime in 2009 has brought a 
change in terms of official national identity articulations in Moldova. Romanianism has 
grown in importance, especially with the outspoken Romanianist and Liberal Mihai 
Ghimpu as interim president of Moldova (2009-2010). In 2013, the Liberals left the AIE, 
being replaced by the Reformed Liberals, a breakaway faction of the Liberal Party that 
led to little change in terms of foreign policy. Highlighting the shifting nature of 
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political fortunes in Moldova, the previously almost unknown Socialist Party won the 
most votes in the November 2014 election (21%), with the Liberal-Democrats (20%) 
and Communists (17%) trailing behind them. In this way, the Socialists became the 
main Moldovanist party on the Moldovan political scene. The former AIE still possesses 
a majority, but as of January 2014 the Liberal-Democrats and the Democrats have 
formed a minority government.  
 
I.3. Chapter Outline 
The next five chapters detail the argument that Moldovan national identity frames 
Moldovan foreign policy and foreign affairs by reproducing a geopolitical, Cold War 
inspired, view of the world. The thesis is structured into three main sections: 
theoretical underpinnings (Chapter 1) and methodology (Chapter 2), an analysis of the 
representations of structure (Chapters 3 and 4) and of agency in international affairs 
(Chapters 5). Therefore, the analysis is divided based on the two criteria employed to 
define geopolitics. Firstly, two chapters (3 and 4) argue that the antagonism between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism reproduces a cleavage between the civilizational and 
geopolitical spaces of East and West. Then, the second part of the analysis (Chapter 5) 
stresses that the Moldovans portray themselves as passive and lacking agency.  
For this purpose, Chapter 1 sets the basis for the discussion by highlighting the 
post-structuralist approach of the thesis and the importance of its conceptualisation of 
national identity and foreign policy as discourses for understanding the Moldovan case 
study. It argues that a post-structuralist, discursive approach, is essential in 
understanding the existence of coexisting national identity discourses in Moldova. 
Moreover, it enables me to analyse national identity’s interactions with other societal 
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discourses, such as portrayals of politics and corruption. The reason for choosing 
national identity for this analysis is based on its theoretical potential, explanatory 
power for foreign affairs in Moldova and its presence everywhere across the country, 
in the media, political debates and even in the streets in Chişinău (Appendix 1). By 
employing a discursive approach, I conceptualise national identity as a story that tells 
people about themselves and helps them make sense of the world. Through this 
characteristic, national identity is one of the prime suspects in analysing the means 
through which foreign affairs and foreign policy are understood and legitimised in 
Moldova, based on the lack of information the people have, as discussed above.  
With this in mind, the thesis is focused on the way in which, on a discursive level, 
Moldovan national identity frames Moldovan foreign policy thinking, offering both 
discursive resources for it to build on and limitations in terms of what can be 
presented as legitimate. Chapter 1 highlights how this argument draws from David 
Campbell’s (1992) theoretical concept of ‘Foreign Policy’ (as opposed to ‘foreign 
policy’), the matrix of meanings and ideas that forms the resource base for foreign 
policy articulations. The analysis also builds on Bleiker (2003) and Cochran‘s (1999) 
conceptualisation of discourse functioning as a structure in limiting agency. In this way, 
the chapter argues, national identity offers the symbolic resources and arguments for 
legitimating Moldovan foreign policy and the limits within which it needs to function. 
Hence, Chapter 1 provides the theoretical basis for the analysis on Moldovan national 
identity and foreign policy in the rest of the thesis.  
This is corroborated with Chapter 2’s focus on the methodology of the thesis. 
This chapter offers an in-depth presentation of the data collection process for the 
project, encompassing interviews, newspaper articles, online sources and 
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ethnographic observation. This extensive use of data offers a comprehensive view of 
national identity in Moldova. Building on the theoretical underpinnings presented in 
Chapter 1, the main method of analysis is Discourse Analysis (Section 2.2). The utility of 
this approach stems from its focus on the construction of dichotomies and hierarchy, 
essential for highlighting the construction of otherness in the Moldovan case. The 
analysis is augmented through the use of qualitative content analysis, relying on a 
coding frame developed from the literature on national identity, DA’s focus on 
dichotomies and from the analysis of the data collected, as per the principles of 
Grounded Theory.  
Chapter 3 turns its attention to the two main national identity discourses in 
Moldova. I argue that these are constructed as opposing, through a series of 
dichotomies encompassing contending views on nationality, language and key 
historical dates. Moreover, the chapter serves two other purposes. Firstly, it offers a 
comprehensive analysis of the literature on national identity in Moldova. Secondly, it 
brings this analysis up to date by contextualising my fieldwork data (2009-2014) and 
highlights the thesis’ contribution to the literature on Moldovan national identity. The 
literature on nationalism in Moldova is focused on the nationalising projects in this 
space, especially on the way in which political elites have attempted to define the 
Moldovans in different ways (Parmentier 2004; Montanari 2001; Schrad 2004; Moroi 
2007). These offer an overview of the main tenets of these projects, whilst also 
reproducing the view that Moldova is dominated by their dichotomous construction. 
Nevertheless, some analyses have been rather superficial, studying national identity as 
the means to explaining other issues in Moldovan society (e.g. Cărăuş 2003), not as a 
focus of research. In response to them, this thesis offers a comprehensive look at the 
29 
 
means through which national identity in Moldova is articulated and the way in which 
its different elements and themes come together in a comprehensive discourse. This is 
achieved through an analysis of the different elements that form the Moldovan 
national identity debate and the connections between them: language, history, 
internal and external others, drawing from the focus in the literature on these topics. 
This is due to the fact that the works on Moldovan national identity examining in 
depth the discursive constructions of Romanianism and Moldovanism have been 
somewhat limited in their scope on specific areas, but making up for this in their level 
of detail. These encompass current day (King 2000) and historical analyses of the 
development of the Moldovan state and society, focused on Russian and Romanian 
policies on this territory (Bîrlădeanu 2008; Cuşco 2008). An important element in this 
discussion is language in Moldova. The literature on language includes historical 
analyses of the policies and language development on the Moldovan territory (Dyer 
1996; Deletant 1996) and the social implications of the use of language in Moldova 
(Ciscel 2006, 2007; Prina 2015).  Chapter 3 builds on these to argue that the 
representation of language highlights the way in which a name can be at the very 
centre of national identity construction and stresses the constructed nature of the 
nationalism debate in Moldova. This is due to the fact that Romanianists use the name 
Romanian, whilst Moldovanists employ Moldovan for what some admit to be a very 
similar or, even, the same language.  
Yet, the main focus of the literature on national identity in Moldova is 
representations of history, either in textbooks and history teaching (Anderson 2005, 
2006, 2014; Ihrig 2006, 2007; Roper 2005; Solonari 2002) or in historiography (van 
Meurs 1998). Additionally, Danero Iglesias (2013a, 2013b) studies historical 
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constructions in current political discourse, whereas March (2005, 2007) has analysed 
the Communists’ Moldovanist policies. The chapter draws from these analyses to 
argue that Romanianism and Moldovanism construct their discourses around opposing 
views of key historical dates and, implicitly, build contrasting historical narratives. 
Three key dates are detailed within the chapter, 1812, 1918 and 1940. The analysis is 
based both on the comprehensive set of works above and on political declarations and 
newspaper coverage all the way to 2014. This stresses the consistency of these 
representations both across time and across media of communication and brings the 
debate up to date, complementing the writings on Moldovan nationalism. 
More importantly, the thesis’ contribution to the literature on Moldovan 
national identity is its comprehensiveness, achieved through its endeavour to bring all 
these elements into one analysis. The thesis collates the existing analyses on Moldovan 
nationalism, highlighting the way in which different symbols and narratives are weaved 
together into a coherent discourse. In this way it offers an explanation for the 
resilience of national identity discourses in Moldova. Its argument is that despite their 
different structure, i.e. Romanianism being an ethnic construction, whilst 
Moldovanism is a mix between an ethnic and a civic articulation of national identity, 
the two national identities are constructed in very similar ways. Even more, this 
approach enables the chapter to conclude that Romanianism and Moldovanism are 
constructed through the representation of otherness, of something that is different, 
threatening. Both employ a negative linguistic construction, representing their 
language as being different from Russian (for Romanianists) and, respectively, 
Romanian (for Moldovanists). This construction is then linked to the representation of 
the internal other, a group within Moldova that is threatening or, especially in this 
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case, hierarchically superior to the nation and the people. For Romanianists these 
encompass all the national minorities, Russian-speaking as they are called, whereas for 
Moldovanists they are the Romanian ethnic group, being represented as either the 
minority that undermine their position as a majority in the country or, respectively, 
leads the country (on the wrong path). Furthermore, these ‘others’ are connected to 
the opposing national identity construction, the Romanian ‘minority’ to Romanianism 
and the Russian-speaking minorities with Moldovanism. In this way, through their 
construction of othering, the two discourses represent themselves against each other, 
forming an antagonistic structure, othering and essentialising each other. 
Building on these findings, Chapter 4 argues that the Romanianism-Moldovanism 
antagonism reinforces a view of the world as divided between East and West. The 
oppositional character of Romanianism and Moldovanism is mirrored in the 
representation of external others. This idea builds on the historical representation of 
the two discourses and the construction of their historical others, as argued in Chapter 
3. For instance, Romanianism creates an equivalence between its discursive ‘other’, 
Moldovanism, and its external (historical) other, ensuring that the fight against 
Moldovanism is essentially resistance against Russia; Moldovanism does the same with 
Bucharest. Based on this, Chapter 4 argues that the opposition between the two main 
discourses also extends to the civilizational and geopolitical spaces associated with 
their external others, the East and the West. It infers that the antagonism between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism is not only determined by its content, but also 
through their association with the two main camps in Moldovan politics, depicted by 
analysts as the ‘democrats’ and the ‘communists’ or the pro-European and pro-Russian 
(or multi-vector) parties. Building on these different levels of oppositional 
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constructions, the East-West cleavage is amplified through a series of dichotomies, 
ranging from democracy to representations of culture and civilizational differences. 
Thus, the East and the West are presented as opposing spaces, linked to Russian and 
respectively Romania as external others for the two national identity discourses. 
Moreover, these spaces are portrayed as in conflict over Moldova, in a Cold War 
scenario. Through this multi-layered set of equivalences and dichotomies, the 
antagonism between the two national identity discourses, their views on 
independence and sovereignty and the political parties representing them, is 
augmented in creating a wide ranging cleavage in Moldova, one that extends all the 
way to foreign policy. Hence, national identity plays a key role in understanding the 
way in which the foreign affairs scene is constructed in Moldova, as a battle ground 
between the two spaces, East and West, Russia and the EU (Chapters 3 and 4).  
Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 stress the means through which national identity 
shapes representations of structure in Moldova’s international affairs, by reproducing 
the opposition between East and West as civilizational and geopolitical spaces, the 
second part of the thesis (Chapter 5) is focused on representations of Moldovan 
agency. Its main argument is that Moldovans represent their country and their 
leadership as lacking agency on the international stage, with proof being brought both 
from the two main national identity discourses and alternative conceptualisations of 
identity in Moldova. The portrayal of the Moldovan state as one that does not have a 
say in international affairs, that cannot or will not act, is a crucial part of the 
geopolitical representation of Moldovan foreign affairs, as the second criterion in my 
conceptualisation of geopolitics. Chapter 5 approaches this topic by looking at 
historical narratives and contemporary representations. It firstly analyses the nature of 
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Moldova’s ‘lack of agency’ across these representations and follows this up with a 
study of how agency is awarded to external others.  Mechanisms such as a 
representation of the high level corruption of political elites or of Moldovans as 
generally indecisive all feed into the construction of a lack of agency on the Moldovan 
part. Then, historical themes such as the Great Power Complex and historical debt are 
employed in order to attach the responsibility to act to the external others (e.g. 
Romania’s policies helping Moldova become more European).  Furthermore, Chapter 5 
also stresses the fact that national identity does not exist in a vacuum, but interacts, 
draws from and competes with other discourses within society.  
Lastly, the conclusion brings all of these themes together and underscores the 
thesis’ original contribution. Moreover, it focuses on the consequences of the thesis’ 
findings for Moldovan foreign policy and for Moldova in general, whilst also noting 
some points of further research.  
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A note on the text 
Unless otherwise stated, I have carried out all translations across the thesis. Moreover, 
Moldovan and Romanian names with Romanian diacritics, as opposed to English 
translations, have been employed all throughout. Additionally, wherever translations 
are problematic due the polysemy of words, they have been discussed in the text or 
footnotes. Lastly, all Romanian names, especially those of medieval princes, have not 
been translated, with Ştefan cel Mare being used instead of Stephen the Great.  
It should also be noted that the official name of the state is the ‘Republic of 
Moldova’, yet, the term used throughout the thesis to define the country is simply 
Moldova. This is usually employed by the authorities in Chişinău, but it is also used to 
name the Romanian region of Moldova (between the Carpathian Mountains and the 
Prut River), formerly the Western part of the Medieval Principality of Moldova; the 
latter is thus called either Romanian or Western Moldova in the text. I also use the 
name Bessarabia throughout the text. Bessarabia is mainly employed in Romania, in 
order to differentiate the territories East and West of the Prut River. Based on this, it is 
popular amongst Romanianists in Moldova.  
I use ‘country’ [ţară] and ‘state’ [stat] interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
This is due to my interviewees’ use of the two terms as equivalent and their preference 
for the former when discussing national identity. Lastly, it is very hard to find neutral 
terminology in order to describe certain events, especially when it comes to different 
historical narratives. Consequently, I have tried to either point out the terminology 
used in each one directly or to use inverted commas for this purpose.  
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1. Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings  
This chapter offers a summary of the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis and its 
main methods. It argues for the suitability of a discursive approach to analysing both 
national identity and the representation of foreign policy in the Moldovan case. The 
thesis’ approach to agency and structure is informed by constructivist and post-
structuralist conceptualisations of the agent-structure problem in international 
relations (IR). This offers the basic framework to analyse the way in which national 
identity discourses are employed to frame articulations of foreign policy and foreign 
affairs in Moldova. Constructivists and post-structuralists acknowledge that normative 
and ideational structures are essential in defining what we perceive as real (Doty 
1997). Thus, agency and structure are constructed through discourse (Suganami 1999). 
Moreover, one of the most important of these discourses is national identity, which 
‘constantly shapes our consciousness and the way we constitute the meaning of the 
world’ (Özkirimli 2000: 4). In this way, national identity is one of the discursive tools 
that Moldovans use to make sense of the world. But more importantly, in the 
Moldovan case it is employed to portray and legitimate a geopolitical view of the 
world. Therefore, the thesis argues that the structure of national identity discourses in 
Moldova, their opposition and their content make it the vehicle through which the 
passive character of the Moldovans and the cleavage between East and west are 
reproduced and become discursively acceptable in Moldovan society.  
With this in mind, the first part of this chapter focuses on the theoretical 
underpinnings that stand at the basis of the analysis. It is divided into three main 
sections, looking at the basic concepts employed throughout. Section 1.1 discusses the 
conceptualisation of discourses as defining the world and highlights some of the 
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theoretical bases of post-structuralism as a research approach. The following (Sections 
1.2 and 1.3) augments this by arguing for the utility of conceptualising national identity 
as a discourse. This is due to the main similarity between the two notions, national 
identity and discourse, their power in making sense of the world. Moreover, by 
analysing national identity as a discourse, I am able to apply the post-structuralist 
focus on the creation of difference and dichotomies; this proves essential in 
understanding the importance of othering for Moldovan nationalism.  But more 
importantly, this approach is crucial in understanding how two competing national 
identity discourses coexist in Moldova and legitimise different outlooks on foreign 
affairs. The last sub-section (1.4) highlights the importance discourses and, implicitly, 
national identity, play in constructing foreign affairs. On a theoretical level, it argues 
for the relevance of an analysis of the two main discourses of Moldovan national 
identity, Romanianism and Moldovanism, for Moldovan depictions of the international 
affairs stage.  
 
1.1. Discourse – defining the world 
The main reason for taking a discursive, post-structuralist approach to this research 
stems from the nature of Moldovan national identity. The existence of two main 
competing discourses of national identity, Romanianism and Moldovanism is best 
explained through an approach that accepts the constructed nature of reality. 
Meanwhile, a discursive approach allows us to delve into the details of their 
relationship and interactions.  This method has been employed extensively in analyses 
of national identity and their links to foreign policy. It is used extensively in works from 
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Ruth Wodak et al. (1999) analysis of Austrian national identity and Ted Hopf’s (2002) 
study of Russian identity and foreign affairs through literary publications from 1955 
and 1999 to David Campbell’s (1992) investigation into the way in which the 
representation of alterity is essential to American foreign policy discourse. I employ 
these studies to inform the approach to research (e.g. Section 1.4), to develop the 
theoretical framework for this analysis and to bring forward concepts or ideas that 
may be useful to this study; I draw relevant parallels are not here, but in the text of the 
actual analysis.  
Other post-structuralist studies have also inspired this analysis. For instance, 
post-colonial studies in international relations outline how colonial powers 
constructed the people in the colonies as inferior, through a process of essentialisation 
(see Said 1978). By adapting the idea of ‘colonialism’, this approach allows the thesis to 
offer a different perspective on Moldova’s relationship with Romania and Russia. This 
relationship, thus, encompasses both the historical element and the sentiment of 
inferiority the Moldovans still nurture towards their external others. Moreover, post-
colonial studies highlight the use of dichotomies such as active-passive, subject-object, 
powerful-weak (Said 1978). These help to devise a framework for analysis, both 
regarding Moldova’s representation of its external others and its representations of 
foreign affairs. 
In the Moldovan case, Cărăuş (2003) employed a discursive approach in order to 
systematise the Moldovan national identity debate. Nevertheless, she does not go into 
a lot of detail, as the main focus of her analysis is the reasons behind the different 
articulations of nationalism. Other works employed this approach to study specific 
details of Moldovan discourses. They stress the usefulness of the approach in analysing 
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the contradictions within Moldovanism; for example, Danero Iglesias (2013a) 
highlights the means through which the Communists’ civic Moldovanism is challenged 
through their reiteration of ethnic elements. This work stresses the relevance of a 
discursive approach in understanding the contradictions between and within national 
identity discourses in Moldova. Similarly, Danero Iglesias and Weinblum (2013) stress 
the structural similarities between Moldovan national identity discourses and other 
types of nationalism and the importance of drawing from classical frameworks for 
analysing national identity, such as Smith (1991). This thesis builds on the 
methodological conclusions of these previous works. Nevertheless, there is no 
comprehensive discursive analysis of national identity in the Moldovan case. This 
thesis aims to fill this gap. 
With this in mind, the rest of this section focuses on the tenets of post-
structuralism, the definition and usefulness of discourse for this endeavour. The 
underpinnings of post-structuralism are represented by Lyotard’s ‘death of 
metanarratives’ (Smith 2001) and a constructivist view that sees the world as 
constructed through language (Griffiths 1999). First, the ‘death of metanarratives’ is a 
break with foundationalist thought and rationalist ideas regarding the existence of an 
objective truth (Campbell 2007). Hence, the philosophical base for Discourse Analysis 
is anti-essentialist - it argues that there is no natural closure of meaning, i.e. there is 
permanent contestation of what we perceive as common knowledge or general truth 
(Horwath 1995: 117-118). Additionally, DA is also anti-foundational, considering all 
truth is historically and culturally contingent (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). Hence, this 
study is not a positivist analysis, but a critique of the way in which certain discourses 
have come to be seen as ‘general truths’ in Moldova. Secondly, the interest with 
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discourse arises from a broader change within research. This is represented by an 
epistemological shift from a positivist position – a belief in universal truth and that 
language was a neutral and transparent medium for transmitting knowledge and 
truths – towards a post-positivist, constructivist, view of the world. Thus, since the 
‘linguistic turn’3, language is seen no longer as transparent or as a reflection of the 
world, but as a site where meanings are conveyed and changed (Taylor 2001: 6). 
Language is a means of meaning-making, of semiosis and, through this, it is essential 
for representing what we perceive as ‘reality’ (Fairclough 2001: 229).  
Based on this constructivist underpinnings, discourse is the main element of this 
analysis. The simplest definition for discourse is ‘language in use’ (Taylor 2001: 5), 
while a more comprehensive one sees it as a system of representation, a 'production 
of knowledge through language' (Hall 2001: 72). Discourse is performative: it gives 
meaning and it constructs the world (Campbell 2007). This does not mean that there is 
no real world, only that our understanding of reality is mediated by language and 
discourse (George 1994; Campbell 2007: 216). More importantly, post-structuralists 
focus on the persistence of certain discourses and deconstructing ‘taken for granted’ 
ideas and what we perceive as common knowledge. Through their performative 
character, ‘discourses reproduce the everyday assumptions of society and common 
perceptions and understandings’ (Burnham et al. 2007: 250). Hence, a discursive 
approach is useful in analysing the way in which Moldovan national identity, as an 
everyday assumption and common representation, is articulated within Moldovan 
society.  
                                                          
3 Development in Western thinking in the 20th century focused on understanding the relationship 
between language and philosophy. The name draws from Richar Rorty’s (1967) The Linguistic Turn.  
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The persistence of these constructions stems to a great extent from their 
connection to power; this is theorised by Foucault (1980) through the 
power/knowledge nexus (Hopf 1998: 177).  Knowledge, when linked to power, 
becomes 'truth'; then, this truth is used to regulate the actions of ‘others’, to create 
rules for society, it creates power (Foucault 1980). Robert Young in his introduction to 
Michel Foucault’s The Order of Discourse argues that the effect of discursive practices 
is:  
to make it virtually impossible to think outside them. To think outside them, is 
by definition, to be mad, to be beyond comprehension and therefore reason. 
It is in this way that we can see how discursive rules are linked to the exercise 
of power; how the forms of discourse are both constituted by, and ensure the 
reproduction of, the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion, and 
domination (Foucault 1970: 48).  
In this way, discourse is not only employed to construct and make sense of the world. 
It also defines what is acceptable, the limits within which we think and represent the 
world. This is extremely important in the analysis of national identities’ influence on 
foreign policy discourses; it emphasises the way in which foreign policy borrows 
themes and symbols from national identity and the means through which national 
identity defines the discursive limits within which foreign policy functions.  
Building on this, post-structuralism has developed an ‘ethos of critique’ 
(Huysmans 2001). Post-structuralists base their work on a suspicion of determinism, of 
those idea in society that are widely accepted and unchallenged.  They attempt to 
show how some discourses dominate others, how we remember some narratives 
while forgetting alternative ones through a series of textual strategies (George 1994; 
Devetak 2005: 167). This is useful for analysing how some discourses dominate 
Moldovan society, whilst others are marginalised. More importantly, it highlights how 
historical narratives of national identity are created through the 
43 
 
celebration/commemoration of certain events and the forgetting of others (Section 
3.4.2). In this way, Foucault’s theory brings forward the critical character of DA, the 
focus on deconstructing ‘taken for granted’ assumptions, as a key principle of the 
approach.  
Lastly, the usefulness of this approach is highlighted in those cases in which the 
discursive construction is different from the conclusions of positivist methods. One 
such example is the ‘European hope’ discourse in Moldova. It stresses that the country 
will be a member of the EU within the next decade, contradicting official opinions in 
Brussels and the experience of the CEECs (Section 5.3.4). The next section (1.2) turns 
its attention to the thesis’ conceptualisation of national identity. It stresses the 
compatibility between the post-structuralist approach to language and a discursive 
theorisation of national identity, through their common epistemological, 
constructivist, underpinnings and through the nature of national identity discourses as 
making sense of the world.  
 
1.2. National Identity 
A whole range of theories have sought to explain both the nature and the origins of 
nationalism and national identity. This section offers a small summary of these debates 
and concludes that the best approach for this analysis is that of national identity as 
discourse, building on the post-structuralist thought espoused above. It also covers in 
some detail other elements of national identity theory that are employed extensively 
in Moldova and in the literature on Moldovan nationalism. These include the cleavage 
between ethnic and civic national identities and banal nationalism.  
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Nationalism has been studied extensively throughout the past decades, 
encompassing a wide array of perspectives and approaches. On one end of the 
spectrum, primordialist theories argue for the antiquity and naturalness of nations; on 
the other end modernists hold that nations are a modern creation. Taking into account 
which factor is prioritised to explain nationalism, this latter group can be divided into 
three main explanations: economic, political and cultural. The first, represented by 
Tom Nairn (1981) and Michael Hechter (1978), provides that economic 
transformations in the form of uneven development create core-periphery differences 
and lead to the development of nationalism in the periphery. Within the second group, 
Eric Hobsbawn (1990) theorises the idea of ‘social engineering’ through ‘invented 
traditions’. He argues that nationalism and the state create nations, not the other way 
around. In the same line of though, Jean Breuilly (1982) outlines how the transition 
from a corporate to a functional division of labour serves as the background for the 
birth of nationalism; in this case nationalism functions as a form of politics, of power 
and control over the state. Meanwhile, Paul Brass (1979) portrays nationalism, through 
an instrumentalist perspective, as the tools in the hands of competing elites.  
In the socio-cultural explanations group, Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as ‘a 
political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent’ (1983: 1). In order to explain nationalism he distinguishes between 
traditional and modern societies and stresses the importance culture and, indirectly, 
education plays within the latter. Thus, the modern, industrialised society is the place 
of birth for the nation through the possibility of cultural standardization and the 
‘imposition of high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the 
lives of the majority’ (1983: 57). Making a similar case, Benedict Anderson (1983: 6) 
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argues that nations are imagined communities of ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. His 
thinking forms the basis for a discursive approach to national identity. He places the 
origins of nationalism in the decline in religious beliefs together with industrialization 
and the development of mass communication through the press. These circumstances 
led to the creation of a sense of belonging for people who had never met through the 
simultaneous enactment of mass rituals in private; this is achieved through the 
calendrical coincidence of newspapers and the simultaneous mass consumption of this 
source of information (Anderson 1983: 25-38). Anderson also stresses the constructed 
nature of national identity, highlighting that ‘imagined’ does not mean imply in any 
way ‘falsity’ (1983: 6). In this way, he conveys the importance of representation in 
constructing reality, mirroring the thesis’ post-structuralist approach to discourse. 
Thus, Anderson inspires this thesis both through his constructivist approach and the 
importance he awards to the media, one of the thesis’ sources of data, in the process 
of nation building. 
Lastly, the centre ground in the nationalism debate is taken by ethno-symbolists 
with their main representative, Anthony Smith (1991). They reach a compromise in 
between primordialists and modernists by acknowledging the importance of pre-
modern ethnic identities to today’s nations. Smith draws from Kohn’s (1944) 
conceptualisation of two models of national identity - Western and Eastern European 
forms of nationalism. The first is civic identity, based on a ‘historic territory, legal-
political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and 
ideology’ (Smith 1991: 11). The second is the ethnic model of national identity based 
on a ‘community of birth and culture’; this encompasses common descent - the 
conceptualization of a ‘fictive family’ which can be traced back throughout history - , 
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popular mobilization and vernacular culture: customs, traditions and, more 
importantly for this study, language (Smith 1991:11). These are not self-exclusive 
forms, but they ‘reflect the profound dualism at the heart of every nationalism. In fact 
every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different 
forms’ (Smith 1991: 13). This claim is relevant to this thesis as the civic-ethnic divide 
plays an important role in understanding the structure of the identity debate in 
Moldova; more specifically, with Romanianism is a largely ethnic construction, whilst 
Moldovanism comprises of both an ethnic and a civic strand. 
Stemming from this classical debate, this thesis employs a social constructivist 
approach. I argue that nationalism is a discourse that constantly shapes our 
consciousness and the way we constitute the meaning of the world. The next few 
paragraphs highlight the tenets of this approach, its compatibility with a post-
structuralist position and usefulness for the Moldovan case. I argue for the usefulness 
of this approach in this specific case study; this is achieved by highlighting its suitability 
for a country divided by different national identity constructions, the instrumentalism 
of elites in Moldova and its usefulness in understanding constructions of otherness . 
Both national identity and discourse help us make sense of the world. This similarity is 
the key element that allows us to analyse national identity as a discourse. More 
specifically, Uri Ram (1994: 153) argues that ‘nationality is a narration, a story which 
people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world’. Thus, 
national identity determines our collective identity by producing and reproducing us as 
nationals’ (Ozkirimli 2000: 4, see also Suny 1993). Hence, nations are constituted by 
the claims of nationalism, not through the presence of specific characteristics; this 
underscores the constructed nature of national identity and its compatibility with the 
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concept of discourse (Calhoun 1997). National identity’s power stems from its 
sedimentation/naturalisation, thus from its perceived objectivity (Norval 2000). Yet, 
this also leaves room for the existence of resistance, contestation and alternatives to 
hegemonic discourses (Ozkirimli 2005: 176; Roseberry 1996; Finalyson 1998) or 
negotiation in between different views on the nation (Duara 1996). Moldova is a 
country riddled with an identity dilemma and at least two main discourses trying to 
capitalise on this issue, Romanianism and Moldovanism. Hence, a discursive 
perspective on national identity is essential in explaining the simultaneous existence of 
two articulations of nationalism. Meanwhile, the logic of hegemonising discourses is 
very useful in conceptualising the relationship (and alternation) between different 
constructions of national identity as hegemonic and counter-hegemonic.  
National identity is produced and reproduced through institutions such as the 
family, school, workplace, media, within the settings of day-to-day life (Balibar 1990). 
Moreover, Michael Billig (1995) argues that the symbols of nationalism are part of our 
everyday life, from flags to currency and recurrent political discourse of the nation or 
words such ‘we’ or ‘here’. Thus, the discourses of national identity are omnipresent. 
This has inspired the wide-ranging data collection conducted for this project, from 
interviews and newspapers to field trips and blogs, as detailed in Section 2.1.2. 
Furthermore, through this theoretisation, social constructivists ensure that the 
diversity of nationalisms is accounted for; they offer an answer Finlayson’s (1998) 
critique that unitary theories of nationalism obscure the uniqueness of each case. In 
this manner, the concept of discourse allows the thesis to treat Romanianism and 
Moldovanism the same, despite some intrinsic structural differences (i.e. one is ethnic, 
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the other is a mix of ethnic and civic) and to evaluate their relationship as one between 
two discourses.  
Similar to Anderson’s thinking, this approach does not see nationalism as false or 
artificial as critics would argue, but contingent and never finished nor fixed; national 
identity is also open to change and re-construction. Hence, a discursive approach 
allows the analysis to grasp the shifting nature of national identity discourses in 
Moldova and the means through which they change and adapt to different political 
and economic circumstances. This is even more relevant taking into account the period 
studied in the thesis, from 2009-2014, which led to a slight redefinition in both 
national identity and foreign policy discourses as an effect of the new structure and 
composition of the Moldovan government and opposition after the so-called Twitter 
Revolution of April 2009 (Introduction). However, change is not the only element that 
needs to be taken into account in the analysis, as national identity draws from 
previous ‘preconstituted and resonant representations of community’ (Duara 1996: 
165). This is considered both when discussing the elements of national identity, 
stressing their historical origins (Section 3.4) and in the analysis of national identity’s 
relationship with other discourses, such as representations of politics (Section 4.1).  
Lastly, this approach draws from Anderson’s conceptualisation of ‘imagined 
communities’ (1983), but it augments this through Brass’ (1979) instrumentalism.  This 
is due to the fact that we must always be conscious of ‘which political interests are 
secured by different types of nationhood’ (Ozkirimli 2005: 177). This is an important 
consideration the case in Moldova, where different political elites and parties have 
different ideas about the Moldovan nation, be they Romanianists or Moldovanists, and 
employ these to legitimise different political projects or, in this case, different foreign 
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policy orientations (see Danero Iglesias 2015). Thus, whereas this thesis is not aimed at 
explaining the reasons behind certain political acts, but their mechanisms of 
legitimation, it must acknowledge the importance of instrumentalist reasons both for 
the existence of a multiplicity of national identity and foreign policy discourses in 
Moldova and, ultimately, for the existence of an independent Moldovan state. 
The post-structuralist approach to national identity also enables the thesis to 
incorporate the idea of myth, as a specific type of discourse, into the analysis. Myths 
are stories, narratives that ‘helps feed world views and cultural outlooks’ (Ansari 2012: 
ix). Kirk (1984: 56-7) argues myths are tales that transcend the passing of time, 
appealing to all generations. Through this ability together with their role in ensuring 
community cohesion (Boia 2001: 29), myths function on the same logic as national 
identity. Barthes takes this further and argues that  
myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them 
the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back 
beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without 
contradictions (1977: 45) 
Thus, myths are naturalised discourses, i.e. discourses that are no longer perceived as 
contingent, but generalised to society to the point of becoming common-sense. This 
conceptualisation fits in with the focus of discourse theory on deconstructing ‘common 
knowledge’. The main function of myths is to express ‘the inner truth about peoples 
and nations and [are] in some respect more truthful and revealing than the study of 
the past’ (Berger 2009: 491). Through this, the myth of the saviour (Sections 5.2 and 
5.3) is crucial for understanding the complex identities of the Moldovan people. 
Moreover, myths ‘supply man with the motive for ritual and moral actions as well as 
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indications to perform them’ (Eliade 1998 [1963]: 20). In this way, myths mirror the 
power of national identity discourses, their role in making sense of the world (see 
Honko 1984: 47). This equivalence forms the basis of this analysis, bringing together 
the post-structuralist focus on discourse with the conceptualisation of myth and 
national identity. Based on this, I argue that the myth of the saviour (Sections 5.2 and 
5.3) provides guidance for Moldovan actions, functioning as a discursive resource 
and/or a discursive limit.  
 
1.3. Identity and Foreign Policy 
Identities, of all types, are defined through both internal characteristics and difference, 
through both what ‘we are’ and ‘what we are not’ (see Jenkins 2004). The first 
category focuses on the characteristics or symbols that define the Moldovan nation, 
which interplay with otherness to construct a comprehensive national identity 
discourse. These encompass elements from the names assigned to languages to the 
representation of political myths and symbols, analysed in depth in Chapter 3.  But 
more importantly, the main function of nationalism is exacerbating external 
differences and dividing the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ozkirimli 2005: 32-33; Verdery 
1993).  Othering mechanisms are central for this analysis through their importance for 
articulations of foreign policy, as relations with external others. Moreover, othering 
also defines the relationship between the two main identity discourses in Moldova. 
This is summed up through the idea of social antagonism and discussed in more detail 
in Section 3.2, under the analysis of the wider cleavage between Romanianism and 
Moldovanism.  
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Thus, the representation of difference is central to the thesis’ analysis. Frederik 
Barth studies ‘social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete social 
categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership’ (1969: 10). 
He concludes that ethnic identities are essentially constructed through the 
interactional construction of external difference. Consequently, according to Barth, 
internal homogeneity within a group is generated through the construction of the 
‘other’ and differentiation from him.  Thus, identity is transactional and situationally 
flexible (Jenkins 2004). Though his initial work on symbolic interactionism is limited to 
the study of ethnic groups, Barth then follows up on those ideas and generalises the 
model to all types of identification (Hall 1996: 345; Parker et al. 1992: 5). These ideas 
are also employed across the IR literature. For instance, constructivist international 
relations theorists break away from the earlier IR thinkers who considered identity as a 
given; they equate articulating an identity with identifying the 'other' and 
differentiating yourself from him (Waxman 2006: 7; Barnett 2002: 62). Furthermore, 
post-structuralist David Campbell argues that identity becomes the ‘true’ identity 
when a threat against it is constructed and this threat stems from the ‘mere existence 
of an alternative way of being’ (1992: 3). Drawing from the difference between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’, identity is the ‘objectification of the self through the representation of 
danger’ in the image of the ‘other’ or as Devetak calls it a ‘spatialised conception of 
security’ (2005: 184). This is essential in understanding anti-imperialist 
representations, as detailed in Section 4.2, and the rejection of threatening others in 
Moldovan national identity articulations. 
Based on this acknowledgement, Duara (1996) argues that nationalism is a 
relational identity and that it contains various ‘others’: historical ‘others’, potential 
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‘others’ or hidden ‘others’. The thesis employs the concepts of internal and external 
others in order to make sense of the structure of national identity discourses in 
Moldova. Internal others belong to the same political entity with the in-group, whilst 
external others form a separate political unit (Triandafyllidou 1998). In the Moldovan 
case the former is represented by different ethnic groups or elites, whilst the latter 
takes the form of other states or organisations, e.g. Russia, Romania, Community of 
Independent States (CIS) or the EU. Together with these, conspiratorial others are also 
included in the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4). I define these as a specific form of internal 
others that are depicted as representatives of the threatening external other. Their 
representation merges external and internal threats into one and they are essentially a 
‘fifth column’, with no will or agency of their own; for instance, the Moldovanist 
rejection of ethnic Romanian elites is based on their perceived agenda of reunification 
with Romania and the Romanian ambitions regarding this territory. This association 
between external, internal and conspiratorial others enables the thesis to highlight the 
connections between the different discursive levels of national identity discourses in 
Moldova and stresses the complexity and discursive reach of these articulations 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Furthermore, it offers the basis for understanding how an 
individual day-to-day issue, such as a shop keeper speaking only Russian, can 
ultimately feed into a foreign policy preference. 
The relationship with the national other is commonly defined through the 
perspective of threat. Triandafillou argues that a significant other is represented by 
any group that poses a threat to the nation (1998: 600); this threat can be either 
direct, on independence, autonomy or territorial claims, or a threat to the 
distinctiveness of the nation. Both these argument are brought together in 
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articulations of Moldovan national identity, through the representations of internal, 
external and conspiratorial others. This is one of the main sources of radicalisation in 
Moldovan representations of national identity. In this way, Moldovanism and 
Romanianism cover all the logical arguments to reject their respective others. Yet, this 
is not the sole representation of the other existent in Moldovan national identity 
discourses. Romanianists articulate a positive representation of Romania, whilst 
Moldovanists relate mostly in the same way to Russia. Thus, the relationship between 
self and other is more complex than the friend-foe representation (Norval 2000). For 
this reason, I employ a comprehensive representation of othering, one that highlights 
the importance of both threatening and positive ‘others’ (Petersoo 2007). This is 
extremely relevant for the Moldovan case, where each national identity discourse has 
a somewhat positive external other and relate to them through dichotomies such as 
developed-underdeveloped (Chapter 5, especially Section 5.3). Otherness is the basis 
for the construction of identity, both from a sociological point of view and from an 
international relations one. From this perspective, the representation of external 
others is an important element defining external relations and foreign policy 
orientations (Chapter 4, especially Section 4.5); for instance, the Romanianist negative 
representation of Russia leads to a rejection of the whole Eastern space and a pro-
European foreign policy.  
Drawing from constructivist and post-structuralist approaches to IR, I infer that 
the relationship between national identity and foreign policy is a lot more complex, 
with the two discursively producing and reproducing each other. Wendt introduces 
identity to the study of IR and defines it as ‘collective meanings, constituting the 
structures that organise our actions’ (1992: 397). He contends that identities 
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determine a nation state's interest, and thus, its behaviour on the international scene 
(Weber 2001: 64). Therefore, national identity is a cognitive framework through which 
political reality is understood and determines ‘road maps’ for foreign policy makers 
(Aggestam 2004). Meanwhile, a post-structuralist approach argues that the 
relationship between identities and a state’s foreign policy goes beyond a simple 
causality of identity that determines interest, which, in turn, influences foreign policy. 
David Campbell defines foreign policy as ‘all the practices of differentiation or modes 
of exclusion’ that have identity as an outcome (Campbell 1992: 68-69; see also 
Schapiro 1988: 100). Thus, he ‘relocates the discourse of security as part of a larger 
process of identity construction’ (George 1994: 210) by pointing out that foreign policy 
is a tool in the construction of identity, not only an effect of it.  Accordingly, foreign 
policy and identity discourses produce and reproduce each other.  As I’ve noted in the 
introduction, this thesis does not study foreign policy, but national identity 
representations of foreign policy. As such, these considerations are relevant for a 
wider study on the relationship between identity and foreign policy in Moldova and, to 
a certain extent, for the exploratory study conducted in the Conclusion. Nevertheless, I 
firmly believe that including these theoretical details offers a hint of the wider 
implications of this research project.  
To conclude, a discursive conceptualisation of the nation is ideal for 
understanding nationalism in Moldova, as it sheds light on the existence of multiple 
national identity discourses and their conflicting relationship. And as political identity 
is a ‘discursive and symbolic construction’ these strategies of production and 
reproduction of identity are essentially discourses, the most important of which being 
foreign policy (Waever 2001: 25). Additionally, utilising this approach also allows the 
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thesis to analyse the relationship between different national identity discourses and 
also, other societal constructions, such as lack of trust in politics (Section 5.2). 
Furthermore, through its methodological focus on the construction of difference, this 
approach links the articulation of external otherness, as a mechanism of national 
identity building, to representations of foreign policy orientations.  
 
1.4. Agency and Structure in IR 
Yet, the evaluation of national identity representations of foreign affairs conducted in 
this thesis is more complex than evaluating a national identity discourse or policy as 
pro-Eastern or pro-Western. My analysis also employs the theoretical 
conceptualisation of structure and agency; their duality influences the thesis in two 
main way. Firstly, it helps structure the superficial presentation of the thesis, into one 
section on structure and one on agency. Related to this, by recognising that both 
agency and structure are constructed through discourse, it also offers the theoretical 
basis for analysing national identity representations of structure and agency. Secondly, 
the discursive approach to the structure-agency relationship offers a different 
perspective on the relationship between national identity and foreign policy. I 
conceptualise national identity discourses as the structure that both limits and offers 
discursive resources for the articulation of foreign policy. In this view, foreign policy 
functions similarly to agency, drawing from the structure, i.e. national identity, but also 
reproducing and adapting identity discourses.  
 Firstly, the agent-structure debate impacts the thesis on a superficial level. The 
thesis is divided into an analysis of the representation of structure and a separate one 
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on the means though which Moldovan agency is constructed. More specifically, 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis define the structure of international relations through 
an East-West paradigm, whilst the last two highlight the lack of Moldovan agency on 
the international stage. Drawing from Waltz (1979), structure is here defined as the 
ordering principle of the international system, including the allocation of capabilities 
within in. In the Moldovan case this is represented through a bipolar constructions, i.e. 
the cleavage between East and West as geopolitical spaces. Then, this thesis 
conceptualises agency as the capacity and willingness to act. Agency is attributed both 
to states and to individuals, i.e. political leaders. The first perspective draws from the 
conceptualisation of Hedley Bull (1995 [1977]) and Alexander Wendt (1999) who argue 
that international relations mimic human relationships. The idea of the ‘state acting’ is 
a construction in itself (Gilpin 1986), but it is very useful in the thesis’ approach, 
enabling the thesis to equate nation with state. In this manner, it links international 
relations (the domain of the state) to the study of the nation as an imagined 
community. This connection is supported by the very definition of nationalism and its 
political nature, but also through the way in which my interviewees stressed the inter-
changeability of state and nation/people, i.e. Moldova and the Moldovans. Moreover, 
they employ the Moldovan ‘we’ when discussing international affairs to define both 
nation and the Moldovan state. The second approach represents the individual as the 
main locus for rationality, identity and agency in foreign affairs. Drawing from 
methodological individualism’s critique of collectives as agents, Bashkar argues that 
nothing happens in society ‘save in virtue of something human beings do or have done’ 
(1979: 174). Translating this in foreign affairs terms, ‘it is not the state which acts: it is 
always specific sets of politicians and state officials’ (Jessop 1990: 367). This approach 
enables the thesis to identify agency easily, by focusing on the possible leaders that 
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could be portrayed as agents, and to employ the concept of ‘conspiratory’ (i.e. internal 
others with no agency of their own) others to explain the presence of external agency. 
Secondly, I employ a discursive conceptualisation of the agent-structure divide. 
Building on the post-structuralist approach to discourse and identity, I argue that both 
structure and agency are social representations, constructed through discourse. 
Moreover, national identity as a discourse that is employed to make sense of the 
world, plays a crucial role in representing structure and agency on the international 
scene.  
The debate on structure and agency is a multi-disciplinary one; it brings together 
elements of sociology, new approaches to nationalism and international relations. The 
ontological agent-structure problem has dominated a great part of the international 
relations debate in the past decades. It has been inspired by the more general social 
sciences analyses on the issue, such as Antony Giddens’ structuration theory (1979, 
1984). This theory holds that agency and structure are a duality, two sides of the same 
coin, internally related through social practices, thus constructing each other. 
Translating this idea to IR, Wendt (1992) contends that agency is a reflexive actor, it 
represents and gives meaning to structure, as ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. 
Through this theoretisation, Wendt aims to overcome the limitations of structural 
analyses of international affairs, such as neorealism, by bringing the structure-agency 
debate to the forefront of IR. Moreover, through the application of this duality and the 
refusal to see either agency or structure as independent variables, Wendt’s (1987) 
methodology associates agency with explanations of the actual and structure with 
explanations of the possible.  
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A second debate on the problem of structure versus agency in IR focused on 
post-structuralist critiques of the artificial divide between structure and agency in 
international affairs thought. Friedman and Starr (1997) state that they are separate 
objects only on a theoretical level or as objects of analysis.  Poststructuralist Doty 
(1997) argues that rather than overcoming the dualism between agency and structure, 
previous approaches to international relations only prioritised one over the other. She 
criticises Carlsnaes’ (1992) idea that post-structuralists, through their focus on the 
undecidable agent-structure opposition, cannot offer a contribution to this 
problematic. Moreover, her solution is to concentrate on practice in order to 
overcome the dichotomy. Hence, Doty (1997) contends that both agency and structure 
are an effect of practices. They do not have an independent pre-given existence, but 
are constructed by the narratives told about them (Suganami 1999). Whilst not 
critique free, post-structuralism offers the basis for the thesis’s analysis of national 
identity representations of structure, as presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and agency 
(Chapter 5).  
The debate on structure and agency goes even further in explaining the 
relationship between national identity and foreign policy, as that between structure 
and agency. This is based on the constructivists and post-structuralists’ 
acknowledgement that normative and ideational structures, i.e. discourses, are 
essential in defining what we perceive as real and, ultimately, possible within this 
reality (Reus-Smit 2009: 222). This is corroborated with Bleiker (2003) and Cochran’s 
(1999) conceptualisation of existing discourse as a structure that limits agency. Thus, 
structure consists of the multitude of discourses that define the realm of the possible, 
setting the limits to what is acceptable. With this overview in mind, the thesis focuses 
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on the mechanisms through which national identity in Moldova functions as a 
structure in defining the limits of acceptability for foreign policy. Furthermore, national 
identity is a discourse in itself, being articulated, reproduced and contested across 
Moldovan society; it also adapts and reproduces additional elements of structure, by 
interacting with other discourses across Moldovan society. For instance, a national 
identity representation that constructs Moldova as passive corroborated with societal 
discourses depicting the Moldovan government as ineffective in foreign affairs 
problematizes the legitimacy of a foreign policy argument based on Moldovan agency 
(Section 5.2). On the other hand, foreign policy discourses function as agency, as they 
reproduce or seek to challenge the structure defined by national identity. This offers a 
different insight on the limits to the foreign policy legitimation process, highlighting 
the credibility (or lack thereof) of certain arguments both on a political level and to the 
wider public.  
Additionally, national identity also forms part of the matrix of resources and 
meanings foreign policy articulations draw from. This conceptualisation employs David 
Campbell’s (1992) distinction between ‘Foreign Policy’ and ‘foreign policy’. As noted 
above, he defines foreign policy as ‘all practices of differentiation or modes of 
exclusion’ (Campbell 1992: 68), producing identity in a very similar way to national 
identity discourses. Hence, foreign policy provides the ‘conventional matrix of 
interpretations in which the second understanding (Foreign Policy) operates’ (1992: 
69). On the other hand, Foreign Policy is the conventional understanding in the 
literature in IR. Within the context of this thesis, Foreign Policy is the series of 
mechanisms and practices that serve to reproduce identity as defined by its 
counterpart (‘foreign policy’), adapting it to different situations and challenges. 
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Therefore, based on its equivalence with ‘foreign policy’, national identity is 
conceptualised as the ‘library’ of symbolic meanings employed in articulating foreign 
policy discourses. 
Concluding, a post-structuralist approach conceptualising both national identity 
and foreign policy as discourses enables the thesis to gain greater insight into the 
articulations of Moldovan foreign affairs. The conceptualisation of national identity as 
discourse allows me to analyse a country such as Moldova, dominated by two 
simultaneous national identity projects, whilst also stressing the importance of their 
relationship and their interaction with other societal discourses. It emphasises the 
means through which national identity influences foreign policy in two ways, firstly by 
offering the symbolic resources that can be employed in arguments regarding foreign 
policy and secondly, by creating the limitations within which a foreign policy discourse 
needs to function in order to be acceptable/palatable to the voter. They are not the 
ONLY symbolic resources, with instrumentalist: economic, political, etc., arguments 
also appear extensively; nevertheless, in order to grasp their importance, further 
research specifically on the articulations of foreign policy in Moldova is required. 
Instrumentalist arguments are employed in conjunction with the national identity 
based ones, stressing the importance of this study and the analysis of national identity 
discourses in the Moldovan case. Secondly, limitations to foreign policy articulations 
are more complex, from stressing the means through which a Moldovanist proponent 
would not be credible arguing for closer relations with Romania to problematizing the 
credibility of an image of Moldova standing its ground or taking agency.  
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1.5. Conclusion 
To summarise, the main philosophical assumptions of this thesis are post-structuralist, 
arguing that the world is represented and gains meaning through discourse. Therefore, 
a discursive conceptualisation of the nation is ideal for understanding the existence of 
a multiplicity of discourses of national identity in Moldova. Through its methodological 
focus on the construction of difference, this approach connects the construction of 
external otherness, as a mechanism of national identity building, to representations of 
foreign policy orientations. Thus, national identity constructions translate into 
different policy orientations through representation of friendly or threatening relations 
with external others.  Through this approach, the thesis analyses the means through 
which Romanianists argue for a pro-Romanian and, especially, pro-Western foreign 
policy orientation, whilst the Moldovanists opt for a Pro-Russian/Eastern one (Chapter 
4).  
Nevertheless, the thesis’ examination of national identity’s impact on 
representations of foreign policy is more complex than these equivalences. It focuses 
on the construction of the wider characteristics of the foreign affairs stage. For this 
purpose, two of the main theoretical concepts that define our view of international 
relations, structure and agency are conceptualised as social representations, as 
constructed through discourse. Drawing from its role in making sense of the world, 
national identity plays a crucial part in reproducing the structure that limits agency in 
international affairs. For instance, Chapter 5 highlight the means through which 
Romanianism, Moldovanism and, also, other articulations of national identity in 
Moldova paint a picture of the Moldovans as passive. In this way, national identity 
representations delegitimise or make it improbable for Moldova to take action in 
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foreign affairs in the eyes of the wider Moldovan public. Thus, the thesis focuses on 
the mechanisms through which national identity in Moldova functions as a structure in 
defining the limits of credibility for foreign policy. This is extremely important in 
understanding the process of legitimation of foreign policy, what arguments are 
credible and acceptable, both within the political sphere and to the wider public. 
In order to analyse national identity and foreign policy articulations, I employ 
Discourse Analysis, a post-structuralist methodology aimed at deconstructing taken for 
granted ‘truths’ and explaining the relationships between competing versions of 
reality. This method is useful through its conceptualisation of nationalism and other 
Moldovan representations as discourses. Moreover, its focus on the in-built 
hierarchical dichotomies within these discourses and the contested nature of reality 
enables the analysis to look in depth at how othering forms the core of Romanianism 
and Moldovanism. With regards to data collection, I employ existing data, drawn from 
official documents, speeches and party manifestoes to opinion columns in newspapers 
and blogs. This is corroborated with data from a series of interviews with political 
elites and high ranking officials and people on the ground. This vast array of data offers 
a comprehensive overview of the different discourse in Moldovan society, analysed 
using the chosen methodology, post-structuralist discourse analysis, to argue that 
Moldovan national identity discourses view foreign affairs through a Cold War lens.  
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2. Methodology 
This chapter offers a detailed account of the data collection and analysis conducted for 
this project. It builds on the theoretical underpinnings presented in the previous 
chapter, especially the importance of language in representing the world. I argue that 
my approach to data collection, encompassing interviews, newspaper articles and 
ethnographic fieldwork, is essential for providing an in-depth look into representations 
of national identity in Moldova. The main method I employ is discourse analysis (DA), 
developed from the principles of post-structuralism. This is corroborated with 
qualitative content analysis, employing a coding frame developed from the literature, 
DA’s toolbox and stemming from the data itself. Discourse analysis is defined as a 
study of language in use (Taylor 2001: 5). I employ Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
analysis and argue for its utility for the analysis of Moldovan national identity as a 
discourse. Through its focus on the construction of dichotomies and hierarchy, this 
method is essential for pin-pointing the dual relationship between Romanianism and 
Moldovanism (Chapters 3 and 4) and the representation of the Moldovan ‘inferiority 
complex’. In this way, my choice of method builds on the theoretical underpinnings 
detailed in Chapter 2, whilst augmenting their usefulness for the Moldova case-study. I 
highlight the match between a discursive approach to national identity and DA, as a 
method focused on analysing and deconstructing what we perceive as common 
knowledge.  
The chapter is structured based on the chronological development of the 
research project, on the artificial divide between data collection and analysis. This is an 
artificial divide, as the data collection and analysis were largely simultaneous, as 
provided by the prescriptions of Grounded Theory.  The first part of the chapter 
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(Section 2.1) details the comprehensive data collection process. It achieves this by 
presenting the reasoning behind each of the three types of data I have collected: 
interviews, newspaper and online articles and ethnographic notes (Section 2.1.1). This 
is augmented through a chronological presentation of my data collection process, from 
interview requests to explaining my choice of newspaper sources (Section 2.1.2). Then, 
Section 2.2 details the process of analysis. It offers a brief insight into the workings of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis, followed by a short description of the coding 
process conducted in order to organise the data. This process was inspired by the 
tenets of content analysis and Grounded Theory. In this manner, I go beyond DA’s 
rejection of coding and offer a complex approach to analysing the data on Moldovan 
national identity, but keeping with the post-structuralist provisions of discourse 
theory. 
 
2.1. Data Collection 
The data for this project is compiled in a whole range of forms, focusing on the period 
between 2009 and 2014. The first and most important reason for choosing this period 
was in order to bring the discussion on Moldovan national identity up to the current 
day, i.e. to the situation as of 2014. The 1990s, after the Moldovan state gained its 
independence in 1991, are the focus of most of the literature on nationalism, history 
and ethnic conflict in Moldova (e.g. Crowther 1992, King 2000). Meanwhile, the 
literature on political developments in Moldova (e.g. March 2007) covers the period of 
Communist rule from 2001 up to 2009.  As noted in the Introduction of the thesis, the 
so-called Twitter Revolution of April 2009 led to a change in the leadership in Chişinău; 
the Communists became the main party of opposition in Chişinău, whilst Romanianists 
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PL were part of the ruling coalition. As a result of different parties coming to power, 
there was also a shift in the national identity orientation of the members of the 
Moldovan government; this was further augmented by a different outlook in terms of 
foreign policy, with the new coalition being tellingly named, the Alliance for European 
Integration.  
Lastly, the focus of this project does not cover the years prior to 2009 for two 
main reasons. The utility of a comparison between the pre and post-2009 discourses is 
noted in the thesis’ conclusion, in Section C.3. Nevertheless, due to the wealth of data 
on the post-2009 period an in-depth analysis and comparisons of both periods would 
require a wider space and considerable more time than this project. More importantly, 
the ‘Twitter Revolution’ was widely represented as a crucial turning point for Moldova 
(and a disappointment by the beginning of 2015). This view seems to have permeated 
Moldovan society, as illustrated in my interviews (e.g. YL2, EX1). The representation of 
2009 as a revolution and as part of a narrative of ‘progress’ (PG5) had the potential to 
alter Moldovan views of the period preceding it. As such, I believe that conducting 
interviews ‘retrospectively’ may have only offered me an opinion of the pre-2009 
period through the lens of representations the Twitter Revolution. Lastly, April 2009 is 
not studied as a date, as the meanings attached to it are still contested; these include 
the representations of the revolution, the achievements of the new government 
andthe retrospective disappointment with this change in leadership (EX2).  
Data collection and analysis was conducted on three levels: political discourse, 
elite and media discourse and grassroots discourse. This approach was informed by the 
fact that  
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common perceptions and understandings are encouraged and reinforced by 
those with access to the media, such as politicians, journalists and academic 
experts (Burnham et al. 2007: 250). 
The three do overlap, but this three-fold typology is useful to help organise the data 
sources, whereas the analysis is structured according to my findings. Approaching the 
analysis from this perspective also offers us a comprehensive view of the discourses of 
national identity present within Moldovan society; this ensures articulations are not 
analysed in isolation and enables me to highlight the relationships between them and 
the variations across different levels. This wide-ranging approach to data collection is 
inspired by the conceptualisation of discourse, encompassing everything from political 
declarations to the reproduction of banal nationalism. Moreover, the first two sources 
are the basis for the comprehensive analysis conducted in the thesis, whilst the 
grassroots study is exploratory, as the thesis’ post-structuralist methodology does not 
enable me to generalise these findings. Nevertheless, political and cultural elites, 
together with the press, have the discursive power and credibility to promote these 
discourses, leading to their trickling down across Moldovan society, offering a good 
avenue for generating hypotheses regarding the appeal of national identity and foreign 
policy (inspired) discourses across Moldova. As such, Section 2.1.1 offers an analysis of 
the reasons behind my choice to analyse political discourse together with the 
articulations of experts and grass roots. This is then followed by a detailed account of 
the data collection process and its intricacies, from the accessibility issues I faced for 
interviews to my choice of newspapers (Section 2.1.2).  
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2.1.1. Levels of Data 
The first level of data consists of political discourse. It looks at political leaders’ 
speeches, party manifestoes and policies. The reason behind this choice is the 
importance played by political actors in articulating national identity discourses and 
the space analyses of the political take up in the literature on Moldovan national 
identity (Protsyk 2006b; King 2003). But more importantly, the political cleavage in 
Moldova overlaps with the national identity one, strengthening each other 
reciprocally, as highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4. Secondly, as noted above, from 2009 
to date, parties representing the two main discourses of Moldovan national identity 
have been in either government or opposition in Moldova. Hence these two different 
groups have had the privileged positions from which to construct and promote 
national identity (and devise foreign policy). In this endeavour, the data consists both 
of existing material, such as party manifestoes, speeches, parliamentary interventions, 
campaigns and official documents, mostly collected from online archives, and a set of 
interviews. When analysing documents the main focus of my research are articulations 
of national identity and foreign policy. These are not strictly limited to discussions on 
the two topics but also cover a whole range of other issues from policies on minorities, 
language, commemorations and history teaching for nationalism to attitudes towards 
reforms demanded by the EU criticism regarding negotiations with Gazprom for 
foreign policy. This is due to the comprehensive web of meaning woven by the two 
national identity discourses, encompassing all these elements in their constructions 
(Chapter 3).  These are corroborated with findings from interviews with political party 
leaders and members. Political leaders usually have the power to articulate discourse 
and the articulations of political elites have the potential to trickle down to influence 
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grassroots discourse. This is due to the fact that political speeches and articulations, 
party manifestoes and campaigns are essentially objects of political consumption; this 
is even more pertinent taking into account the sheer number of elections Moldova has 
been through in the past few years (four in five years – April and July 2009, 2010 and 
2014).  
The second level of analysis is that of the media and elites. The elite group 
consist of two main categories, political analysts, columnists and journalists and 
academic and cultural elites. Hence, for the first group, the main source of data is op-
eds, columns and articles in Moldovan newspapers, corroborated with speeches at 
different events, interviews in the media, etc. These are augmented through the data 
collected in a series of interviews conducted with representatives of this group. The 
media, beyond offering the medium of expression for a series of other actors, has a 
role in itself in producing and reproducing discourses (Benthall 1993; van der Gaag and 
Nash 1987). It also plays a crucial role in the articulation of national identity, as posited 
by Antony Smith (1991). Moreover, this focus on the way in which the media 
constructs identities is a direct application of post-structuralism’s emphasis on 
widening the ‘empirical’ agenda, by going beyond the state and looking at different 
sub-state actors, ranging from bureaucracies to the press. One example of such an 
approach is the work done by Ted Hopf (2002) on the way Russian identity (1955 and 
1999) can be analysed by studying its articulation within Russian society, from 
memoirs to the printed press. In this way, Hopf (2002) highlights the importance of 
written works for the articulation of national identity.  
For the purpose of this thesis, cultural elites consist of academics and museum 
researchers as the main categories interviewed. Academics have an aura of 
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‘objectivity’ to their work, increasing their credibility, but not necessarily making their 
discourses apolitical (Figueroa 2008). They are central to the articulation of national 
identity through their works; these can range from historical analyses employed to 
legitimise different national identity conceptualisations to analyses of current events. 
For instance, the analysis of historical narratives within Romanianism and 
Moldovanism builds on the existing literature, focusing specifically on academic 
historical writings after 1991. For this purpose, three main authors and their 
monographs are central to this analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4: Gheorghe 
Ghimpu, Vasile Stati and Victor Stepaniuc. This choice was made in light of their 
importance for the Liberal and, respectively, Communist political articulations and due 
to their appearance in interviews with representatives and supporters of the different 
national identity discourses, i.e. PL and PS members (PG3, PG5). Moreover, academics 
are also popular writers and columnists across the Moldovan press, e.g. Octavian Ticu 
for Timpul. Meanwhile, academic works, especially those focused on geopolitics are 
extremely popular in Moldova, making the main shelves and windows of some across 
libraries across Chişinău (Appendix 2).  These factors illustrate the importance of 
academics in the Moldovan context and illustrate their potential to promote national 
identity discourses amongst the people in Moldova.  
Ethnographers working for different national museums form the second part of 
this ‘academic’ group. They have a wider impact on national identity constructions, 
through their power to organise museum exhibits, especially relevant in the case of 
historical representations in the History and Archaeology Museum (HAM) and the 
Ethnography and Natural History Museum (ENHM). Museums are part of the 
ideological apparatus of the state, essential in producing and reproducing the nation 
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(e.g. Bennett 1995). They serve in refreshing and strengthening visitors’ collective 
memories and thus, identities (Nora 1996). In this way, museum curators determine 
the articulations put across to the Moldovan public. Additionally, my fieldwork 
highlighted the popularity of museums for school trips and thus, their potential to 
impact on the representations of Moldovan youths and, hence, the next generation of 
identity constructions.  
Within this context, the third level of data collection is at grassroots level. The 
analysis at grassroots is not comprehensive; it focuses on the potential of elite and 
political discourses to impact on the Moldovan citizen, whilst also offering an 
exploratory analysis of the elements of national identity that are most important to 
the Moldovans. This focus draws from the view that definitions of the nation are 
dependent on much more than the discourse articulated by elites (or those with the 
power to articulate discourses, as Foucault argued). National identity is also dependent 
on the way in which it is internalised at individual level (Finlayson 1998). Building on 
the conceptualisation of nationalism as discourse, the individual produces and 
reproduces this type of identity discourse in forms that may be different from the 
official representation. In the case of Moldova, most studies focus on elite discourse 
on nationalism and foreign policy, and a mere few on opinions and attitudes on the 
ground (see Heintz 2005 for a few references, Cash 2009 for the discourse of ‘people 
of culture’). This focus highlights the necessity for a ‘on the ground’ approach to 
analysing nationalism and attitudes towards foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the literature also notes that the two main national identity 
discourses in Moldova and the general debate on this issue do not extend beyond the 
Moldovan elites, as the Moldovan layman is more concerned with ‘bread and butter’ 
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issues (King 2001; March 2007). This problematizes the very endeavour of analysing 
national identity in Moldova at this level. Nevertheless, though only an exploratory 
study, this analysis aims to challenge this view. This is achieved through the thesis’ 
focus on articulations by Moldovan elites, political, cultural and media representatives. 
Then, the analysis is enhanced through a series of grassroots interviews. The focus on 
elites was inspired by their centrality in the process of articulation and reproduction of 
national identity discourses (see Smith 1991). Thus, the thesis does not aim to 
generalise these opinions to the whole of Moldovan civil society, but argues that they 
have the potential to trickle down. This builds on the interest the thesis takes in 
different elements of these national identity constructions. More specifically, drawing 
from the thesis’ focus on foreign policy, one of the crucial themes of the analysis is the 
representation of otherness, especially through the portrayal of external actors 
(Chapters 3 and 4, especially Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). I contend that even as 
grassroots discourse does not reproduce national identity in its entirety, they still focus 
on the ‘othering’ process present within them, i.e. the mechanisms through which a 
group or nation is represented as threatening, negative for the nation or somehow 
superior to it. This is corroborated with the findings of recent research conducted on 
grassroots identity in Moldova (Knott 2014). Her initial findings stress that the 
Moldovan people do identify as either Romanian or Moldovan to different degrees, 
but that there is a clear differentiation between the two groups in terms of self-
identification. More importantly for this study, one element that is reproduced 
consistently across these groups is the othering process, e.g. the Romanianists clearly 
rejecting Russian characteristics and actors (Knott 2014). Lastly, whereas national 
identity, through representations of language or history, may not relate to the day-to-
day concerns of the Moldovans, foreign policy, especially through the expectations 
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people have of it (i.e. prosperity, freedom, a functioning political system) does link in 
to these daily concerns.  Thus, I posit that some issues associated with national 
identity, especially othering mechanisms, are already on the minds and in the day-to-
day concerns of Moldovans through their links with pragmatic issues; for instance, 
foreign policy worries such as gas prices have both a national identity implication, i.e. 
regarding Moldova’s relations with Russia, and a deeply pragmatic one for day-to-day 
life in Moldova.  
 
2.1.2. Types of Data 
Three types of data collection methods were employed in this endeavour. The first 
method consists of interviews. They are widely used in social research, especially in 
studies of the social and political orientations of different groups and are associated 
with interpretative methodologies (Hopf 2004). As they offer the opportunity to 
inquire openly about meanings and motives, they prove ideal for understanding the 
different representations and issues that are taken for granted within Moldovan 
society. Given the openness of the topic at hand, the type of interviews employed is in-
depth semi-structured interviews. These allow this research to grasp both general 
attitudes and narratives in a comparative manner (as opposed to unstructured 
interviews), whilst also being open to any form of development regarding the question 
and prompting schedule (as opposed to structured ones) (see Wilson and Shapsford 
2006 for a discussion on the various types of interview).  
The interviews were conducted in June-August 2012. The choice of period was 
due to the author’s term time commitments. In retrospect, it may have been easier to 
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conduct interviews at a different time of the year, as many of the people I contacted 
were on holiday during the summer. In order to organise the interviews I initially 
contacted more than 120 people. They represented the first two main levels of data 
collection: representatives of political parties and experts such as academics, museum 
curators and, more generally, ‘people of culture’ (Cash 2007). The initial round of 
emails went out in April-May 2012 and I received 17 positive responses, most of which 
asked me to let them know nearer to the time. At the end of May I sent a reminder 
email to those who had not responded. Upon arriving in Moldova in June 2012, I also 
tried to contact interviewees through telephone and by going to their offices in 
Moldova. This latter approach was more successful than emails, most people being 
perfectly happy to spare some time to have a chat with me. It is worth noting though 
that in a couple of cases these have led to some tense conversations with very busy 
(and even unhappy) people; nevertheless, even these have yielded a lot of useful data, 
albeit more succinctly presented than in other interviews. Lastly, I have also expanded 
my list of contacts/interviewees on the advice of the Moldovans I interviewed 
throughout the summer and, thus, reached the 45 interview mark.  
Most interviews were conducted in Chişinău; to triangulate their findings, I have 
also done a few interviews and made notes regarding short conversations in Drochia, 
in the North of the republic of Moldova. This both due to the lack of responses from 
the people I have contacted for interviews and the problematic transport links across 
Moldova, especially in the summer. As such, the representativity of the data collected 
through interviews is to a great extent limited to the Moldovan capital. Nevertheless, 
the newspaper articles and political declarations collected for the thesis 
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counterbalance this shortcoming of the interviews through their wide distribution 
across Moldova.  
On the political level, I endeavoured to interview both representatives of political 
parties and civil servants working in the area of ethnic relations and foreign policy. In 
the latter category, I sent out emails and called official bodies such as the Moldovan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Interethnic Relations Bureau and the Romanian and 
Russian Embassies in Moldova, but with little success. Only one civil servant accepted 
to be interviewed anonymously. In the former category, I contacted the parliamentary 
parties in Moldova (PDM, PL, PDLM, PCRM, Socialists) and a series of non-
parliamentary parties, important because of their radical views and vocal leadership 
(the pro-Romanianist National Liberal Party – PNL and the Voievod4 Movement 
[Mişcarea Voievod]). I sent emails both to the main party contact email addresses and 
to some of their MPs; these were chosen due to their involvement in foreign policy 
related committees (e.g. the Foreign Policy Committee or the Friendship Group with 
Romania) in the Moldovan Parliament or because of their previous statements on 
national identity. One of the initial aims of this project was to analyse the importance 
of national identity in Moldova’s relations with Romania. As such, I also contacted 
Romanian MPs and interviewed three members of the Romanian Parliament’s 
Commission for Romanians Abroad. Some parties/MPs were very forthcoming in terms 
of their participation in the project. Yet, many political organisations did not respond 
to emails or telephone calls, nor were they very welcoming when I attempted to 
discuss my project at their main offices in Chişinău. This raises questions as to why 
                                                          
4 ‘Voievod’ is the Romanian for prince or military leader of a principality and it is used here as the name 
of the organisation.  
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they refused to talk, but these issues are beyond the remit of this thesis. Thus, in order 
to ensure all of their voices were represented, where MPs or high ranking members of 
the parties were not available, I interviewed youth leaders or other officials, such as 
local councillors or mayors. Since all the interviews were subject to access and the 
availability of the interviewees, they are supplemented by existing interviews 
conducted for a series of media outlets, such as Radio Free Europe (RFE/EL), Radio 
Chişinău, TVM, etc. This part of the data and my interviews with columnists is touched 
upon in the next pages, as it is part of the archival data collection.  
I took the same approach with regards to expert interviews. I contacted 
academics studying national identity and foreign policy in Moldova from some of the 
main Chişinău universities (e.g. Moldovan State University, Free International 
University of Moldova). I especially focused on academics writing about national 
identity issues, such as Ludmila Cojocari who has studied perceptions of Victory Day 
commemorations (discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.2). I also sent out emails to 
museums and research organisations/institutes dealing with the issue of national 
identity or foreign policy. In the first category I contacted the Ethnography and Natural 
science Museum (Chişinău), the Museum of Country Life, History and Archaeology 
Museum (Chişinău), the Military History Museum, the National Memory Museum and 
the History and Ethnography Museum in Bălţi. The second category encompassed 
centres such as ADEPT [Association for Participatory Democracy], the NATO 
Information Centre or IDIS [Institute for Development and Social Initiatives]; together 
with these, I also contacted a few NGOs, such as the Pro-Europa Regional Centre in 
Chişinău and Bălţi. 
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Lastly, for grass-roots interviews, I firstly interviewed people I knew in Moldova, 
acquaintances of friends and snowballed these contacts. One important source of 
contacts were my former Moldovan colleagues at university in Romania. This was 
augmented through a set of interviews with members of youth organisations. This 
group was chosen due to its accessibility and willingness to participate in the study. 
Most of the interviewees were current or former leaders of student organisations in 
Moldova. Some had moved into being researchers and columnists for various 
newspapers, whilst others were active in political parties. As such, this group straddles 
the divide between grass-roots and the political elites and experts groups. But more 
importantly, they represent the post-communist generation, a group that has not lived 
in the Soviet Union. As such, they offer a novel insight into the future of the national 
identity debate in Moldova 
Due to the contested nature of the topics discussed in the interviews, i.e. 
national identity and foreign policy, a great part of my interviewees, especially those in 
official positions, have chosen to remain anonymous. In order to avoid repeated uses 
of ‘anon.’ All of the interviews conducted in June-July 2012 have been allocated a code 
in order to be identified in the text of the thesis (see table below). Based on the 
discussion above, they have also been categorised into a series of artificial groups, in 
order to enable the reader to identify some characteristics regarding the source of the 
data used throughout. These groups are: experts - EX (academic, museum curators, 
researchers), members of political groups - PG (political parties and movement), 
people working in the media – M (columnists, editors), youth leaders - YL (current or 
past leaders of a series of NGOs), Romanian MPs – RO, and others - OT.  
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Interview Codes 
Code Interviewee Date Length 
EX1 Academic - State University MD  5.07.2012 0:57 
EX2 Academic - Free International University of MD 25.07.2012 Notes 
EX3 Curator - Ethnography and Natural History Museum 5.07.2012 1:40 
EX4 Curator - Ethnography and Natural History Museum 5.07.2012 1:17 
EX5 Director - Military History Museum 6.07.2012 0:38 
EX6 Academic - State University MD 12.07.2012 0:33 
EX7 Academic 12.07.2012 0:31 
EX8 Researcher - interethnic issues 5.07.2012 1:11 
EX9 Researcher - foreign policy issues 7.08.2012 0:32 
EX10 Researcher - foreign policy issues 7.08.2012 0:25 
EX11 Academic studying Moldova 6.08.2012 0:51 
    
M1 Newspaper Columnist 25.07.2012 0:43 
M2 Newspaper Columnist 7.08.2012 1:06 
M3 News Outlet Editor 13.07.2012 0:58 
    
OT1 Civil servant  6.07.2012 0:45 
OT2 Entrepreneur 7.07.2012 0:32 
OT3 Entrepreneur 7.07.2012 0:35 
OT4 Engineer 30.07.2012 1:02 
OT5 Entrepreneur 03.08.2012 0:28 
OT6 Worker 7.08.2012 1:12 
OT7 History teacher  6.08.2012 1:08 
OT8 NGO Leader 16.08.2012 1:55 
    
PG1 PNL member 11.07.2012 0:45 
PG2 PNL Leader 11.07.2012 1:22 
PG3 Socialist Leader 12.07.2012 0:41 
PG4 Socialist Deputy 12.07.2012 0:25 
PG5 PL Youth Leader 12.07.2012 1:42 
PG6 PD Mayor 25.07.2012 1:03 
PG7 PCRM Local Councillor 8.08.2012 1:46 
PG8 New Right Leader 6.07.2012 1:43 
PG9 New Right Leader 29.08.2012 1:48 
PG10 Leader - Conservative Movement 7.08.2012 1:22 
PG11 Leader - Actiunea 2012 11.08.2012 0:22 
PG12 Member - Actiunea 2012 12.08.2012 0:40 
PG13 PLDM MP's Assistant 5.07.2012 0:55 
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RO1 RO MP - Parliamentary Commission for Romanians 
Abroad 
24.07.2012 Email 
RO2 RO MP - Common Commission for European 
Integration 
5.08.2012 0:43 
RO3 RO MP - Parliamentary Commission for Romanians 
Abroad/Foreign Affairs 
23.08.2012 0:35 
    
YL1 Youth leader 26.06.2012 1:30 
YL2 Youth leader and blogger 29.06.2012 0:58 
YL3 Youth leader and blogger 26.06.2012 1:23 
YL5 Youth leader 29.06.2012 1:09 
YL6 Youth leader 12.07.2012 1:12 
YL7 Youth leader 11.07.2012 2:04 
Table 2.1 Interview codes 
 
The 45 interviews were all in Romanian. All but two of the interviews were audio 
recorded; one interviewee asked for the questions and replied by email, whilst another 
refused to let me use the recorder, so I wrote down their main points and the 
interesting details. A few other interviewees asked me to turn the recorder off for 
some of their comments; these too were also written down in great detail in my 
notebook. On average, each interview was about 60 minutes, but they ranged from 25 
minutes to 2 hours (based on the length of the recoding), as illustrated in the last 
column of the table above.  
 Lastly, all interviews were conducted in the state language of Moldova, 
Moldovan/Romanian, encompassing two respondents who did not have 
Moldovan/Romanian as their first language. Hence, it may not be representative of the 
approximately 30 per cent national minorities in Moldova, such as Russian, Ukrainian, 
Găgăuz, etc. further research being needed for these groups. Nevertheless, the 
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Communists, as the main representatives of the minorities’ vote up until 2014, 
together with the Socialists have promoted these discourses widely, highlighting their 
resonance for minority ethnic groups in Moldova. For instance, I highlight the 
Communists’ and Socialists’ reproduction of the ‘Victory Day’ narrative regarding the 
commemoration of May 9. In this way, the thesis stresses these constructions’ 
potential to resonate with the ethnic minorities of Moldova. 
 
The second method is archival and online data collection and was employed in 
order to analyse party documents, declarations and newspaper articles. These, 
together with blogs, were collected online. The internet is the second most trusted and 
most used source of information for the Moldovans, after TV (IIMD September 2014: 
20). Just as with archival research, data collected online suffers from an inherit bias, 
but it also has two main advantages.  The first one is ease of access, as it is, quite 
literally, a few clicks away. More importantly, spaces such as blogs, forums and 
comment boxes eliminate to a certain extent the interview bias created though social 
desirability; this is when a respondent alters their expressed views in order to 
correspond with the socially approved opinion (Wilson and Sapsford 2006). This is 
essential given discourse analysis’ interest in seeking variation and extreme cases. 
Nevertheless, the sample of internet users is not typical of the majority of the 
population (Sapsford 2006). Yet this should not be a problem given DA’s 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings, as presented in the second part of this 
chapter (Section 2.2), which do not seek a strict correlation between population and 
sample, as some positivist approaches do. Thus, these are ideal to supplement the 
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data collected through interviews, whilst also triangulating the findings from 
interviews. 
Political declarations were analysed both through their reproduction by party 
sources and through the way in which they are reported by the media. The first 
category includes party documents and official blogs. Party documents and statements 
were collected from online archives located on the party websites. This was due to the 
lack of response to my attempts to see any archives Moldovan parties might have. I 
have consulted these online archives both by using key words (e.g. 1812) and reading 
their statements and press communications around key dates, from commemorations 
to dates when their statements made the news (e.g. on Unimedia). Additionally, I have 
also consulted parliamentary archives online employing the same logic. These were 
augmented through data collected from political leaders’ blogs; for instance, Socialist 
leader Igor Dodon, Liberal leader Mihai Ghimpu and National Liberal Vitalia Pavlicenco 
are all popular and prolific bloggers. I have also collected interviews conducted by 
journalists in order to triangulate the data and to compensate for political parties and 
organisations not responding to my interview requests. This data is very easy to 
obtain, in most cases also being transcribed. Nevertheless, it suffers from issues such 
as the inherit bias and lack of control over the questions asked, as do all data collected 
for other purposes (Wolff 2004).   
I have also consulted a wide range of newspapers and media outlets throughout 
my data collection. They were chosen based on three criteria. The first is their 
popularity and readership across Moldova; this evaluation is based on an study on 
Moldovan press by  IMAS-INC Chişinău on a sample of 1739 people aged over 15 (IMAS 
2012b). More importantly, my initial list of newspapers was expanded and refined 
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through conversations with my interviewees focusing on what sources of information 
they used. The second reason behind my choice was to achieve a balanced view of 
national identity representations. With this in mind, I have chosen Romanianist 
newspapers Timpul, Jurnal de Chişinău and Adevărul and Moldovanist publications 
Moldova Suverană and Comunistul; this was augmented by looking at more ‘neutral’ 
newspapers in terms of national identity, such as Saptamana. I also consulted 
Unimedia, as one of the main online news portals, together with Radio Free Europe. All 
these were consulted constantly from 2011-2 to 2014 on a daily basis. More than 400 
articles were saved throughout the period; most were chosen based on how 
interesting and relevant the themes they touched upon were for this project – these 
included everything from attitudes towards Russia to columns on the Constitutional 
Court’s decision that the state language of Moldova is Romanian. They were also 
sorted based on their key themes, i.e. the coding frame emerging from the literature 
on Moldovan national identity: language, historical dates, representations of Romania, 
Russia, the EU, mirroring my first coding frame (see Section 2.2.2 and Chapter 3). This 
shortened considerably the time it took to apply the final coding frame to the articles 
and columns; moreover, throughout the process many were discarded as they were no 
longer relevant to the general thrust of this thesis’ argument as it developed. 
Out of this wider sample, 120 were quoted and/or referenced in the text. The 
table below makes note of the articles referenced from each source, highlighting the 
balanced approach to the different data sources.  
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Romanianist No. Moldovanist No. Others No. 
Timpul  22 Moldova Suverană 9 Radio Free Europe 15 
Jurnal de Chişinău 9 Comunistul 14 Unimedia 18 
Adevărul 19   Saptamana 13 
Table 2.2 Newspaper sources by national identity orientation 
Nevertheless, none of these main publications are solely Moldovanist or Romanianist. 
For instance, Moldova Suverană used to be a Communist party’s porta voce and has 
been used in research on Moldova as an example of Moldovanist discourse in the 
media (e.g. Danero Iglesias 2015). In recent years it has become independent and one 
of its columnists acknowledged that they do not always stick to the Communists’ view 
of national identity any more (M1). Other newspapers, such as Saptamana, have 
columns (and columnists) that espouse both Romanianist and Moldovanist views, so 
have been very hard to classify. More importantly, these newspapers are used both for 
their columns and the ideas put across by their editors and for their news reports and 
interviews; in this way, collecting newspaper articles is a process intertwined with the 
collation of political statements. From this point of view, Radio Free Europe (RFE) is an 
excellent example of this national identity ‘hybridity’. One of their main columnists, 
Vitalie Ciobanu, is a staunch Romanianist; meanwhile, RFE is an excellent source for 
interviews all across the political and national identity spectrum and, through its vox 
populi, with grass roots. As such, I argue that dividing the newspapers I consulted into 
Romanianist and Moldovanist is a problematic categorisation.  
With this in mind, I have chosen an alternate categorisation in order to illustrate 
my choice of data and its coverage of the whole national identity spectrum in 
Moldova, as illustrated in the table below. This categorisation is not perfect, as some 
articles/columns could easily be interpreted as in-between categories; I have tried to 
83 
 
circumvent that by corroborating my categorisation with the way in which different 
articles were referenced in the text of the thesis to represent one or the other 
discourse. The codes for the categories are employed to identify the characteristics of 
each data sources in the bibliography (‘Online and Other Sources’ Section). 
Category Code Number of sources 
Moldovanist 
political 
radical R-MD 3 
moderate P-MD 46 
non-political  N-MD 22 
PDM/PLDM  C 13 
Romanianist 
political 
radical U 5 
moderate P-RO 25 
non-political  N-RO 29 
Table 2.3 – Online data sources by national identity orientation 
For this purpose, I have combined political party data and newspaper articles into two 
main categories: political and non-political. The political category includes official 
statements by party members and news pieces on their statements. The non-political 
is based around newspaper columns, statements by cultural elites, historians, etc. and 
blogs in support of a certain national identity orientation. Mirroring my approach to 
collecting political statements, I have also consulted a series of non-party affiliated 
blogs on Unimedia and Vox Publika. Bloggers are recognised all across the Moldovan 
political spectrum for their importance in forming public opinion. As an illustration of 
this, Moldovan political leaders (e.g. Socialist Igor Dodon or Liberal Mihai Ghimpu) 
have regular meetings with blogger groups (e.g. Dodon 3.05.2012). 
Each of these categories has then been divided into Romanianist and 
Moldovanist, with a sub-category for extra-parliamentary/radical movements. These 
latter groups include the National Liberals for Romanianism and the Voievod 
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Movement for the Moldovanism. This divide is based on the analysis conducted in 
Chapters 3 and 4; therein I stress that the political articulations of national identity 
discourses are usually quite moderate, rejecting radicalising elements such as 
unionism. Additionally, I created a separate category for the Democrats and Liberal 
Democrats to highlight their ambiguous national identity constructions (Section 4.1). 
Nevertheless, in light of the fact that my interviewees tended to portray them as 
Romanianist, to a certain extent through their participation in the Alliance for 
European Integration, that category can be collapsed under the category of moderate 
political Romanianism. One last category, ‘others’, includes a wide range of sources, 
from columns that I could not define as either Romanianist or Moldovanist to news 
pieces that did not cover national identity issues; they also include grass roots 
interviews (i.e. the RFE vox populi) and statements by EU, Russian or Romanian 
leaders. These were employed in order to achieve a comprehensive grasp of Moldovan 
views on national identity. 
Based on this categorisation, the table above highlights the balance between 
Romanianist and Moldovanist data sources employed for this project. It also highlights 
my main focus on moderate articulations of national identity in Moldova. The slightly 
larger number for my Moldovanist sources are partly due to the fact that the middle 
ground parties (PDM/PLDM) are in a separate category. But more importantly, I chose 
to consult more Moldovanist political declarations in order to make up for the lack of 
Russian language sources (usually supporters of Moldovanism). For instance, from the 
list of most popular newspapers (IMAS 2012b) I could not consult the Russian language 
ones, such as Makler or Argumentî i Faktî which are second and third in terms of 
notoriety in Moldova.  
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As suggested by Muller (2008), the last method of data collection consists of 
ethnographic observation in order to gain a better insight into societal discourses. The 
method is not employed extensively, its main use was to gather data such as the 
expressions of national identity pictured in Appendix 1. I have taken extensive field 
notes throughout my visits to Moldova, both in April and in June-August 2012. These 
included everything from small conversations with Moldovans, i.e. guests for dinner, to 
details of events I took part in, such as the 2012 commemoration of the 7th April (i.e. 
the Twitter Revolution). Additionally, I recorded an extra 9 hours of data at various 
events. These included the launch of a book on Moldova, some sessions from the 
Actiunea 2012 Summer School in Bacau and the launch of a new exhibition at the 
Natural History and Ethnography Museum in Chişinău. In terms of referencing, I also 
use OT to refer to any other of the many discussions I have had or any other fieldwork 
note I have made during my time in Moldova in the text of the thesis. These instances 
highlight the value and novelty of ethnographic research and the utility of its findings 
in relation to interviews, archival and online data collection.  
 
2.2. Method and Data Analysis 
Based on the data collected for this project, this section offers an overview of the data 
analysis process. Its main aim is to outline the thesis’ methodology, discourse analysis. 
Since DA and those theorising it can be a lot less prescriptive and clear regarding the 
workings of the method than one would find in a methodology compendium, I follow 
this discussion on DA with a brief summary of its toolbox and an overview of the 
development of my coding frame, as the basis of the analysis process.  
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Due to its reliance on the philosophical and epistemological assumptions 
presented above, it is ‘misleading to think of DA as a method’ (Potter 1997: 144) and it 
is even worse to apply it just as a ‘value free’ technique. Thus, drawing from its 
compatibility with the thesis’ posts-structuralist approach I argue that Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse analysis is the optimum method for this project. Unlike other types 
of DA, e.g. Fairclough’s (2003) critical discourse analysis, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory is purely post-structuralist. It argues that there is nothing outside discourse; 
there is a real world, but it cannot be understood outside language. In this endeavour 
the first part of the section outlines DA’s tenets, toolbox (2.2.1) and usefulness for the 
Moldovan case-study. Based on DA lack of a ‘recipe’, I augment this method with a 
series of supplementary ones, such as qualitative content analysis. The chapter closes 
with a detailed discussion of the data collection process in Section 2.2.2.  
Post-structuralist discourse analysis is the main method employed to make sense 
of the data throughout the thesis. It acknowledges that language is not just a reflection 
of the world but constituting phenomena. As noted in the discussion above, 
knowledge and identities are created through discursive practices, through the 
maintenance and transformation of patterns and discourses within language. This 
enables us to employ DA to study the discourses that produce and reproduce 
Moldovan national identity and foreign policy representations. The analysis of 
discourse should centre itself on discourse as ‘topic’ and not as ‘resource’ for knowing 
other aspects of life, making discourse the main focus of the approach (Wood and 
Kroger 2000: 8-9). Thus, discourse analysis is not only a ‘practice of analysing empirical 
raw materials and information in discursive forms’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4) 
but an analysis of ‘a social practice that shapes the world’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 
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18). In this context, David Howarth (2000: 128) argues that ‘discourse theory is 
concerned with understanding and interpreting socially produced meanings, rather 
than searching for objective causal explanations’. Thus, my research is not focused on 
causal explanations, but on the way in which national identity discourses represent 
foreign affairs. Then, DA illuminates how ‘all theories and discourses rely on [...] 
seemingly objective and natural oppositions in language’ (Smith 2001: 240). Thus, the 
main ethos of post-structuralist research is to uncover assumptions and internal 
contradictions with discourses, essential for this thesis’ focus on the reproduction of 
common knowledge in regards to foreign affairs across Moldova.  
Discourse analysis also provides the basic framework for understanding how 
different structures of meaning can coexist and analyses the struggles between these 
discourses (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 12).  This methodological focus augments the 
thesis’ theoretical underpinnings, being perfectly suited to analyse Moldovan 
nationalism, which comprises two competing articulations of national identity 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Other reasons that support DA’s suitability for the analysis range 
from its conceptualisation of discursive conflict and dichotomies to the attention it 
awards to a comprehensive data collection and analysis. Howarth defines DA as  
the process of analysing signifying practices as discursive forms. This means 
that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
material – speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, 
policies, ideas, even organisations and institutions – as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ that 
enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words and practices 
(2000: 10). 
Through its comprehensive use of data, DA enables an extensive analysis of Moldovan 
national identity. This is very relevant, as Moldovan national identity constructions are 
very complex discourses, encompassing element from political statements to 
newspaper columns and all the way to history text-books and banal elements of day-
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to-day life in Moldova. Discourse analysis, thus, allows us to study these disparate 
elements as parts of the same discourses of national identity and offer a 
comprehensive view of the national issue in Moldova.  
Furthermore, DA draws form the principle of deconstruction, showing how every 
text depends on a dichotomy, two elements constituted in opposition and all meaning 
is constituted through difference (Campbell 1992: 71). These dichotomies, Derrida 
argues, always hide a hierarchy as one term is privileged over the ‘other’ (Devetak 
2005). Thus, DA offers a good framework for analysing Moldovan national identity and 
its extensive use of dichotomies, e.g. Moldovan versus Romanian language. Moreover, 
this focus is crucial for understanding the representation of Moldova’s external others 
and the reproduction of Moldovan inferiority and prejudices against Romania and/or 
Russia (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
 Discourse theory has been criticised for being idealist and reducing reality to 
ideas of it (Howarth 1995: 127). However, the constructivist position, even in its 
extreme, post-structuralist form, does not deny the existence of the real world; it 
argues that only through language we give meaning and thus understand and are able 
to relate to the material world. Essentially, through its main epistemological 
assumption, DA cannot tell us what is right and wrong, what is true or false, but it can 
illuminate the researcher on how these judgements are made, on what basis are these 
categories constructed (Wood  and  Kroger 2000). Furthermore, critics point out that 
post-structuralism does not pay any attention to material causes that form the limits 
of discourse. In response, post-structuralists argue that the economy or environmental 
constraints only exist when they are constructed within discourses and that through 
this process of articulation discourses set their own limits by ‘ruling out certain options 
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as false’ (Horwath 1995: 129).   Thus, the thesis focuses on the way in which national 
identity articulates arguments regarding foreign policy and discourses on the economy 
are amongst these arguments. 
To conclude, post-structuralism represents an ‘ethos of critique’ (Huysmans 
2001) deconstructing what we believe to be common knowledge, by revealing how 
dominant understandings of the world, in this case representations of the foreign 
affairs, have come to be and are reproduced constantly. Based on an interpretitivist 
epistemology, it does not aim to find the Truth, for as a post-modern technique, it 
does not accept its existence; the outcomes of a post-structuralist analysis are then 
merely versions of reality (Jaworski and Coupland 1999) just as national identity 
discourses are. But more importantly, a post-structuralist approach to discourse can 
prove to be extremely useful in this analysis through its conceptualisation of signs as 
contested and through its focus on the representation of difference. 
 
2.2.1. Toolbox 
There is not a recipe for DA; Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory has very few 
methodological considerations, being concerned mostly with theorising discourse and 
its role in society (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). Moreover, Potter (1997: 147-148) 
argues that DA is a ‘craft skill’ without a preformed recipe and that the main 
prerequisite is ‘analytic mentality’ (see also Bryman 2008: 501). Nevertheless, whilst 
there are no clear guidelines, Laclau and Mouffe developed a toolbox of concepts to be 
employed in pursuing discourse analysis.  In order to set the basis for the wider 
analysis conducted in the next three chapters, this small section offers a brief overview 
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of: articulation, empty signifiers, equivalence/difference and re-textualisation, and 
highlights their usefulness in the Moldovan case.  
Articulation stands at the very basis of post-structural thinking and this approach 
to analysing discourse. For post-structuralists ‘the creation of meaning as a social 
process is about the fixation of meaning, as if a Saussurian5 structure existed’, by 
excluding any other possibilities. This process is called articulation and it is a perpetual 
process, as discourse is no more than a temporary closure of meaning (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002: 25-9). Meaning is forever contested (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 113), as is 
the nation, unfinished in constant need of reproduction (Anderson 1983). Thus, 
articulation is especially pertinent to the Moldovan case, where two discourses 
articulate and rearticulate (and adapt) different views of the nation and compete to 
achieve closure regarding the meanings attached to ‘being Moldovan’. To make sense 
of this discursive conflict, I employ the concept of ‘empty (or floating) signifiers’. They 
are elements that lack meaning, they are always available for definition and cannot be 
permanently fixed due to the existence of competing meanings assigned to them. 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) illustrate this point with two examples of nodal points, 
for political discourses a nodal point is ‘democracy’, whereas for national discourses it 
is ‘the people’. In the Moldovan case, empty signifiers range from what is understood 
as the nation or the people and their characteristics to details of national identity 
narratives such as key historical dates, e.g. 1918, or the meanings attached to 
democracy. They are assigned different (and opposing) meanings by the two main 
national identity discourses and are crucial in understanding the opposition between 
                                                          
5 Developed by Ferdinand de Saussure, structural linguistics argue that each signified (an idea, concept, 
object) and signifier (the means of expressing the signified) are linked, fixed within a structure. 
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Romanianism and Moldovanism, as illustrated in chapters 3 and 4. These elements are 
brought together by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) to explain the creation of identity. They 
explain that identity can be constructed through the articulation of empty signifiers 
and that, just like them, identities are over-determined, being assigned different 
meanings by different discourses. This is useful for the analysis of the multiple 
constructions of Moldovan identity. Yet, the most important element of this view on 
identity is the mechanisms through which these discourses are built around empty 
signifiers. This is achieved through two logics: equivalence and difference. The first 
consists of the process through which chains of equivalence are created, equating a 
cluster of signifiers with a central nodal point, here the identity. Difference on the 
other hand distinguishes two different clusters of signifiers (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
Hence, for Laclau and Mouffe identity is constructed through the creation of two 
opposed clusters of meaning, one erasing differences within the group and the second 
constructing the ‘other(s)’. Equivalences are pivotal to understanding the means 
through which internal and external others are equated within Romanianism and 
Moldovanism (Chapters 3 and 4). More importantly, they highlights the means through 
which the representations of the two discourses are essentialised by equating foreign 
policy, views on ethnic minorities, etc. into a comprehensive representation of the 
criteria for belonging to one national identity discourse or the other.  With this in 
mind, I define ‘essentialisation’ as the process through which groups are represented 
as quasi-natural, through underlying essential characteristics (e.g. stereotyping). In this 
way, essentialisation enhances the homogeneity of the represented group and ignores 
any form of variance within it (Rothbart and Taylor 1992: 16). Thus, this 
conceptualisation of identity as built around two oppositional clusters is congruent 
with the sociological view of identity based on the construction of otherness 
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highlighted in Section 1.3 and is extremely useful in my analysis of the ways in which 
Moldovans construct their identity.  
Lastly, re-textualisation is an important element in the analysis of relationships 
between different discourses. Re-textualisation highlights the importance of context in 
the creation of a discourse. It underscores that texts draw on earlier meaning 
formations in order to analyse how discourses are reproduced and, more importantly, 
changed (Fairclough 2003). However, meaningful context in itself is no more than a 
discourse or a collection of discourses. Hence, context, be it historical or institutional 
can be reiterated into different discourses through re-textualisation, by assigning 
similar meanings to the same floating signifiers or by employing the same logic(s) of 
equivalence or difference. Hence, no discourse exists in isolation; they all relate in 
some way to context, itself a text by post-structuralist standards. Re-textualisation, 
thus, offers the framework for understanding both the relationship between different 
discourses in Moldovan society and, more importantly, the way in which foreign policy 
arguments can build on national identity constructions. Thus, employing discourse 
analysis means analysing the following concepts: empty signifiers, chains of 
equivalence and difference, but also looking at re-textualisation and the relationship 
between discourses. Using this toolbox, DA studies how discourses constitute reality, 
while also highlighting how some representations function as ‘truth’, as taken for 
granted, while others are in open antagonism (detailed in Section 3.2). This toolbox 
has been essential in developing the coding frame for analysing the data collected for 
this project, as detailed in the next section.  
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2.2.2. Analysis  
The first step of the analysis process was transcribing all of the 43 recorded interviews; 
they were all in Romanian and I transcribed them in the same language, only 
translating them if they were quoted in the text of the thesis. Thus, the analysis was 
conducted entirely in Romanian. This ensured I avoided any issues arising from the 
translation and the cross-linguistic character of this project, conducted in Romanian, 
but presented in this thesis in English. Translation can obscure some of the deeper 
meaning of these discourses or the cultural meaning embedded in linguistic 
expressions (Simon 1996). One example to illustrate this point is the multitude of 
words employed in Moldova to refer to the ‘nation’. Two of these are most common 
are ‘neam’ and ‘popor’ [people]. The former is the most common and it also has the 
meaning of kin and relative. This choice of term highlights the Moldovan view of the 
nation as a family (e.g. Druta 1997), offering a deeper insight than the use of the term 
‘people’; Section 3.3 takes this discussion further, linking it to the idea of ethnogenesis.  
In response to DA’s lack of a strict method, I augmented it through the use of 
qualitative content analysis as techniques for exploring the text. Jaworsky and 
Coupland (1999) argue that DA needs support from other traditions of research. 
Nevertheless, DA’s value stems from its ability to see the sort of detail that may be lost 
to other methods (Potter and Wetherell 1994) which would likely miss the ‘creative, 
inter-subjective part of social relations’ (Jaworsky and Coupland 1999: 13). Content 
analysis can be employed in a multiplicity of ways and adapted to different research 
questions (Weber 1990). I employ content analysis as a qualitative, interpretitive 
method of analysing anything that can be considered as content; this includes text, 
images, etc. But more importantly, I do not use content analysis to refer to the 
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quantitative analysis of text (e.g. Silverman 1993), as this would not fit with the 
theoretical underpinnings provided by discourse theory. Moreover, the multiplicity of 
meanings attached to different terms, i.e. ‘being Moldovan’ (Chapter 3), makes this 
method impractical in the Moldovan case. 
The main aim of content analysis in this thesis is to simplify material, by 
paraphrasing and summarising (Flick 2002). It consist of developing analytical 
categories and then to coding the data accordingly (Mason 1994). Coding was 
employed in this project to ‘organise the copious notes, transcripts or documents that 
have been collected and it also represents the first step in the conceptualisation of the 
data’ (Bryman and Burgess 1994: 218). It was useful in systematising the large body of 
data consisting of interviews, fieldwork notes, political documents and newspaper 
clippings. Yet, discourse analysis, as a method, rejects the idea of coding, as it believes 
that terms do not have a fixed meaning. Thus, coding is always corroborated with the 
toolbox of DA, in order to avoid contradicting the theoretical underpinnings of 
discourse analysis. 
The coding frame was developed throughout the data collection and analysis 
process. Three main elements impacted on it: (1) the literature on Moldova and 
national identity in general, (2) the focus of DA and my endeavour to employ its 
toolbox and (3) the data collection and analysis process itself. The basis for the coding 
frame was the literature on Moldovan national identity and the main themes it 
highlighted, e.g. language, history, political allegiances. The main issues arising from 
the literature became the wider categories when coding. These were also 
corroborated with the analysis conducted by other authors researching national 
identity, such as Wodak et al. (1999) study of Austrian national identity. Wodak’s 
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(1999) focus firstly confirmed the soundness of my initial coding frame, but also 
enabled me to note the presence and, more importantly, the absence of other themes, 
i.e. citizenship and, respectively, the representation of a long term future for Moldova.  
But more importantly, the coding frame was determined by the initial focus of 
the research project. Building on Charles King’s (2003) article (see Introduction), my 
initial research project had two main objectives. The first was to study how different 
national identity discourses are intrinsically linked to a foreign policy orientation, for 
instance Romanianism to being pro-European. For this purpose, I built on the post-
structuralist view of foreign policy as creating others (Campbell 1992; Devetak 2005), 
thus on the theoretical underpinnings of this study; thus, I focused the analysis and 
codes on representations of othering – the way in which external others such as 
Romania or Russia are portrayed. This augmented my view of the other elements of 
national identity such as language and history, breaking down these codes into more 
focused ones (i.e. ‘Russia’s impact on Romanian/Moldovan language’) that shed light 
on the multi-level othering in Moldovan national identity constructions as illustrated 
throughout Chapters 3 and 4.  
My second objective was to evaluate the existence of a middle ground national 
identity construction that could bring the whole of Moldova together around one idea; 
this would function as a counter discourse to the almost hegemonic cleavage between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism. My findings suggest that the potential for such a 
discourse is problematic. Nevertheless, this focus has been essential for the project, as 
it also enabled me to circumvent one of the criticisms attached to discourse analysis, 
the fact that it reproduces the same discourse it is trying to deconstruct, having an 
effect of making it ‘virtually impossible to think outside’ this dichotomy (Young 1981: 
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48).. Related to this, one more issue is the fact that the researches choose the themes 
to analyse in their research and this can lead to them actually seeing what they want 
to see in the analysis; this can lead to a biased analysis and what Schegloff called ‘bad 
politics’ (Wetherell 2001: 385). Thus, by focusing on the counter discourse of a civic 
identity, this approach has enabled me to avoid, intentionally or not, reproducing the 
very dichotomy between Romanianism and Moldovanism. Moreover, my interest in 
the elements that stand at the basis of this construction provides the critical focus 
necessary to prevent that from happening. The essentalising character of the two 
national identity discourse is further challenged by highlighting the complexity and 
variations within them and by the analyses of Chapter 3 and 4. 
 
Secondly, the coding frame was also influenced by my method, discourse 
analysis. I focused extensively throughout my analysis and whilst developing my codes 
on the main elements in the DA toolbox. For example, floating signifiers with multiple 
meanings, such as democracy (Section 2.2.2) underscored the pit falls of coding in the 
Moldovan case. Hence, my codes became more specific, for instance ‘democracy as 
minority rights’ to illustrate the Communists’ representation of this point. Similarly, 
DA’s theoretical focus on hierarchy was also included in my coding frame and it 
highlighted the existence of a different approach to understanding Moldova’s relations 
to Romania and Russia, from the perspective of inferiority. Taking this approach has 
highlighted the Moldovan representation of its external others as superior and, 
ultimately, inspired Chapter 5’s argument regarding Moldova’s lack of agency on the 
international stage.  
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Lastly, the coding schedule changed throughout my data collection process, as 
the main themes of the data started to emerge. From this point of view, the analysis 
process followed the prescriptions of Grounded Theory. Grounded Theory provides 
that the data collection and analysis are not sequential processes, as the structure of 
this chapter would suggest, but simultaneous ones. It supports the fact that theory 
should be emerge from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). I started reading Moldovan 
news and column on a daily basis from the beginning of my project in October 2010. 
This raised new ideas that were ultimately incorporated into the coding frame; for 
instance the theme of the strict opposition between pro-Eastern and pro-Western 
political parties recurred across my readings and including it in the coding frame 
formed the basis for my argument regarding the East-West cleavage (Chapters 3 and 
4). I also developed my coding frame throughout the interviewing process and 
especially whilst transcribing the interviews, as a first reading of my whole data. After 
each interview (or group of interviews, if they were one after the other) I would take 
notes regarding the key ideas that arose. These were corroborated with the themes 
arising from the transcription process and with the codes inspired by the literature and 
the discourse analytic approach. The influence of the data was on the coding frame 
usually a case of refining or taking a different approach to the existing categories. For 
instance, the initial coding schedule looked at the representation of Romania/Russia as 
positive or negative others. During my interview process, these categories were 
refined and looked at how these positive external others can act as teachers and 
aiders, as two different codes. Other entirely independent themes also appeared 
across the interviews. One such example is the ballad Mioriţa, a part of national 
identity touched upon in Chapter 5. Lastly, a part of my findings (and, implicitly, the 
codes attached to them) have been detailed in conference papers and articles, but 
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have not made it into the final version of this thesis. Amongst these are the 
representation of the ballad Mioriţa or the potential for a civic national identity 
discourse in Moldova.  
Built on these three pillars, the literature, DA and the data itself, the coding 
scheme was applied to the whole of the interview data and the saved selection of the 
archival data, as described above. The process was not linear, but repetitive as per the 
provisions of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). As I discovered more nuance 
in certain representations, I adapted my coding frame and reapplied it to the relevant 
interviews. Moreover, my approach was refined further by looking into the literature 
on structure and agency in International Relations, as the key theoretical theme that 
could help me make sense of my findings. As such, during the coding process two main 
themes arose from this reorganisation of all the information and comprehensive 
comparison of different views. The first was the obsessive representation of the 
Romanianism-Moldovanism cleavage, whilst the second was the reiteration of a 
‘passive’ Moldovan identity. These are the basis of the thesis’ main argument, that 
Moldovan national identity reproduces a geopolitical view of the world. The former is 
analysed in great depth in Chapters 3 and 4, whilst Chapter 5 turns its attention to 
representations of Moldovan ‘passivity’.  
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3. Moldovan national identity – ‘between’ Moldovanism and 
Romanianism 
Romanianism and Moldovanism dominate both the political scene in Chişinău and the 
academic writings on nationalism in Moldova, as illustrated in the brief literature 
review in the Introduction. Based on this, I argue that the cleavage between the two 
national identity discourses is essential in understanding the East-West divide that 
dominates Moldovan foreign policy articulations. In this context, the main aim of this 
chapter is to offer a brief analysis of the two main national identity discourses in 
Moldova, Moldovanism and Romanianism and to argue that their constructions are 
opposed to each other. Building on this chapter’s findings, Chapter 4 contends that the 
national identity divide translates into East versus West one in the Moldovan case. In 
this way, the two chapters work together to explain the Moldovan representation of 
the structure of foreign affairs.  
The chapter begins by offering an overview of the literature on Moldovan 
national identity (Section 3.1). It argues that this body of literature focuses almost 
entirely on the two main discourses, Romanianism and Moldovanism, and reproduces 
their dominance in Moldovan society.  This is followed by a brief section (3.2) detailing 
some theoretical considerations for the analysis, such as the conceptualisation of 
Moldovanism as comprising of both an ethnic and a civic strand. Then, the main part of 
the chapter (Sections 3.3 and 3.4) examines the main tenets of each discourse, their 
views on nationality, language and history and highlights the opposition between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism on these criteria. The choice to analyse these 
elements was made in light of the theoretical writings on national identity, especially 
Antony Smith’s (1991) work on civic and ethnic nationalism and their elements; his 
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theoretisation is essential for making sense of both ethnic Romanianism and hybrid 
(ethnic and civic) Moldovanism.  Moreover, language and history are also central in the 
literature on Moldovan national identity (King 1994; Ihrig 2008) and have been noted 
as important by my interviewees. The analysis encompasses academic writings, official 
discourse, media representations and grassroots interviews, in order to argue for the 
widespread character of these debates.  
The third section, ‘Language’ (3.3), argues that both discourses represent 
language through othering processes. For instance, Moldovan language is defined 
through the fact that it is different from Romanian and threatened by it. But more 
importantly, Moldovanism also equates Romanian with Romanianism, the Romanian 
‘minority’ in Moldova, as an internal other, and with Romania, as the external other. 
On the other hand, Romanianists contend that Romanian is threatened by 
Moldovanism’s promotion of Russian language and, ultimately, everything Russian. A 
similar process of equivalence and othering is present in historical representation, as 
discussed in Section 3.4. I argue that the two discourses attach contradicting meanings 
to key dates, such as 1812, 1918 and 1940. For instance, 1918 is depicted by 
Romanianists as a liberation and by the Moldovanists as an occupation by the 
Romanian other. But more importantly, each of these key dates is defined against an 
external other and, i.e. the threatening other associate with the opposing discourse. 
Thus, these elements are woven into a series of equivalences in between external, 
internal and linguistic others, building into an antagonistic structure between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism.  This overlaps with the political cleavage across 
Moldova, 2009-2014, with the left, the Communists and Socialists, being Moldovanist 
and the political right, the Liberals and even Liberal-Democrats, Romanianist. The 
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political cleavage is highlighted throughout this chapter, employing quotes from 
political figures or party manifestoes to illustrate certain elements of national identity; 
additionally, an in-depth analysis of party position on national identity is offered in 
Section 4.1.  
Furthermore, political articulations of national identity in Moldova are the best 
illustration of the way in which both Moldovanism and Romanianism have moderated. 
Though outside the scope of this thesis, this phenomenon extends to grass-roots 
articulations of national identity, as suggested by Knott (2014). One of the main 
manifestations of this moderation is the fact that representations of otherness are not 
radical, excluding groups from the polity or rejecting any form of contact or 
cooperation; they are essentially rejections of hierarchic relations. For example, the 
Romanianist rejection of the Russian language is ultimately a dismissal of the Russian-
speaking minorities refusal to learn Romanian; Romanianists argue this is due to the 
minorities superior position in Moldovan society (see Section 3.3).  
But more importantly, these discourses are more moderate in principle, 
considering their ultimate goal. Romanianism as articulated in the political sphere is 
not as radical as unionism, whereas Moldovanism is not as radical as constructions of 
Soviet identity. This is due to the hegemony of the discourse of Moldovan 
independence and the fact that neither Romanianism nor Moldovanism challenge this 
principle. The idea of an independent Moldovan state is widely accepted across 
Moldovan society, contestation being limited to some extra parliamentary parties and 
NGOs (PNL, Actiunea 2012). For instance, Romanianist leader of the Liberal Party, 
Mihai Ghimpu stated: 
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When we talk about the Romanian language it doesn’t mean that Moldova will 
be united with Romania. It’s a bluff. Unification with Romania will never happen! 
During Băsescu’s last visit it became clear that we will never be a part of 
Romania. Moldova is an independent state. Speculation regarding unification 
with Romania must be put aside, somewhere, in a coffin. Today, we must take 
care of the economy and end these speculations (quoted in Druta 2011). 
Similarly, Moldovanists also articulate a nuanced discourse, for instance by suggesting 
the use of the ‘Moldovan (Romanian) language’ expression to define the national 
language.  
As such, the reality of the political national identity cleavage in Moldova 2009-
2014 challenges King’s (2003) radical view of Romanianism and Moldovanism. In fact, 
what he defines as a middle ground national identity discourse (‘denationalisation 
theory’) best describes the moderate character of the national identity debate in 
Moldova. Denationalisation theory holds that the Moldovan people ‘are certainly 
Romanians, but decades of Soviet cultural policy have had a deleterious effect on 
Moldovans’ national consciousness’ (King 2003: 63). Building on this, my interviews 
have noted that the theory of denationalisation can easily be construed as either a 
part of Moldovanism or Romanianism. For instance, a view that sees the Russian 
impact on the Moldovan people as positive is essentially Moldovanist. Such a 
construction is the PPCD’s representation:  
with one lung I breathe in Romanian culture and with the other Russian culture. 
And I am convinced that this is the source for the uniqueness and beauty of the 
culture and spirituality of our country and our nation […] a great advantage, a 
gist bestowed upon us by destiny (Rosca 25.01.2011).  
Alternatively, a view of the Moldovans as ‘tainted’ by the Russian influence (EX1), 
‘brainwashed’ (PG5) and needing educating in order to remind them they are 
Romanians is part of the Romanianist articulations.  
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Stemming from this focus on moderation, the second reason for the existence of 
moderate national identity constructions is the lack of national identity conflict; based 
on the idea that identities become true identities when they are under threat 
(Campbell 1992), Romanianist and Moldovanist can become more defined and, in 
some cases even, radicalised. This is usually due to circumstances, such as protests and 
situations where officials are forced to choose a side. Romanianism and Moldovanism 
can come into debate whenever language, historical dates or even foreign policy 
become a focus of conflict across Moldovan society. 
Moldovans, especially at the grass-roots, are characterised by an ignorance of 
national identity issues, supporting King’s (2000) argument regarding the Moldovans’ 
interest in ‘bread and butter issues’. This leads to a perpetuation of moderate and, 
even, middle ground representations of national identity. Additionally, I note all 
throughout where there are attempts at articulating a middle ground construction, 
such as a neutral view on Moldovan language or a common narrative of the veterans 
of 9 May 1945. I refer to any attempt to bring the whole of the Moldovan people 
(Romanianists, Modlovanists or those who do not take a stance) together under one 
identity as a middle ground construction of national identity; through this widespread 
appeal, middle ground constructions are essentially different from moderate 
representations of moderate Romanianism and Moldovanism. 
 
3.1. Building on the existing literature 
Moldova is a ‘site of failed nation-building projects’ (Cash 2008: 75). The academic 
examinations usually portray it as divided in between Moldovanists and Romanianists, 
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a dichotomy widely accepted within the literature on Moldova (King 1994, 2000; 
Anderson 2008; Cash 2007, 2008, etc.). For example, Protsyk (2006b) analyses the 
nation-building projects in Moldova and presents the two projects through opposite 
characteristics (e.g. similar/dissimilar). Meanwhile, Ihrig (2006: 43) starts off his 
analysis of history textbooks with: ‘Two narratives of the nation – Moldovanism and 
Romanianism – have been competing for the hearts and minds of the citizens of the 
Republic of Moldova since the early Nineties’. Very few analyses acknowledge that 
there is space for more nuanced approaches (see Anderson 2008), whilst only King 
(2003) and Zgureanu-Guragata (2008) actually touch upon them. King (2003), in an 
analysis of national identity and foreign policy, outlines the three main orientations of 
Moldovan foreign policy and associates them with three conceptions of Moldovan 
national identity. Though not analysed in depth, this work does account for a third, 
middle ground view in national identity, a form of civic Moldovanism. Similarly 
Zgureanu-Guragata’s (2008) work acknowledges the existences of other types of 
national identity but seems to be entirely driven by the idea of assigning different, 
ethnic or civic, labels to different political parties’ national identity discourse and does 
not discuss in depth the details of each national construction. Hence, in its limited 
coverage, Zgureanu-Guragata’s article offers an argument for the complexity of 
national identity constructions on Moldova. Nevertheless, both authors fail to 
construct an academic counter discourse to the dualistic nature of the Moldovan 
national identity debate. On the other hand, critical analyses of national identity, 
focused on the lifeworld of Moldovans, have discussed alternative elements of 
Moldovan national identity. These include hospitality and religion and go beyond the 
constructions of Romanianism and Moldovanism (e.g. Cash 2007, 2008). Yet, none of 
these works argue for the existence of an alternative discourses, only elements, 
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symbols and characteristics that can be built into and merged with the other 
representations, including Romanianism and Moldovanism. In this way, the critical part 
of the literature on Moldovan nationalism also fails to offer an alternative discourse of 
Moldovan national identity. Hence, academic analyses have largely reproduced the 
opposition between Moldovanism and Romanianism whilst failing to offer an 
alternative representation of the Moldovan situation. 
Lastly, a different understanding of the divide between Romanianism and 
Moldovanism needs to be highlighted. As illustrated by Ihrig’s (2006) quote above, 
there is a view that given the deadlock between the two national identity discourses, 
they are equally balanced, each appealing to half of society. This is very hard to prove 
in the Moldovan case, whilst the extent of grassroots appeal is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Firstly, Census (2004) data shows that 2% of the population declare 
themselves to be Romanian6. Additionally, more recent surveys highlight that 63% of 
Moldovan speak Romanian and 33% say that speaking Romanian means they are 
Romanian (Magenta 2014)7 and, thus, challenge the numbers in the census to a certain 
extent; the survey is rather problematic as according to one of my interviewees (YL3 in 
a conversation in 2014) some of their results are ‘a bit surreal’, which may be 
explained by the fact that the poll was commissioned by Romanianist newspaper 
Timpul. Nevertheless, the perception of the Romanianists as a minority is balanced out 
by the fact that most of the Moldovan intelligentsia, the actors that modernist thinkers 
                                                          
6 As of January 2015, the 2014 Census results regarding ethnicity had not been released. Nevertheless, 
there has been a leak, whose accuracy was later denied by the census organisers. It noted that the 
percentage of Romanians had gone up to 23 and that 40% of Moldovan citizens speak Romanian 
(Independent 2.01.2015). 
7 Moldovan surveys do not include two separate categories for Romanian and Moldovan under the 
ethnic identity question. As such, I am unable to draw any further conclusions regarding the results of 
this opinion poll.  
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place at the centre of nation-building, are Romanianists (see King 1999). Hence, the 
impression that the two are equal is not based on their spread within society but in the 
importance each discourse assigns to the other in its representation of Moldovan 
realities or, more specifically, the fact that the two discourses produce and reproduce 
each other.  
 
3.2. Theoretical and Methodological considerations 
Since this cleavage between the two national identity discourse is also present within 
the academic literature, this thesis employs the academic definitions of Romanianism 
and Moldovanism, together with their use of the ‘–ism’ versions of the terms to refer 
to the national identity discourses and national projects linked to them. The main 
argument of the chapter is that the two are constructed in opposition to each other, 
the self-representations of Romanianism and Moldovanism forming an antagonism. 
Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that of social antagonisms ‘occur because 
social agents are unable to attain their identities (and therefore their interests) and 
they construct an “enemy” who is deemed responsible for this “failure”’(Howarth 
2000: 106). Hence, as none of the two national identity discourses has actually 
achieved a form of totality, i.e. become the norm in Moldovan society, the two draw in 
their constructions from the articulations and existence of the other. This chapter 
argues that through their representations of nationality, language, history and, 
especially, constructions of otherness (internal and external) as accrued within every 
type of identity representation, Romanianism and Moldovanism constitute an 
antagonism. Thus, the main focus of the investigation is on both the way in which 
these discourses are constructed by their supporters and how they are represented 
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through the eyes of their ‘other’, i.e. Romanianist representations of Moldovanism and 
the other way around. This is achieved through an overview of the dichotomies that 
stand at the basis of their antagonism, from their views on language to those on 
certain historical events.  
 Lastly, the thesis focuses mainly on the Communists’ version of Moldovanism, as 
the most popular and common version within the period discussed (due to the party’s 
position as the main opposition party 2009-2014); this is corroborated with the 
Socialists’ articulations, taking into account their rise to prominence from 2010 
onwards. Drawing from March’s (2007) analysis of the Communists’ policies, I define 
Moldovanism as comprising both an ethnic and a civic discourse (see also Danero 
Iglesias 2013a). This is in contrast to Romanianism that is dominantly an ethnic 
construction. This conceptualisation challenges the Communists’ and Socialists’ claims 
to promote a civic Moldovan identity that would end the ethnic conflict in Moldova. At 
the same time, it stresses the impact of Soviet ‘institutionalized definitions of 
nationhood’ (Brubaker 1994) in the region and the persistence of ethnic, almost 
primordialist, forms of identification and their exclusionary constructions (Opalski 
2001). Due to its focus on the comparison between the two discourses, this chapter 
stresses most of the ethnic elements of Moldovanism, but also touches on some civic 
issues, e.g. the promotion of the Russian language. More importantly, I argue that 
beyond the different focus of the ethnic and civic strands of Moldovanism, they 
function in a very similar way. More specifically, the process of othering, crucial for the 
analysis of representations of internal and external others and, hence for foreign policy 
articulations, is common to both the civic and the ethnic strands. The choice to 
conceptualise Moldovanism as a hybrid discourse is also motivated by the fact that 
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there was no distinction across my data collection in between the supporters of civic 
and ethnic Moldovanism, especially amongst Romanianist representations. Thus, 
Moldovanism is analysed as a single discourse both due to the similitudes between 
intrinsic characteristics of its two strands and the external representation of the 
discourse. Lastly, this study of Moldovanism reiterates March’s (2007: 604) conclusion 
that civic Moldovanism is ‘often an unworkable compromise’, with elites usually 
struggling to maintain that middle ground position.  
Moreover, Moldovan society illustrates the existence of both moderate and 
more extreme views of national identity. This thesis mainly analyses the moderate 
versions, but also highlights elements of the more extreme discourses (e.g. arguments 
for reunification with Romania). This approach draws from Finalyson’s (1998) 
argument that opposing discourses can coexist, but that these dualistic structures 
radicalise themselves at extreme moments. He offers the ideal framework to explain 
the simultaneous perpetuation of the competing, Romanianist and a Moldovanist, 
discourses across Moldova. More importantly, the argument regarding radicalisation is 
essential to this analysis, as it highlights the ability of these discourses to exist in both a 
moderate form and in their more radicalised versions, depending on events. It also 
explains the shifts within the Moldovanist discourse, across the years. More 
specifically, the literature concludes that after 2005, the Communist regime slowly 
became more Bessarabist, tempering its anti-Romanian rhetoric (King 2003; March 
2007). Despite this, I argue that after 2009, the anti-Romanian rhetoric had returned, 
especially after the framing of the Twitter Revolution in terms of a Romanian 
organised coup (BBC 9.4.2009). Moreover, these moments of radicalisation are widely 
covered across the Moldovan media and impact on a great part of Moldovan society; 
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in this manner, they perpetuate a radicalised version of Romanianism and 
Moldovanism and the image of a radical (Romanianist and Moldovanist) elite and 
political class. This is illustrated in the way in which, during my interviews, non-elite 
members of Moldovan society reproduced radicalised elements of these discourses, 
from the idea of leaving Transnistria behind to an outright rejection of Romania’s 
policies regarding Moldova.  
 
3.3. Language 
Language is the first element of national identity that is analysed from the perspective 
of Romanianism and Moldovanism. Language is the basis for vernacular culture and 
one of the main elements of an ethnic view of the nation (Smith 1991: 11-12). 
Language has dominated the literature on Moldovan identity (Ciscel 2007) and is also 
considered as the ‘means of political control’ in Moldova (March 2007). Romanianists 
argue that the language spoken by the people of Moldova is the same as Romanian or 
a regional version of Romanian. More importantly, this chapter infers, their 
representation of language is based on othering, on the rejection of Russian language, 
Russian-speaking ethnic minorities, Soviet ‘Russia’ and, implicitly, Moldovanism.  On 
the other hand, Moldovanists insist that the language spoken in Moldova is actually 
Moldovan and hence different from Romanian; through this, they too focus on 
othering and the rejection of everything that is Romanianist or Romanian. The origins 
of a separate Moldovan language lie in a Soviet project to differentiate the two 
languages implemented in the Moldovan ASSR on the left bank of the Prut River, 
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nowadays Transnistria8 (King 1994).  Moldovan became a language through the 
standardization of a central Bessarabian dialect starting with 1929 and after the 
Second World War in the whole of Bessarabia (Schrad 2004). During the Soviet period 
and up until 1989, the biggest difference between Moldovan and Romanian was the 
fact that the former was written in Cyrillic while the latter in Latin script (King 1999, 
2003). Currently, linguists such as Deletant (1996) or Dyer (1996) argue that Moldovan 
has more Slavic influences than Romanian. They emphasise certain words that are 
seen as either archaisms or regionalisms in Romanian; to illustrate this category and 
the constructed nature of difference, the PCGN Report (2005) notes bortă (hole), 
gospodar (prince) or mîţă (cat), words that are also widely used in the Romanian 
region of Moldova to this day. Moreover, they note the existence of words that have 
been brought into the language from Russian throughout the 19th and 20th century, 
whereas Romanian was importing neologisms mostly from French and other European 
languages. An analysis of the famous Moldovan-Romanian Dictionary compiled by 
Moldovanist Vasile Stati in 2003 illustrates how differences are created at the level of 
vocabulary, and not grammar, in an attempt to legitimise the existence of a separate 
Moldovan language (PGCN Report 2005). As a reaction to the Soviet policy, one of the 
most important demands of the Popular Front of Moldova in the late 1980s was the 
recognition of the language as Romanian and the return to Latin script, which was 
ultimately achieved with the Moldovan declaration of independence. Moreover, Soviet 
promotion of the Moldovan language enables the Romanianists to perpetuate the link 
between contemporary Moldovanism and the former regime, with all its negative 
characteristics, from deportations to the imposition of Russian(-speaking) national 
                                                          
8 Another part of the Moldovan ASSR with the capital at Balta currently lies in the Ukraine (see 
Introduction). 
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elites (e.g. YL3, PG2, EX7). This mirrors Moldovanism’s rejection of Romania, as a 
linguistic other.  Nevertheless, in 1994 the Moldovan Constitution stated that the 
official language of the Republic of Moldova is Moldovan, overturning the initial 
success of the Romanianists. Since then, the Moldovan Academy of Sciences has 
recognised that the two are the same, the one difference between the two languages 
being the grammatical changes Romanian has been through in the 1990s (see PCGN 
Report 2005). Similarly, in late 2013, the (Romanianist dominated9) Moldovan 
Constitutional Court (2013) also concluded that the language spoken in Moldova is 
Romanian, but due mainly to ideological reasons, a series of Moldovan parties, e.g. the 
Communists, Socialists and Democrats, have not recognised this on the political level 
(Gândul 6.12.2013).   
Thus, Romanian and Moldovan are the largely the same but divided through 
representations of sameness (Romanianism) and difference (Moldovanism). An 
important layer in this cleavage is the nuanced representation of the difference in 
vocabulary between the two. Researchers at the Moldovan Natural History and 
Ethnography Museum have used the term grai or ‘speech’ to define the difference in 
between Romanian and Moldovan  
Our speech is the same as the one in Iasi [Romanian Moldova] with ‘şi’, with 
‘ghine’, ‘oleacă’, not ‘picuţu’ as in Ardeal. [...] And we in our Moldovan speech 
also use some words, Russian mangled words, Russian terms... but you have this 
issue in Romania too with English words (EX3). 
This exhibits the way in which the language used to talk about language, be it 
‘language’, ‘grai’, ‘dialect’, etc. defines our representation of it. In the Moldovan case, 
it helps augment or erase differences in terms of ethnicity and national identity, thus 
                                                          
9 Alexandru Tănase, the president of the Court, is a well-known Romanianist and son of Timpul 
editorialist and Romanianist supporter, Constantin Tănase.  
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stressing the constructed nature of this representation. Additionally, the impact of 
Russian terms ensures that the language the Moldovans speak is perceived as ‘not 
proper’ or less ‘beautiful than Romanian’, leading to a sentiment of inferiority, 
discussed in more depth in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
Related to the language debate, one of the most important elements of a 
nation’s history from the point of view of ethnic identity is national ethnogenesis. The 
representation of ethnogenesis in Moldova offers us a sum-up of the main tenets and 
othering arguments of the two discourses. According to Romanianists, the people of 
Moldova have been part of the same transformations as those within the rest of the 
Romanian space10, a nation created from the mix of the Dacians and the Romans, 
following the Roman occupation of Dacia in 106 A.D11. On this line of thought, writer 
Gheorghe Ghimpu notes that   
the ethnonim ‘Romanian people’ and the glotonim ‘Romanian language’ have 
appeared and have been used by these people since the 8th-9th centuries, from 
the time this people came to being on the territory of historical Dacia. And with 
the centuries, the Romanian people have kept their original ethnic name and the 
correct name for their maternal language, Romanian, as sacred things (2002: 
638-639) 
According to this primordialist view, the Romanian people have been on this territory 
for the past millennium and their autochthonous character legitimises their national 
demands to this day. Moreover, the use of the Romanian language is equated with 
being Romanian, an idea that is still applied in current day. Surveys have shown that 
33% of the Moldovans also adhere to this view, i.e. that speaking Romanian means you 
                                                          
10 The current territory of the Romanian state and somewhat beyond its borders, encompassing 
southern Dobrgea, Voivodina, Northern Bukovina, etc. depending on who and for what purpose is 
articulating this discourse. 
11 This is in itself an idealised view of Romanian ethnogenesis, ignoring, amongst others, Hungarian, 
Slavic, Bulgarian, Turkic, etc. influences on both the nation and its language (see Boia 2010: 171-256 for 
a comprehensive analysis of Romanian writings regarding Romanian ethnogenesis).  
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are Romanian12 (Magenta 2014). On the other hand, Moldovanist historian Victor 
Stepaniuc argues that in the Carpathian – Dniester area ‘the population formed as a 
result of the merger of radical free Dacians with Romanized Dacians who came from 
the West and with the Slavs who came from the East’ (2005: 19); he echoes the way in 
which Soviet history textbooks underlined the importance of the Eastern Slavs 
amongst the tribes that amalgamated to form the Moldovan people (Solonari 2002: 
421). The Moldovanist argument is, thus, based on the importance of the Eastern Slavs 
and the Slavic element, but also on the difference in between the people of Moldova 
and the Vlachs in Wallachia (Druţă 2008). Additionally, whereas this construction 
focuses on the ethnic representation of the Moldovan nation, the importance of the 
Slavic element is also stressed in civic Moldovanism, through the importance awarded 
to the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities, their rights and the promotion of Russian as 
the language on inter-ethnic communication, as portrayed by Communist policies 
(March 2007).  
Thus, the Romanianist and Moldovanist focus on the issues of language and 
ethnogenesis illustrates the primordial character of the two ethnic constructions. 
Another element that marks the importance of blood ties in Moldovan national 
identity discourses is the terminology used when talking about the nation. The direct 
translation of the word ‘nation’ is natiune (somewhat of a neologism), but the most 
used synonyms are those of popor and neam. During my fieldwork (2012) popor was 
employed as a scientific term used in conjunction with terms like ethnogenesis, but its 
meaning, ‘people’, can also be used in democratic legitimation. Neam, on the other 
                                                          
12 Nevertheless, the extent to which these respondents are Romanianists or Moldovanists, thus referring 
to their one or others’ identities is not mentioned. 
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hand, was the most extensively used of the three when discussing national identity in 
across my interviews. It has two meanings in Romanian13, nation and kin. In this way, 
the use of neam to define the nation implicitly stressed the idea of family links within 
the national community, highlighting its primordialism.  
Then, Romanianism and Moldovanism build on their representation of 
ethnogenesis to stress the importance of othering for their discursive articulations. The 
rejection of the Slavic influence on their language (both through the rejection of the 
Cyrillic alphabet and through the use of Russian terminology) is one of the key themes 
of the Romanianist discourse. It draws from the demands of the independence 
movement in the 1980s (King 2000). The importance of the Romanian language is 
commonly associated with the role it played in Moldova’s national revival of the 1980s 
and independence (Ghimpu 2013). In this way, Romanian language is a crucial element 
defining the idea of Moldovan independence and the rejection of Moldova’s Soviet 
past. More importantly, the portrayal of the Slav as the ‘other’ within the Romanianist 
discourse is based on a strict representation of belonging to different language 
families, the Romance and the Slavic Indo-European groups. Some of my interviewees 
have mentioned an expression that is quite common in Romanian schooling – 
‘Romania is an island of Latinity surrounded by Slavic people’ (e.g. YL1, YL5, OT8). This 
view also explains the Romanianist repudiation of Russian language and its use in 
contemporary Moldova, especially their representations of Russian as a ‘threat’ to the 
state language. The Moldovan Liberals have stressed, at their 2005 party congress, that  
Law 3465-XI regarding the functioning of languages on the Moldovan Republic’s 
territory, adopted 1 September 1989, declared that the official state language 
was Romanian. Since then, sixteen years have passed and the Russian language 
                                                          
13 Without taking a side within the national identity debate, I take the scientific view that the language 
spoken by the people of Moldova is Romanian, for ease in the writing of this thesis.  
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continues to be dominant in all domains. The promotion and development of the 
Romanian language as a state language has been stopped (PL 2005).  
Similarly, Mihai Ghimpu, the president of the Liberals, argued in parliament that ‘the 
Russian language is the language that has destroyed Romanian, it is an occupation 
language’ (PL 7.12.2012). Hence, Romanianists portray the current situation in 
Moldova as similar to that during the Soviet Union, their main complaint regarding the 
national minorities being the fact that they, allegedly, refuse to learn the 
Moldovan/Romanian language. Linked to this is the common usage in Moldova of the 
expression ‘Russian-speaking’ to define national minorities such as Ukrainians, Găgăuz, 
Bulgarians, etc. (e.g. YL1, YL2, EX6). The concept of ‘Russian-speaking’, encompassing 
ethnic minorities from Russians, to Ukrainians and Găgăuz (who speak a Turkic 
language) essentialises them as the linguistic other against which the Romanian 
majority defines itself. In this way, the internal ‘other’ is linked to the linguistic and, 
through its name, the external other, Russia. Moreover, there is the perception that 
the Romanian-speaking majority usually bow to the will of the minority and speak their 
language, Russian. A common Moldovan joke is that if ten Moldovans are sat in a 
group, all speaking Moldovan/Romanian and a Russian arrives, they all change to 
Russian (see also Ciscel 2006, 2007). This is a remnant of the Soviet hierarchy in which 
the ethnic Russian and Russian speakers dominated society and communication, a 
sentiment echoed even 20 years after the fall of the regime in my interviews: 
We cannot say we should have the Russian language too [referring to the 
possibility of officialising a bilingual society] ... how could it be equal, when at the 
time when I finished my studies in Russian, I was inferior because I had 
previously done 10 years in Romanian (PG6). 
Hierarchy is omnipresent in this type of representation, the mere idea of equality 
between the Moldovan majority and its minority ethnic groups being rejected by 
Romanianists through their historical experience. This is consistent with the feeling of 
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entitlement regarding language use in the post-Communist countries (Kymlicka and 
Grin 2003). This representation highlights how othering is framed in terms of a 
rejection of a hierarchic relationship and, implicitly, and in this case, the moderate 
character of Romanianist discourse. Currently, ‘lack of dignity’ is the main concept 
used by Romanianists to explain this attitude, as dignity would ensure that the people 
of Moldova would act en masse to defend the use of their language. Thus, from a 
linguistic point of view, the Romanianists’ other is the Slavic/Russian language and the 
perception of its generalised use within Moldova as mentioned within my interviews in 
June-August 2012 (e.g. YL2, OT6).  
Thus, just as historically, Romanianists associate Moldovanism with the Soviet 
Union and its perceived Russian character, so to this day, representations of 
Moldovanism are equated to the Russian language and its position in Moldovan 
society. This view is often linked with the Communists’ party’s policies, such as the 
2003 National Political Conception which establishes Russian as a second language in 
Moldova, a language of inter-ethnic communication (e.g. March 2005, 2007; Danero 
Iglesias 2013a). Yet, the Moldovanists have gone further in their attachment to the 
Russian language and rejection of the Romanianist narrative of the ‘Russian threat’; for 
instance, Mihail (3.10.2011) argues for value of Russian for ‘civilising’ the Moldovans, 
e.g. through the thirty translations of Shakespeare in Russian as opposed to a single 
one in Romanian. Additionally, the fact that the PCRM leadership chooses to speak 
Russian on different occasions further strengthens this link (Năframă 18.05.2012; 
Mihail 14.12.2012). One of my interviewees also highlighted this line of throught, as: 
You can see it at the level of party leadership. For example, the Communists, at 
their congresses, even at the last one, they spoke Russian... and even from 
elementary things like this you can tell who is interested in what (OT4).  
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Echoing Moldovanism’s rejection of the Romanian language, Romanianism constructs 
Russian as a threat. Even more, in the case of Romanianism, the linguistic ‘othering’ 
also feeds into the internal ‘othering’, whilst the idea of ‘dignity’ stresses the 
hierarchical relationship between the two languages and echoes the findings of Ciscel 
(2007) and Prina (2015) regarding the concept of ‘respect’. The national identity 
debate is also reflected within internal Moldovan politics. The paragraphs above have 
already highlighted the position of the Liberal and National Liberals in regards to the 
Romanian character of the language; the most telling example in this case is the PL’s 
motion to rename the national language day, from ‘Our Language Day’ to ‘Our 
Romanian Language Day’ (PL 5.9.2012).  
On the other side of the political and national identity spectrum, the PCRM was 
the main Moldovanist party up until November 2014, when the Socialists burst onto 
the Moldova political scene, getting the most votes in the parliamentary election. Both 
parties have often argued for the existence of a Moldovan language, separate from 
Romanian. This argument is based on both a democratic reasoning and the precedence 
rationale. Upon being asked who is right in regards to the language spoken in Moldova, 
former president and leader of the Communists, Vladimir Voronin (12.10.2007), 
stressed that: 
The citizens are right. […] When we held the referendum on October 1 2004, 
2.1% of citizens declared themselves Romanian. The other 78% declared 
themselves Moldovan. This is what we guide ourselves on.  
In this way he reproduces the equivalence between language and ethnicity present in 
Romanianism. Then, he has also argued that the Moldovan language is older than 
Romanian; this reproduces the contention that the Moldovan state and nation 
precedes its Romanian counterpart, through the fact that the first dates back to 1359, 
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whilst the second to 185914; a similar view is reproduced in Moldovanist newspaper 
Comunistul (21.04.2010). More importantly, the existence of the Moldovan language is 
essential for claims of national originality and, linked to it, the rejection of Romanian 
superiority: 
Without any bit of anti-Romanian thinking, where did the whole false idea of ‘our 
Romanian language’ come from? Why is all of your energy aimed at oppressing 
the souls and hearts of the people and its aspirations towards originality, 
towards cultural innovation? Why should this aspiration work on the matrices set 
by Bucharest, that have appeared 400 years later than the notion of Moldovan 
language and Moldovan people. Why this wish to transform into provinciality 
everything that has enabled our people to have a contribution to our common 
European history (Voronin 2011). 
The claim of ‘originality’ stresses the main point of Moldovanism, i.e. creating a nation 
different from the Romanian one, but the use of hierarchical constructions adds a new 
layer in our understanding of their project. This is highlighted through the use of the 
term provincial, implying a centre-periphery relation; this is constructed through the 
representation of ’Bucharest’, the Romanian capital, as superior to the Moldovans. 
Thus, the linguistic ‘other’ in the Moldovanist case is associated directly with the 
external ‘other’, Romania. This argument comes as a reaction to the hierarchical 
representation of Romanian language as superior to its incorrect counterpart, 
Moldovan. It weaves the historical thesis of precedence with the linguistic elements of 
the nation in order to challenge the perceived dominance and superiority of the 
Romanian language in Moldovan society. But more importantly, the speech the 
excerpt belongs to is held in front of the Moldovan Sciences Academy and is aimed to 
be a critique of (their) Romanianism. Similarly to the moderate Romanianist 
representation of ethnic minorities,  the anti-hierarchical element of Voronin’s 
                                                          
14 1359 is the first documentary mention of Moldova; 1859 is the year when the Western part of 
Moldova and Wallachia were united under the name of the Principality of Romania (see Introduction).  
119 
 
Moldovanism is a part of the mechanisms of othering the Romanianists Additionally, 
this group is also represented as an internal other, whose perceived rule over Moldova 
is rejected by Moldovanists (PG3); besides for the members of the Moldovan Sciences 
Academy, who argue that the Moldovans speak Romanian, this group also includes 
Romanianist cultural elites and perceived Romanianists amongst politicians, e.g. the 
members of the Alliance for European Integration. This illustrates the reproduction of 
the political cleavage through the lens of national identity. Lastly, at the 2008 Munich 
Security Conference, Voronin acknowledged that Romanian and Moldovan may be 
identical. Nevertheless, he argued that since Moldovan language existed before 
Romanian, there is a legitimate argument to support the difference between the two 
(Mediafax 10.02.2008). This leads to no more than a battle of glossonyms in which 
both sides acknowledge the similarities in between the languages, but argue for their 
discrete/separate character. Furthermore, taking into account the importance 
awarded to the name of the language together with its equation with nationality, this 
former element is an important criterion in assigning individuals and/or parties to the 
two discourses. Concluding, Romanianism argues against the superior position of the 
Russian speakers, which they associate with the Moldovanist discourse and, mirroring 
this, Moldovanists reject Romania and all things Romanian. This underscores the 
symmetrical construction of the two discourses and their reciprocal ‘othering’. 
Moreover, the battle of the glossonyms is highlights the constructed nature of this 
cleavage.  
Yet, due to its nature as a conflict of ‘names’, the debate on language also offers 
the potential for finding common ground in Moldova. This potential was also 
augmented through the Constitutional Court’s decision that the state language in 
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Moldova is Romanian. This decision was a mechanism discursively aimed at 
hegemonising this representation of the state language as Romanian and offering a 
form of closure to the conflict on language. Thus, language represents one of the key 
points of moderation and, even, consensus for national identity projects in Moldova; 
illustrative of this is the fact that even some leading Moldovanists acknowledge that 
their language is Romanian. For instance, Ilian Casu (2015) argues that he is Moldovan, 
but speaks the Romanian language. Yet, more importantly, he is a member of Our 
Party [Partidul Nostru], a pro-Eastern and Moldovanist party led by Renato Usatii, and 
their candidate for mayor of Chişinău. 
 
3.4. History 
This cleavage is deepened through the representation of history across Moldovanism 
and Romanianism. This section argues that this is achieved through the contrasting 
representation of key dates in Moldovan history and their association with national 
external others. History, the second element of the analysis, is part of both the ethnic 
and the civic conceptualisations of nationalism (Smith 1991). A history that portrays 
the nation as an imaginary family by stressing ethnogenesis or genealogies is part of 
the ethnic view, whereas history emphasising the idea of a historic land as a 
‘repository of historic memories’ can be seen as an element of civic identity15. Smith’s 
argument outlines the importance of studying the different representations of history 
within Moldovan national identity discourses. Moreover, it enables us to analyse 
Moldovanism’s ethnic and civic strands as part of the same representation of 
                                                          
15Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that history in itself does not determine the nature of a 
nationalist discourse; its categorisation as civic or ethnic is defined through the convergence of all the 
elements in that discourse. 
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nationhood and history. Historical representations are firstly analysed through 
historiography and history textbooks. This is augmented by an examination of the way 
in which contemporary discourses represent a series of key dates in Moldovan history 
(1812, 1918 and 1940), in order to highlight the antagonism created through these 
representations.  
The choice of years (1812, 1918 and 1940s) for the analysis has been inspired by 
the attention awarded to these key historical points both in the Romanianist and 
Moldovanist narratives, but also in the literature studying them. These three dates 
mark shifts in Moldova’s history (e.g. King 2000; Caraus 2003; Birladeanu 2008); for 
instance, King (2000) notes the years 1812 and 1918 as the beginning and the end of a 
distinct age in the country’s development, marked by the Russian influence on this 
territory. Significantly, they are also employed to define the different ages in Moldovan 
museums; the Moldovan History and Archaeology Museum divides its rooms into 
‘1812 to 1900’ and ‘1900 to 1920’. Through their importance and association with the 
various national others such as Russia, these key dates are ideal to illustrate 
Romanianist and Moldovanist contrasting views on national identity. Furthermore, the 
analysis is not limited to the dates in themselves but also focused on their 
consequences and the periods following them; as such, the comparison between the 
Moldovanist and Romanianist representations of history actually covers their attitudes 
towards Moldovan history beginning with 1812 to current day.  
Other important dates that could be the object of this study are 1848, 1859, 
1877-1878 and 1924. The first three mark the revolution of 1848 in the Romanian 
principalities, the unification of the Romanian principality of (Western) Moldova and, 
respectively, achieving Romanian independence (see Introduction). Nevertheless, since 
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none of these events have included the people on the territory of current day 
Moldova, they rarely appear in Moldovan representations of their history. Some are 
mentioned in Romanianist constructions (e.g. EX1) but not beyond that; they are 
especially absent in Moldovanist representations of history and, as such, not relevant 
for a comparative analysis of historical constructions across the two main national 
identity discourses. Then, 1924 marks the founding of the Moldovan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic, a crucial point in the narrative of Moldovan stateness 
(Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Yet, it is absent from the Romanianist version of history; 
moreover, it is also marginalised in Moldovanist writings, with both Stati (2007) and 
Stepaniuc (2007) dedicating only 10 pages to the MASSR out of more than 400 (55 and, 
respectively, 96 pages are concerned with 1918 and its consequences). Lastly, the key 
date of 1991, marking the independence of the Republic of Moldova, is not included in 
this chapter’s analysis. Nevertheless, Section 4.2 touches upon the meanings attached 
to current day independence and sovereignty and, implicitly, reiterates the values 
attached by the two discourses to 1991. Lastly, 2003 is also an important date, as it 
marks the moment when the Moldovan Communists became pro-European, as a result 
of the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum. This date is key for an analysis of 
Moldovan foreign policy, but not for this thesis which is an analysis of national identity 
in Moldova. This section builds on the extensive literature on Moldovan textbooks and 
historiographical research. Whilst drawing from some historical studies on the nature 
of the Moldovan debate, the main focus in terms of academic writings is on the period 
of Moldovan independence, in order to ensure the current day focus of the thesis, as 
opposed to a historical one. Similarly, the main aim of the fieldwork evidence 
presented is to illustrate the current representations of the historical debate; they are 
not exhaustive, as representations of history in Moldovan society are not the central 
123 
 
focus of this thesis. For this purpose, the analysis of academic writings on the two 
discourses concentrates on authors that both write after 1991 and are influential 
amongst the current Moldovan elites. Three two main authors used in this analysis are 
Romanianist Gheorghe Ghimpu and Moldovanists Victor Stepaniuc and Vasile Stati, all 
recognised in the academic and political domains through their links with the Liberal 
Party and, respectively, the Communists. Gheorghe Ghimpu is considered to be the 
spiritual leader of the Liberals; his brother Mihai Ghimpu is the official party leader. 
Meanwhile, Victor Stepaniuc is a Communist ideologue and MP for the Communist 
party in the Moldovan parliament since 1996. Vasile Stati was also a communist MP 
1994-2001 (see Section 2.1.1). 
Historiography plays an important role in understanding the nature of the 
national identity debate and its historical development in Moldova. It stresses the role 
played by Moldova’s history in Romanianist and Moldovanist representations across 
the ages. More importantly, it highlights the importance of the foreign origins of these 
national identity projects. Meanwhile, textbooks have been the most studied 
environment for the re-articulation of history in Moldova, largely because of the ample 
debate on their content and various changes in official policy on textbooks (Roper 
2005; Anderson 2005; Musteaţă 2008). They offer an evaluation of contemporary 
articulations of history across Moldova and the existing conflicts. Whereas for a short 
period in the 1990s, Moldovan schools used Romanian textbooks, in 1995 the 
government’s attempt to change the Romanianist ‘History of the Romanians’ textbook 
with a ‘History of Moldova’ caused large-scale protests (March 2007).  A similar 
attempt in the early 2000s was unsuccessful, but a compromise solution was found; 
Moldovan and universal history were integrated into a comprehensive history 
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textbook, but this was changed again, back to Romanian history in 2011-2. These 
changes are due to the shifts in government in Chişinău, from pro-Romanian in the 
early 1990s to Moldovanist after 1994 and an arguably Romanianist after 2009, thus 
affirming the link in between political parties and national identity. Hence, my focus on 
history textbooks has been inspired by their contested nature and the interest 
awarded to them in the literature on Moldovan nationalism. More importantly, history 
textbooks play a crucial role in reproducing historical narratives, as summed up by 
Hundt and Bleiker  
While narratives of nationhood create boundaries between self and other from 
the very beginning of the education cycle, secondary school education plays a 
particularly crucial political role. It is at this level that historical narratives are 
first taught in detail, thereby providing interpretative and factual foundations for 
the previously established way of performing a particular way of political 
socialization (2007: 71). 
Thus, history textbooks are the means for constructing and disseminating a dominant, 
widely accepted narrative of history. Hence, as representations of Moldovan 
ethnogenesis have already been covered, the next few pages focus on a discussion of 
the way in which a series of key events for Moldovan history are represented and 
celebrated/commemorated in contemporary Moldova. This analysis is augmented 
through an in depth study of the narratives employed to understand these events; 
these highlight the common structures around which Romanianism and Moldovanism 
are constructed in an antagonism.   
 
3.4.1. Historical Narratives 
Romanianist and Moldovanist national histories share key historical elements, but 
differ very much in terms of narrative. Narratives, I contend, are essential in 
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understanding the relationship between past, present and future and hence an 
important element of foreign policy-making. Romanianist history textbooks 
concentrate on a narrative of the ‘people as nation’, in which the Romanian people as 
a whole are the main actor (Solonari 2002). The main themes of this discourse are 
progress as emancipation and unification. Thus, unification with Romania is the main 
ideal of Romanianists, stressing the positive representation of the Romanian external 
other (Solonari 2002). This is the theoretical, academic approach to Romanianism, as 
current day representations of it are more nuanced. As noted above, the political 
articulation of Romanianism does not challenge the theme of Moldovan 
independence; hence, unionist ideals are only espoused by extra-parliamentary 
parties, whilst groups are somewhat marginalised. From a historiographic point of 
view, the history of the people of Moldova is a part of Romanian history; thus, this 
narrative is not dissimilar with the history of other Romanian regions, such as 
Transylvania, which was chronologically under Hungarian, Turkish, Habsburg and 
Austro-Hungarian suzerainty or control from the 12th century until 1918 (Hitchins 
2002). Hence, the main moments of Romanian history are the 1600 unification 
achieved by Mihai Viteazul [Michael the Brave], 1859, when Wallachia and Western 
Moldova united forming the Romanian state and 1918 with the creation of Greater 
Romania (see Ihrig 2007). 
On the other side of the debate, there are two main approaches to studying 
the historical narrative of Moldovanism: in school text books (Solonari 2002; Ihrig 
2006, 2007) and in Soviet and Moldovan historiography (van Meurs 1998). Van Meurs 
(1998) undertakes a comprehensive study of Russian (Tsarist and Soviet) historical 
sources on Moldova. Meanwhile, Solonari (2002) studies a series of different school 
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books, both from before 1991 and after; he covers a wider range of sources than other 
studies, for example Ihrig (2006) who only analyses the post-independence Moldovan 
textbooks. These three main studies, together with general works touching upon the 
issue of the history of the people of Moldova highlight the main issue with 
Moldovanist articulations of history: the fact that they tend to be incoherent and 
different representations are in competition under the greater umbrella of 
Moldovanism. This is apparent in comparing Soviet, Moldovan pre- and post- Soviet 
discourses and through the divide between civic and ethnic Moldovanism (King 2003). 
Solonari (2002) outlines the main historical narrative of Soviet textbooks as 
one of ‘people-as-toiling-and-exploited-masses’; this draws from Marxist views of a 
society based on class conflict and reproduces a civic representation of the 
‘community’. This view outlines the way in which a narrative based on the nation is 
avoided, denying any coherence to the grand historical narrative of the Moldovan 
people. Meanwhile, the post-Soviet Moldovanist articulation brings a few changes to 
the narrative, nuancing the positive representation of the Russian influence and the 
external, Russian, other (Solonari 2002). Firstly, the Russian/Eastern Slav influence is 
depicted as positive in both constructions relating to the ethnogenesis process and in 
the cultural development of the nation; yet, post-Soviet constructions also stress the 
role of other ethnic groups, Hungarians, Pechenegs, Kumans16, etc. Meanwhile in 
terms of external relations, there is a wider focus than just on those with Russia, as 
happened with the Soviet narrative. Hence, it can be argued that post-Soviet history 
teaching is less single minded than the re-independence versions of history, but still 
focused on constructing of a separate Moldovan nation and the representation of the 
                                                          
16 Other migratory peoples that have come in contact with the indigenous population on this territory 
during the first millennium.  
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positive Russian other. However, the existence of different versions of history only 
serves to complicate the narrative and to problematise any attempt of hegemony for 
Moldovanism, as long as there is a form of resistance within the discourse itself.   
 
3.4.2. Key Events: 1812, 1918 and 1940 
Having assessed the general characteristics of the Romanianist and Moldovanist 
historical narratives and the importance they both award to their positive (internal 
and/or external) others, the next section focuses on representations of some key 
events in Moldovan history in order to highlight the antagonistic character of the two 
narratives. One important common element for the two discourses is the history of the 
medieval principality of Moldova, from 1359 to 1812 and encompassing the reign of 
Ştefan cel Mare and the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Ştefan cel Mare is an 
omnipresent figure in Moldova, from statues and boulevard names to his portrait 
being on all Moldovan banknotes. But more importantly, this period and the figure of 
Ştefan cel Mare are crucial in understanding similarities between Romanianist and 
Moldovanist representations of history. Ghimpu (2002) argues that Ştefan cel Mare, 
prince of Moldova between 1457 and 1504, is actually a Romanian prince; this is based 
on the fact that his language was named ‘Romanian’ in the writings produced by his 
chancellery and in foreign documents referring to the principality. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the Communists have made Ştefan cel Mare a central symbol of 
Moldovan history and of the continuity of the Moldovan state, negating the 
Romanianist argument regarding his nationality. This is based on the idea that he, as a 
prince of Moldova, could not have been Romanian, especially since he chose to 
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repeatedly punish the Wallachian princes for their cooperation with to the Ottoman 
Empire (Obretin 2010; Ghidirim 2010). Hence, the same representation of difference in 
between Moldova and the other Romanian principalities is used here to create a 
Moldovan identity for Ştefan. In this way, the Moldovanists not only rewrite the 
historical narrative, but also borrow Romanian historical symbols. This problem is not 
limited to representations of the medieval period in Moldovan history. During the time 
the Communists were in power, celebrations for the 9 May17 were always started with 
a wreath laying at the statue of Ştefan cel Mare, ensuring his figure was integrated 
within the ritualistic articulation of the Moldovanist discourse of national identity. On 
the other hand, on 7 April 2012 after the commemoration of those who perished in 
the Twitter Revolution, groups of young people with Romanian tricolours18 left their 
candles all around Ştefan’s statue in the central square in Chişinău; in this way, his 
historical figure was integrated into their narrative of the fight against communism, as 
one of the main themes of the protests. Concluding the Romanianist and Moldovanist 
representations of Moldovan medieval history are similar in terms of narrative, i.e. the 
fight against the Turks, but as the case of Ştefan cel Mare has shown, incompatible 
through their assignation of Moldovan or Romanian etiquettes. This incompatibility is 
further augmented by representations of the following key moments, starting with 
1812 and all the way to Moldovan independence in 1991. One by one, these dates are 
discussed in the next pages. The first part of each discussion focuses on the post-
independence evaluations of these events, whilst the latter stresses the way in which 
these narratives resonate and these dates are remembered and commemorated in 
                                                          
17 Victory Day, celebrating the end of the Second World War in Europe, a date this chapter returns to 
later. 
18 ‘Tricolour’ is the name Moldovans and Romanians use for the Romanian flag, so from now on, 
whenever this name is used within the thesis it is with this meaning.  
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contemporary Moldovan society, in the press and in political discourse. In this context, 
an important focus is on protests and conflictual situations, as these have the potential 
to be covered in the news and have a greater impact upon the Moldovan citizen.  
16 May 1812 is crucial for Moldovan history and Moldovan identity creation as it 
represents the date in which the eastern part of the medieval principality was 
removed from Moldovan control and came under Russian administration, following 
the Treaty of Bucharest. Moldovanist Stepaniuc (2007) argues that at this time, 
Moldova was actually divided between the Russians and the Turks. Based on this idea, 
Stati (2007: 206) presents the events as liberation from the centuries old Ottoman 
‘yoke’. A similar view is presented in Moldovanist history textbooks, stressing the use 
of the word ‘absorption’, a trope with no negative connotations to present Russian 
actions (Solonari 2002: 422). Furthermore, from this point of view, the Russian 
occupation of 1812-1917 is perceived as no more than ‘postponed stateness’ 
(Stepaniuc 2007: 8), thus strengthening the narrative of the Moldovan state’s 
continuity (see Section 4.3 for more detail). Conversely, the Romanianists refuse to see 
these events as any form of liberation, but portray it as a trade in between the two 
empires. They reiterate Romanian statesman Nicolae Iorga’s statement that ‘the 
Romanian people never asked the tsar to be liberated’ (Ghimpu 2002: 369-370). 
Romanianists contend that the Moldovan state as a totality is better than division and 
occupation and this reproduces the narrative of unification present in the history 
textbooks (see Solonari 2002).  
In a similar normative evaluation, Moldovanists represent the loss of autonomy 
following the first decade of Russian occupation quite neutrally or even as an 
important element in the process of national revival in Moldova, leading up to the 
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independence of 1917 (Stepaniuc 2007). Romanianists though, link this event directly 
with the perceived betrayal of 1812, as a continuation of the disregard for 
Romanian/Moldovan voices within Bessarabia. This period is described as being 
dominated by 
the anti-popular, antisocial and anti-Romanian regime introduced by the 
occupants in order to change the ethnic structure and Romanian character of 
Bessarabia, to make the population in between the Prut and the Nistru one 
which the imperial Tsarism can trust [… and] despite the Russian and those 
Russified cruelty in Bessarabia for more than 100 years, despite all of their 
cunning attempts, Bessarabia continued to be Romanian. Even more, Bessarabia 
became a fortress of Romanianism (Ghimpu 2002: 377).  
This quote highlights the narrative of Moldovan survival, as a miracle against all odds, 
but it also stresses the negative image of the Russian occupation in Moldova, as a 
threat to the nation. These ideas have been drawn from writings on Moldovan history, 
but also resonate with Moldovan society.  
In 2012, Moldova marked 200 years since the Russian liberation/occupation 
which led to widespread debate regarding the date both in parliament and in media 
coverage. The two most read Romanianist newspapers, Timpul and Jurnal de Chişinău 
(JC), excelled in historical analyses (e.g. Caşu 15.05.2012), interviews with historians 
(e.g. Dragnev 2012; Negrei 2012) regarding the date and editorials about it, most 
arguing against the ‘lies’ of the Soviet interpretations. They re-textualised the previous 
arguments regarding Moldova’s lack of choice in the events of 1812 and the negative 
character of the Russian occupation. The main theme of most articles was 
representations of 1812 as a ‘national tragedy’, the Russification of Moldova and the 
portrayal of Russia as threatening the Moldovan nation (Cebanu 23.01.2012). 
Furthermore, given its position as the first of the contested dates, the meanings 
attached to 1812 are argued to be crucial to understanding 1918, 1940 and 1991 
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(Cojocaru 2012); this highlights the lack of compromise vis-à-vis the meanings attached 
to this event – in their view it is either one narrative or the other, one of Russian 
liberation or one of Russian occupation. Lastly, the effects of 1812 are associated with 
contemporary events, from the war in Transnistria in 1992 to the shooting of a 
Moldovan citizen Vadim Pisari by Russian peace-keepers on the Moldovan-
Transnistrian border in January 2012 (Tănase 6.01.2012). This highlights the constant 
negative character of the Russian side. Moreover, a series of events regarding the date 
were well mediatised, such as a series of academic conferences on the topic in 
Chişinău and Iasi, with a notable Romanianist view (Caşu 15.05.2012). At the same 
time, the Russian Youth League organised a round table entitled ‘Century-long 
collaboration in Moldovan-Russian relations: important stages, problems and 
perspectives. 200 years since the Bucharest Peace Accord’ (Corai 19.12.2011), 
underscoring the collaborative character of these relationships (not occupation). A 
participant at the round table has been quoted to say that Russia is the main actor to 
thank for saving Moldova and Moldovan stateness, emphasising the positive effects of 
Russia’s influence; this statement that was widely criticised in the Romanianist press 
(Corai 19.12.2011).  
Similar sentiments are echoed in the political sphere, where Igor Dodon, leader 
of the Socialist Party, argued in Parliament that ‘these 200 years have been beneficial 
for the Republic of Moldova. We have established important historical relations with 
the Russian Federation’ (Parliament 11.05.2012). Similarly, former president and 
leader of the PCRM, Vladimir Voronin declared that 
Bessarabia, in a few decades was transformed from a backward province of the 
Moldovan principality, scene of endless conflicts between the Russians and the 
Turks into one of Russia’s most dynamic regions (PCRM 24.10.2011). 
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This statement sits very well within the Moldovanist narrative, whilst also highlighting 
one of its main issues. There is a mention in the text of Bessarabia as a ‘backward 
province of the principality of Moldova’, thus pinpointing the fact that Bessarabia was 
never the centre of the principality and thus would struggle to obtain legitimacy as its 
heir. Liberal Mihai Ghimpu and the independent Mihai Godea (Parliament 10.05.2012, 
11.05.2012 and 17.05.2012) reacted to this statement by arguing 
everything we feel today: poverty, glum, organised crime, communism, in linked 
to the occupation of 1812, which is the basis for the occupation of 28 June 1940 
(Ghimpu in Parliament 10.05.2012) [and] 
it is from 16 May 1812 that our true dramas come from. This date has generated 
the most terrible historical problems, whose inheritance has made us to this day 
cowardly, amnesic and lost (Godea in Parliament 17.05.2012) 
This is very useful in understanding both the impact of this type of historical 
remembering and the way in which blame is assigned to external ‘others’ in Moldovan 
national identity discourses. But more importantly, the commemoration of the date 
has also led to protests regarding the meanings attached to it. One such example 
materialised in a peaceful demonstration and ‘1812-2012, 200 years of occupation’ 
being written with candles in Piata Marii Adunări Naţionale (PMAN) [Great National 
Assembly Square], the biggest square in Chişinău, at the initiative of the Liberal Party 
(Unimedia 16.05.2012). Next to it, there were two placards, one quoting Romanian 
poet Mihai Eminescu ‘To say the name Bessarabia is to protest against Russian 
occupation’ and the other ‘Russia – recognise the occupation!’. These emphasised how 
Russia, as an external ‘other’ is the central element of the debate on 1812. 
Simultaneously, Actiunea 2012 organised a 7,000 person protest through Chişinău to 
commemorate the date (Galbur 14.05.2012). The Moldovanists, on the other hand, 
celebrated 1812 with a concert. In an interview given for this occasion, Mihai Garbuz, 
leader of the Patriots of Moldova argued that 
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We have an orthodox country, it’s only normal to celebrate the liberation from 
Ottoman occupation. We want, through this [concert] to unite all the 
nationalities that live in the Republic of Moldova. Today, they are divided, on 
barricades (2012). 
Likewise, this stressed the representation of the Christian, Orthodox, self as opposed 
to the Muslim Turk, a construction of otherness based on religion, common in 
representations of Europe (Section 4.5.1). Lastly, whether representing the general 
public or not, these actions have both visibility, media coverage and, hence, an impact 
on civil society, as disenchanted as they may be with the political class and 
uninterested in Parliamentary debates.  
Thus, historical writings attach two different meanings to the historical date of 
16 May 1812. This dispute is echoed within Moldovan society, through the importance 
awarded to the topic in the press, parliamentary debates and protests. Through these, 
the narrative of Moldovan-Russian brotherly relations competes with that of the unity 
and survival of the Romanian nation. Yet, the difference between the two does not 
only lie in the use of different narratives to explain the importance of the date, but in 
the different ways in which relations with the external ‘other’, Russia, are represented. 
The Moldovanists either construct a neutral imagery or positive influence on the part 
of Russia, whilst the Romanianist discourse portrays the period as an aggression 
against the Romanian nation in Bessarabia; hence the good-evil dichotomy is used in 
differentiating the two national identity discourses.  Lastly, 1812 acts as a central focus 
of the two historical narratives, a key turning point, whose understanding influences 
the representation of all the other important dates of Moldovan history, as illustrated 
in the next pages.  
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The next key date is 1918, the formation of Greater Romania. However, given 
that the events marking this are spread out across a range of dates, 
commemorations/celebrations are not as clearly set as those for 1812. To be more 
precise, Bessarabia first declared its independence from Tsarist Russia on 2 December 
1917, only to be united with Romania on 27 March 1918, after a decision of the 
Moldovan Assembly (Introduction). The date of 1 December 1918 is widely celebrated 
as the date of the reunification of the whole of Greater Romania, following the 
decision of the Transylvanian people19; this representation underscores the themes of 
emancipation and progress through unification as noted by Solonari (2002). In this 
context, Ghimpu (2002) stresses the crucial importance of the Moldovan element in 
the process of Romanian unification both in 1859 and in 1918. In 1859 a Moldovan 
prince, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, was the one elected in both principalities officialising the 
formal union; meanwhile in 1918, Moldova decided on unification first, Bukovina and 
Transylvania waiting until November and, respectively, December 1918. This 
emphasises the perceived unity between the Moldovans West of the Prut and those in 
the Republic of Moldova, as recognition of Moldova’s belonging to the Romanian 
nation. Pride in Moldova, as a totality encompassing both the Republic and the 
Romanian region, was also acknowledged across my interviews (e.g. YL2). The second 
element of the Romanianist narrative counteracts the Moldovanist argument that the 
choice made by Moldovan Assembly in 1918 was a pragmatic one, in order to avoid 
being annexed by Ukraine. This is achieved by citing a speech made by Constantin 
Stere, one of the leaders of the Assembly, on the day of the vote: ‘You must carry the 
                                                          
19 Representatives of the ethnic Romanians across Transylvania met at Blaj 1 December 1918 and 
unanimously decided on the union. This decision was supported by the German minority, but rejected 
by the Hungarians in Transylvania.  
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flame […], be the defenders of the whole Romanian nation in the hardest moment of 
its history’ (quoted in Ghimpu 2002: 419-420). The speech is employed to legitimise 
Stere’s and the assembly’s actions in the name of the Romanian nation. Moreover, just 
as was the case with 1812, the meanings assigned to the date also encompass its 
consequences. Hence, the Romanianist narrative portrays these events as crucial in 
Moldovan development and, even more,  
If pre-WWI Romania is described at all, then the Romanianist textbooks of the 
Republic of Moldova stress that there was progress and positive development 
in all parts of Romanian society - which is contrasted against the backwards and 
retarding Tsarist regime in Bessarabia (Ihrig 2007: 35). 
This is an extremely important point, because through a narrative of progress through 
union this construction also conceals an important dichotomy which is reiterated in 
relations between Moldova and Romania: developed – undeveloped (Section 5.3.2). 
Hence, the Romanianist representation of history marks 1918 as a key event in the 
process of unification, central to this narrative, whilst portraying the period following it 
through positive characteristics.  
On the other side of the spectrum, the Moldovanists consider 1918 to be the 
start of Romanian occupation on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Through a 
meaning substitution, the act of union with Romania is being presented as the interest 
of the exploiting classes, thus through a Marxist type of narrative (Solonari 2002) or as 
an ‘occupation’, as pointed out by Stati, since  
the Romanian armies, by political order, not only occupied but also extended, for 
22 years (1918-1940) the Romania political regime, the Romanian Kingdom’s 
sovereignty over the occupied territory, which in international law is called 
conquest (2007: 63). 
This occupation is then followed by a dark period characterised by economic 
degradation (Ihrig 2007). Nevertheless, even Western academic writing has argued 
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that during these two decades, Bucharest had a tendency of marginalising Bessarabia, 
which had become ‘an underdeveloped corner of Greater Romania, just as it had been 
the Siberia of the West in the Russian Empire’ (King 1994: 348; Livezeanu 2000). Still, 
the Moldovanist construction represents the absolute opposite to the Romanianist one 
through a dichotomised representation of Moldova’s second external ‘other’, 
Romania.  Yet, as mentioned before, these representations are more complex than a 
simple good-bad binary. This is indicated through the fact that the Moldovanist view 
also focuses on another element, the brief period of Moldovan independence, as 
illustrated by Stati  
there are three phases in the national revival and evolution of Moldovan statality 
in the contemporary age: the first Moldovan Republic (1917-1918), the second 
Moldovan Republic (1940-1991) and the third Moldovan Republic (1991 – 
current day) (2007: 11).  
Worth noting here is that the period between 1940 and 1991 is also seen as a period of 
Moldovan stateness, though Moldova was an autonomous republic within the Soviet 
Union. This raises questions regarding the Moldovanist understanding of autonomy 
and independence, especially in light of the view that 1812 was an act of liberation as 
discussed above. My main argument is that the nodal point of the Moldovanist 
discourse is not, as believed, independence, but actually stateness, the existence of 
Moldova as a state within itself, irrespective of whether it has autonomous powers or 
independence, which would explain the views on 1940-1991 (see Section 4.3 for more 
detail). On the same line of thought, the 1924 formation of the Moldovan autonomous 
‘state’, within the Ukraine, is presented as ‘a progressive act protecting the national 
rights of Moldovans’ (Stati 2007: 96). Thus independence/stateness is a key element of 
the Moldovanist historical discourse, defined against the Romanian ‘other’. 
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Commemorations and celebrations related to 1918 also made the headlines in 
2012. Firstly, they appeared in the press through the reproduction of political 
statement and a series of editorials regarding the meanings attached to the date (Caşu 
27.03.2012). Then, protests and moments of political activism also made the 
headlines. These were mainly organised by Romanianists and focused on contrasting 
the representations of negative periods in Moldovan history with the positive nature 
of reunification. For example, in his 1 December 2011 speech, the PL’s Valeriu 
Munteanu argued for the Romanian character of the people of the Republic of 
Moldova and, in that context, for the importance of 1918 as a national achievement. 
Moreover, the narrative of Romanian resistance is also present in this speech, 
highlighting its importance for the Romanianists, as  
Today in Bessarabia, even if for 50 years of Soviet occupation and 20 of 
communist and neocommunist, we have been subjected to a denationalising 
policy, condemned to pauperism and barbarity, 80% of the people of this land 
are Romanian, even if lacking knowledge, they identify themselves differently, 
80% speak Romanian, even if the call it something else, because we have all paid 
a tribute to a regime that has been unfair to this land, to its good people, just as 
homemade bread on Easter Saturday (PL 01.12.2011).  
The statement also indicates the way in which the narrative of survival is not only 
defined in terms of occupation, but more importantly against Moldovanism and its 
imposition throughout the land. It stresses the pacifist and ‘good’ character of the 
people of Moldova, associated to a certain extent to a narrative of victimhood, a 
theme that is covered in Section 5.1. Next to political declarations, the Liberal Youth 
have also organised commemorations of the date, laying wreaths at Ştefan cel Mare’s 
statue in central Chişinău, offering Romanian tricolours to the public and, in 2010, 
opening a path towards a plaque commemorating those fallen in 1940-1941 (PL 
26.03.2010, 30.11.2011). As before, these events, through their press representations 
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manage to put the date on the civil society’s agenda. Moreover, they also highlight 
Romanianism’s historical coherence. This is achieved through the connection of these 
key historical dates and periods, Ştefan cel Mare as a Romanian and then the 
equivalence between the perceived liberation of 1918 and its reversal in 1940-1941, as 
stressed in the next subsection. No one date is isolated, the meanings attached to 
them all run through this narrative and hence, none of them can be used in achieving 
some form of historical compromise with the Moldovanist discourse.  
Yet, these have not been the only type of commemorations, as on 25 March 
2012, Actiunea 2012 in collaboration with the Council for Unity organised a march of 
approximately 3,000 people in Chişinău. Previously, the Communists, Socialists and 
Social-Democrats had called the planned events a provocation, aimed at destabilising 
the country (see Comunistul 13.09.2012). Socialist party leader Igor Dodon even stated 
that such actions should be banned together with all parties and organisations that 
promoted the union with Romania (News 24.03.2012; Dodon 27.09.2012). However, 
the radical antagonism is not only a present on the discursive level, with one side 
striving to curtail the other’s ‘right of expression’. This conflict has also spilled into 
violence in a clash between participants in the march and a counter-manifestation 
organised the Party of the Moldovan Patriots. The leader of the Patriots, Mihai Garbuz, 
claimed that ‘We came out to defend Moldovan stateness’ (quoted in Liţa 27.03.2012) 
stressing the importance of this nodal point of ‘stateness’ for the Moldovanists; 
meanwhile the Patriots were chanting ‘We are home. We defend our country’ and ‘No 
to Romanian expansion’ (Unimedia 25.03.2012). Moreover, PCRM leader, Vladimir 
Voronin, also reiterated the argument regarding ‘Romanian occupation’ and its 
disastrous consequences in relation to 1918 (PCRM 24.10.2011). Thus, similarly to the 
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way in which the meanings attached to 1812 were linked to different representations 
of an external other, those relating to 1918 are comprised of a dichotomy between 
good and bad, positive and negative in portraying Romania (and Romanian rule). 
Additionally, the Romanianist theme of unification clashes with the Moldovanist one of 
stateness. Lastly, national identity conflicts in contemporary Moldova do not limit 
themselves to academic debates, they also spill over into the political sphere, into 
street manifestations and even violence. These developments ensure that any form of 
nuance, concession or understanding between the two is marginalised only to 
radicalise Romanianism and Moldovanism further.  
The last key event to be discussed in this context is the Second World War with 
two key dates: firstly the commemoration of 1940, when the territory of the Republic 
of Moldova came under Soviet rule, and 9 May 1945, marking the end of the war in 
Europe. The first has made the headlines repeatedly, especially with the Liberal party’s 
project to have a commemoration day on 28 June, the date of the first wave of 
Moldovan deportations. Meanwhile, 9 May is commemorated yearly, as Victory Day, 
being widely covered by the Moldovan press. Based on the previous analyses of key 
dates in Moldovan history, the meanings attached to the Second World War may 
already become apparent. June 1940 is seen in the Romanianist narrative as the start 
of the Soviet occupation on Romanian territory. The legitimation for this development 
is the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (23 August 1939), usually called the Nazi-
Communist agreement amongst Romanianists (PG5). This is done in order to represent 
the act and its consequences solely as the deed of two totalitarian regimes, hence 
detaching it from the norms of democracy and the legitimacy it may be able to lend it. 
Moreover, this representation obscures the problematic nature of democracy in 1940s 
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Romania20, perpetuating an idealistic image of the positive external other amongst 
Romanianists. Following the pact, on 26 June 1940 the Soviet Union sent Romania an 
ultimatum regarding Bessarabia; on national grounds, it argued that the population of 
Bessarabia was largely Ukrainian [sic], whilst Northern Bukovina and the Hertza Region 
would be a compensation for the 22 years of Romanian rule over Bessarabia. Two days 
afterwards the Romanians gave in. This point in history is widely debated, as the 
Moldovanists do not hesitate to define these actions as a legitimate transaction 
between two states, according to international law (Stati 2007: 100-101) and present 
them as the ‘liberation of the Moldovan Democratic Republic and North Bukovina from 
Romanian occupation’ (Stepaniuc 2007: 352). Additionally, even as this was achieved 
with the Soviet army entering Moldova, this is argued to have constituted a peaceful 
solution to the Bessarabian problem in line with the previous protests against 
‘Romanian occupation’ (Stepaniuc 2007: 318-351). Furthermore, Moldovanists 
legitimise the Soviet annexation of June 1940 as a follow-up to 1812, when the Tsar 
decided to annex Moldova in order to protect its essentially Russophone population. 
Hence, they define 1918-1940 as an illegal Romanian occupation (van Meurs 1998: 48-
49).  
On the other hand, Romanianists construct the intervention as occupation, 
whilst assigning blame to a certain extent to Romania21. An excerpt from the Council of 
Unity’s declaration regarding this date highlights these ideas: 
                                                          
20 As a snapshot of Romania’s political woes: due to the weakness of the Romanian king the Romanian 
military seized power (September 1940), placing General Ion Antonescu who collaborated with the 
extreme right Iron Guard to form the National Legionary State 1940-1941 and, ultimately, allied 
Romania with Nazi Germany in the war.  
  
21 The one element nuancing this view is the fact that marshal Antonescu, the Romanian leader in 1941, 
ordered his armies to cross the Prut and liberate Bessarabia, thus reclaiming the land they could not 
defend in 1940. This was though only achieved after the, previously mentioned, alliance with the Third 
Reich.  
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At that time, Romania was threatened on four fronts: from the North by the 
Soviet Union, from the West by Hungary and the Germans, from the South East, 
Serbia was ready to attack, and helped by Stalin. Surrounded by enemies, 
abandoned by all her friends and allies, trying to avoid useless bloodshed, 
Romania is forced to adopt the dramatic decision to evacuate its army and 
administration from Bessarabia (26.06.2012).  
This excerpt not only offers a clear representation of the circumstances of 1940 
according to Romanianists, but also illustrates contemporary thinking, through the 
views of an organisation such as Consiliul Unirii [Council of Unity], a group of pro-
unification organisations and parties. This view is not consistent across Romanianism, 
Ghimpu (2002: 513) arguing that Romania ‘ceded without the smallest of opposition in 
order to save national dignity […] against the wish of a lot of Romanians’. Even more, 
none of the representations mention the extreme-right leanings of the Romanian 
leader, Ion Antonescu, or his alliance with Nazi Germany. The problem of assigning 
blame in the events of 1940 is very complex and one element in which the 
Romanianist discourse can offer different solutions. It impacts on Romanian-Moldovan 
relations through the perceptions of Bessarabia being left behind as detailed in Section 
5.3.2. This is an important point in the analysis of power relationships within 
‘otherness’ or more specifically whether for Romanianists being Romanian truly means 
being equal to the citizens of Romanian.  
As with the other dates, these historical narratives are then translated into 
political discourse through their reiteration by political party members. Since 2010, 
Liberal Mihai Ghimpu has proposed that 28 June should become ‘Soviet Occupation 
Day’ and should be treated as a day of mourning; moreover, a stone was installed to 
commemorate this in front of the Moldovan Government building, to mark the place 
where a monument to all those fallen as a consequence of the events of 1940. 
However, this idea has been repeatedly challenged by critics (Ghimpu 2012). The same 
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day, 28 June, has also led to a rather heated debate in Parliament in 2012. These 
declarations are very telling in constructing otherness, as  
If it weren’t for the 1812 occupation, there would not have been a 1940 and if it 
weren’t for the annexation in 1940, the [marshal Antonescu’s] words ‘Romanian 
soldiers, I command you, cross the Prut’. It is here that we have to start: Who 
was the executioner? (Parliament 28.06.2012) 
This statement makes no mention of Romania’s acceptance of the Soviet ultimatum, 
further noting Antonescu’s words as redeeming Romania’s guilt. In addition, the 
equivalence created in between 1812 and 1940 ensures both the coherence of the 
historical narrative, but also that the threatening ‘other’, as the occupier and 
executioner is clearly identified as Russia. Hence, this type of political discourse is 
characterised the lack of ambiguity regarding the good and bad characters in the story, 
Romania and Russia. The Communist reply to this claim was to argue that it is a 
moment of celebration, congratulating the citizens of Moldova for the ‘liberation of 
Bessarabia from Romanian occupation’ and for returning to the historical name of 
Moldova, the name used by Ştefan cel Mare and hence ‘all who respect Ştefan should 
stand up and celebrate’ (Parliament 28.06.2012).  The simple opposition between 
holding a moment of silence as the Liberals had asked and a celebration demanded by 
the Communists stresses the contradiction between the two. At the same time, an 
attempt to reach a compromise by ignoring the issue altogether as suggested by 
Democrat Dumitru Diacov was received with anger and calls of ‘lies’ from the Liberals 
and mockery regarding him being a Romanianist through his alliance with the Liberals, 
from the Communists. This emphasised the impossibility of reaching a consensus, even 
one empty of content, on this issue. Then, among organisations, the Council of Unity 
called 28 June 1940 a ‘black day in the history of the Romanian people’. Likewise, the 
current situation in Moldova is seen as a direct consequence of the events of the 
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Second World War (Council of Unity 26.06.2012); this stresses the importance of 
history in providing explanations to current developments in Moldova and the linear 
character of the historical narrative.  The representation of the pact is also symbolic of 
the Moldovan Great Power Complex, discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.  
Simultaneously, the Russian Youth League held a commemoration march with placards 
saying ‘Thank you Russia!’, some statements from participants being: 
We are here to support our own, our Moldovans! [and] The 28 June 1940 was a 
first step in the economic development of the country, its social situation and 
demographic growth. That is, it was a positive event (Publika 28.06.2012). 
The unity in both discourse and activities between organisations representing the 
Moldovan national minorities, such as the Russian Youth League, and Moldovanists 
aids the Romanianist representation of their equivalence. Through this, the internal 
‘other’, the national minorities, is closely associated with the discursive ‘other’, 
Moldovanism, essentialising this group. The Romanianists too organised a march and 
chanted ‘200 years of occupation, enough!’ and ‘We demand the annulment of the 
consequences of the Hitler-Stalin pact!’ (Timpul 28.06.2012).  
The representations of 1940 are also based around the application of a good-
bad dichotomy to the two external ‘others’ of Moldova, Romania and Russia. Yet, the 
meanings attached to the Second World War are also prevalent in the celebration of 
the end of the war, more specifically 9 May 1945. Named Victory Day in Russia, this 
day is seen as a key moment of Soviet occupation by the Romanianists and as a day of 
celebration for the Moldovanists. In the case of Victory Day there have been clear 
attempts on the part of the Moldovan leadership to bring the two sides together in a 
common commemoration. The 2012 commemoration was marked by discourses from 
the leaders of AIE – the prime-minister, speaker of parliament and president – centred 
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on the idea of commemorating war heroes, without noting the side they had fought on 
(Diaconu 2012). The government focused its commemoration on the veterans of the 
war, without distinction or note of the side they fought on, an idea reiterated in some 
of my interviews (YL1, OT4). This attempt highlights the moderation of the official 
discourse on national identity in Moldova. However, the dichotomist narrative is not 
entirely challenged by this attempt at finding a common ground. Cojocari (2007) has 
stressed that people gather together at the Eternitatea Complex, the main war 
cemetery in Chişinău, in a joint commemoration of their dead. Yet, they relate to the 
commemoration in essentially opposing ways, just as when asked about the 
motherland some would talk about Moldova or Romania, whilst others mention the 
Soviet Union (Cojocari 2007). 
Meanwhile, the Communists, as a party of opposition in 2012, chose to 
celebrate the end of WW2 in a different location, challenging the government’s 
narrative of the commemoration in its entirety. In previous years’ commemorations 
(e.g. 2007) the Communists, then in power, made statements regarding ‘the liberation 
of the Moldovan land’ and ‘glory to the Soviet Army’, illustrating the use of the 
Moldovanist historical narrative (Cojocari 2007: 98-103). Similarly, Danero Iglesias 
(2013a: 12-15) has also highlighted the representation of the Nazi, fascist Romania in 
Vladimir Voronin’s speeches 2001-2009 at these commemorations. Conversely, Mihai 
Ghimpu stated that he would not attend the 9 May 2010 celebrations in Moscow, as 
‘How could I take part in this parade next to the army that brought us communism, 
organised famine and deported us to Siberia?’ (Unimedia 24.04.2010).  
The necessity for discussion and debate on these problems has been seen as 
the main solution to finding some form of common ground, but to what extent this is 
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possible when the two views of history are politicised to this extent is debatable (EX6). 
One such example is the use of symbols linked to the two understandings of the day, 
the ribbon of St George and the Romanian tricolour. The first is the Soviet Union’s and, 
now, the Russian Federation’s symbol for the commemoration of their victory in the 
Second World War22, whilst the second has been employed in past years as a symbol 
of Romanianess to counter the omnipresence of the ribbon of St George. These are 
worn and distributed around on the day. In 2011 the mayor of Chişinău, self-declared 
Romanianist Dorin Chirtoaca, received the ribbon of St George and chose to wear it, 
something the Moldovan press eagerly picked up on (JC 9.05.2011). Upon being asked 
about the connotation they attach to 9 May, most of my Romanianist interviewees 
would bring up this topic and argue that it was some form of treason (e.g. YL1). This 
emphasises the main challenge in achieving some compromise in regards to such 
events. In response to this criticism, the following year Chirtoaca decided that all buses 
in Chişinău should be painted in the colours of the (Romanian?) tricolour: red, yellow 
and blue, for Victory Day (PL 4.05.2012; News 6.05.2012). At the same time, the 
Socialists’ Party has had advertising panels with the ribbon of St George all over 
Chişinău, congratulating the people of Moldova on Victory Day (Unimedia 27.04.2012). 
Thus, through its symbols such as the tricolour and the ribbon of St George, the 
conflict between the two national identity discourses is omnipresent in day-to-day life, 
especially in the capital of Moldova.  
Summing up, these case studies have stressed the fact that history is not only 
present in academic writing and history textbooks but is a subject of contention across 
                                                          
22 It is the ribbon used for the medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 1941–
1945" awarded to all personnel, civilian or military, who helped the war effort, hence its association 
with Victory Day. 
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Moldovan society. Whilst historical narratives can offer some form of common ground, 
their reverberations across Moldovan society, in the press, politics and protests have 
radicalised their message and reproduced two opposed understandings of national 
identity. Though oversimplifying two very complex historical representations, the 
opposition between the representation of key dates in Romanianism and 
Moldovanism is summed up in Table 3.1. It highlights very clearly the contrasting 
representations of 1812, 1918 and 1940-1945 and their consequences. Moreover, it 
also stresses the importance of historical external others, such as Romania and Russia, 
in these constructions. 
Date Moldovanism Romanianism 
1812 
Freedom from the Turks 
Autonomy and development 
Russian occupation 
1918 Romanian occupation 
Reunification with Romanian 
motherland - progress 
1940/ 
1945 
Freed from the Nazi/Romanian threat 
Developing Soviet Moldova – the 
‘golden age’ 
Russian occupation 
Deportations, famine 
Table 3.1 Key Dates according to Moldovanists and Romanianists  
Furthermore, there is a generalised use of the ‘scientific’ argument when 
discussing Moldovan history, creating a dichotomist view of truth versus lies in regards 
to these representations. One such example is a conversation with the Romanianist 
director of the Military History Museum in Chişinău. Answering a question regarding 
the museums’ position in the national identity debate and its implications for the 
museum’s exhibits, he replied that ‘they’re historical objects, it’s the truth, you ca not 
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play with them’ (EX5). Hence, the two national identity discourses attach opposite 
meanings to both their representations of the language spoken by the people of 
Moldova and their history. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter brings together both the literature on Moldovan nationalism and data 
collected in fieldwork in 2012 in order to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
different elements that form the Moldovan national identity debate and to draw this 
discussion up to the current day. The analysis highlights the ways in which 
Romanianism and Moldovanism are re-textualised and adapted to the current day. 
This endeavour is taken further in Chapter 4, discussing their relationship with foreign 
policy. Moreover, so far constructions of national identity have shown a remarkable 
uniformity from the academic to the political, media and grassroots level, suggesting a 
pillarisation, a vertical division of Moldovan society. This is achieved through the 
complex webs of meanings created through each discourse, encompassing elements 
from language to external ‘others’.  
Both Moldovanism and Romanianism are focused around representations of 
language and national history. Meanwhile, their ethnic variants share a largely 
primordialist view of the nation, built around different portrayals of ethnogenesis. But 
more importantly, irrespective of their ethnic or hybrid, ethnic and civic, character, 
both discourses are built around the principle of historical continuity, but also the idea 
of ‘neam’ [nation, kin] as a name for the nation. This mirrored view stands at the basis 
of the dichotomy between the two national identity discourses. The importance of 
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language, from glotonims (Moldovan or Romanian) to using terms such as ‘liberation’ 
or ‘occupation’ when discussing historical events, has underscored the relevance of 
discourse analysis, as a methodology focused on text and language, for this study.  
Lastly, the two main national identity discourses comprise two opposing 
historical narratives organised around different interpretations of the same key events. 
Three of these have been detailed within the chapter, 1812, 1918 and 1940, 
emphasising the way in which they form the nodal points of the two discourses. A 
fourth one, 1991, is scrutinised in Chapter 4, as it represents the year Moldova has 
gained its independence; through this, it is essential in understanding contemporary 
representations of othering.  In this context and moving beyond the literature on 
nationalism in Moldova, the narrative of survival through the ages and that of 
reunification have been underscored as the main foci of the Romanianist 
representation of history, whilst stateness plays the same function in Moldovanism’s 
case. But for the multiplicity of historical articulations that can prove to be slightly 
contradictory, current day narratives show a remarkable amount of coherence, with 
the three key events and their consequences being usually portrayed as equivalent. A 
highly illustrative example is the fact that some Romanianists equate the Soviet 
(starting in 1940) and Tsarist (starting in 1812) occupations of Moldova, the two 
usually being merged into one ‘Soviet Tsarist rule’ (e.g. YL4, EX1). Nevertheless, the 
fact that the meanings attached to each date are linked inextricably with the other 
nodal points means that none of them can be modified without endangering the whole 
narrative; this leaves very little space for a compromise to be found in between the 
two national histories. Lastly, national identity, and history especially, are used as to 
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make sense of the world; for instance, they explain contemporary events, such as the 
Pisari case.  
Additionally, the chapter has also stressed that Moldovanist civic constructions 
are important both through their role in Moldovanist articulations and for the way in 
which Romanianists portray Moldovanism. The civic strand is underscored through the 
Moldovanist focus on stateness and the avoidance of an ethnic focus in depictions of 
key historical dates. Despite their apparent contradiction with ethnic Moldovanism’s 
attention to language, civic elements do not seem to challenge the ethnic 
construction, but strengthen it. This is achieved by offering different messages to 
different groups and at different occasions (see Danero Iglesias 2013a). But more 
importantly, both the civic and the ethnic strand of Moldovanism reproduce similar 
themes regarding external others in their depictions of the friendly Russian other and 
threatening Romania, feeding into the same representation of foreign affairs as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Moldovanism’s focus on the Russian language, as 
a language of ethnic communication, thus to promote civic identity across Moldova, 
enables the Romanianists to strengthen the portrayal of the connection between the 
linguistic, internal others and external other, Russia.  
Concluding, this chapter highlights the importance of equivalences and 
associations for national identity discourses in Moldova, especially in their mutual 
representations and hence, in their process of othering. In this context, both 
Romanianism and Moldovanism employ a negative linguistic (and national) identity as 
being different from the Russian and, respectively, Romanian languages. Linguistic 
identity is then associated with the creation of the internal other in a hierarchic 
construction, the national minorities for Romanianism and the Romanians for the 
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Moldovanists. Additionally, through the historical association, Moldovanism is linked 
to the agent who is perceived as having created it, Tsarist and then, Soviet Russia. 
Within this, Romanianist creates an equivalence between its discursive ‘other’, 
Moldovanism, and its external (historical) other, thus ensuring that the fight against 
Moldovanism is essentially a resistance against Russia. Similarly, in Moldovanism’s case 
the equivalences are a lot more obvious, through the fact that they are in between 
what they perceive to be the Romanian minority, the Romanian language, the 
Romanianist project and the external ‘other’, Romania. Thus, the two Moldovan 
national identity discourses represent each other as built around a series of 
equivalences in between the threat to linguistic identity, internal and external others 
in a mirrored antagonistic structure; nevertheless, this is not a perfect reflection, as 
noted through the fact that it is not Moldovan, but Russian language that is the 
Romanianist linguistic ‘other’. Moreover, through their resistance of the other project 
and the chains of equivalences created around them, especially with regard to their 
external ‘other’, both national identity discourses can be argued to be anti-imperial 
discourses. Drawing from this, the main theme for the next chapter is to bring this 
discussion to the level of representations of foreign affairs and argue that the national 
identity antagonism reproduces a East-West cleavage on the international scene. Thus, 
it underscores the reproduction of first criterion of the Moldovan’s Cold War 
representation of foreign affairs.  
A second conclusion stemming from this chapter is that current day 
Moldovanism and Romanianism are both moderate discourses. They are constructed 
on the idea of hierarchy and not necessarily of rejection of others. More importantly, 
radical articulations, such as unionism, are marginalised – only represented by extra-
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parliamentary parties. This argument is taken further in Chapter 4. It highlights the 
nuanced approach to national identity taken by Moldovan political parties, especially 
by centrist ones such as the Democrats and Liberal Democrats. This illustrates the 
impact of holding office and the limitations created by the hegemonic character of the 
discourse of independence. Yet, Romanianism and Moldovanism’s moderate character 
also hides more radical versions. Despite its absence in day to day articulations, a more 
conflictual discourse appears in moments of contestation. These can range from 
contradicting parliamentary debates, as underscored above when discussing the 
commemoration of 28 June or through street protests and, even, violence (Section 
3.4.2). 
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4. Articulating the East-West Geopolitical cleavage 
This chapter augments the findings of the previous, by turning its attention to 
representations of international relations. It argues that the antagonism between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism reproduces a view of the foreign affairs scene as 
divided between two cultural and normative spaces, the East and the West. The 
representation of the East-West cleavage is the first element in the wider argument of 
the thesis, that national identity discourses in Moldova promote a geopolitical view of 
external affairs. Chapter 5 augments this by arguing that the Moldovans represent 
their identity as passive, lacking agency. Thus, this chapter assesses how the external 
framework within which Moldovan foreign policy functions is articulated and 
reproduced (see Chapter 1, especially Section 1.4). It points out that the East-West 
opposition is an element in the conceptual treasury that foreign policy discourses feed 
from and which defines the limitations (e.g. to their consistency or credibility to the 
wider public) they have to work within. 
For this purpose, the first section of the chapter (4.1) reiterates one of the 
conclusions of the previous analysis. Building on Way’s (2002) acknowledgement that 
national identity is one of the sources for pluralism in Moldova, the section contents 
that political cleavage between left and right in Moldova is actually a national identity 
and foreign policy one. This is achieved through a brief evaluation of the self-
representation of Moldovan parties, their policies and the way in which their 
opponents and wider society portrays them.  The argument is then developed through 
the multitude of references to their statements and policies in both Chapter 3 and in 
this chapter.  Then, the analysis returns to the content of the two main national 
identity discourses and argues that the chains of equivalences built around 
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Moldovanism and Romanianism (Chapter 2) can be strengthened and expanded to 
encompass elements of external otherness. I argue that both discourses are 
constructed in mirroring ways, comprising of threatening external other(s) linked to 
internal and conspiratorial others. These others are represented as threatening 
Moldovan independence and sovereignty; these themes enable the thesis to connect 
the contemporary discussion with historical narratives defined by the ideas of 
continuity and survival and underscore the consistency of these national identity 
discourses (Section 4.2). The representations of otherness are discussed in-depth, 
separately for Moldovanists and Romanianists in the sections titled accordingly, with 
examples being drawn from both political and societal sources. The last section, ‘The 
East-West Geopolitical Divide’ (3.4), rounds up the discussion by arguing that, through 
the importance awarded to external others in Romanianism and Moldovanism and 
their positioning at the centre of these geopolitical spaces, the national identity 
antagonism translates into a geopolitical and civilizational cleavage between the East 
and the West. This is highlighted through a series of dichotomies, including cultural, 
historical and normative elements, employed to differentiate the two spaces. 
Therefore, through these multitude of dichotomic layers and equivalences, the 
national identity antagonism produces and is reciprocally reproduced by, the political 
cleavage and the geopolitical East-West divide.  
  
4.1. Political Cleavage 
The purpose of this first section is to offer the basis for the argument that the national 
identity debate in Moldova expands from the academic to the political sphere, whilst 
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also stressing its role in the political cleavage in Chişinău. The bulk of the argument 
encompasses samples of their views on different elements of national identity, as 
highlighted throughout Chapters 3 and 4. Building on these, I highlight the role of 
national identity in the political cleavage in Moldova. Reciprocally, I also contend that 
the politicisation of national identity has led to a perpetuation of the divide between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism. Nevertheless, the political cleavage is not as clearly 
defined as the national identity one. Firstly, parties such as the Liberal Democrats and 
the Democrats offer a very moderate and, even, neutral construction of national 
identity; the later party could even be accused of having an ‘empty’ representation of 
Moldovan national identity (EX3), due to its avoidance of the topic. Similarly, the 
Communists’ pro-European foreign policy discourse can be seen as a challenge to the 
dual construction around Romanianism and Moldovanism. All these will be discussed 
in the detailed presentation of each party and in the Conclusion. But more importantly, 
I argue that representations of the political scene are dualistic, ignoring these nuances 
and, as such, reproduce the duality between Romanianism and Moldovanism.  
The very structure of the political system in Moldova is defined through this the 
national identity cleavage (see Comunistul 17.07.2011). A PNL member highlights this 
when asked about the national identity of Moldova as 
the parties here, after achieving independence, separated into two camps: one 
communist, forces with origins in the Soviet period and have led us for so many 
years, and a democratic camp that wished to restore the truth that was stolen 
for so many years under Soviet occupation (PG1). 
The interviewee hints at the link between Moldovan history, national identity and the 
political cleavage between the communists and the so called democratic camp. This 
way of presenting the Moldovan political scene, with the Moldovanists on the left of 
the political spectrum, whilst the Romanianists are on the right is a common theme in 
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my interviews with Moldovans (e.g. EX2, YL1, YL5, PG5). These etiquettes of left and 
right do not refer to party positions regarding the economy or individual freedoms, as 
the positions of the PCRM and PDLM can vary widely (Manifesto Project, n.). They are 
to a great extent national identity (and foreign policy) markers, i.e. right wing parties 
are largely Romanianist, whilst left wing ones are Moldovanist. The left-right 
dichotomy strengthens the cleavage between the two national identity discourses, 
especially since in past elections the two sides were broadly balanced in terms of 
votes. 
The quote above refers in general terms to the political system in post-
independence Moldova, but the Moldovan party system has been very fluid in its first 
two decades, parties being created and disappearing from one election to the next. For 
this reason, the thesis focuses only on the period between 2009 and 2014, with some 
references to the situation on the prior political scene, in order to put the discussion in 
context. Literature on the previous political circumstances has argued that 
‘competition between political parties is founded on an identity discourse […] identity 
becomes a political resource as these parties grapple for power’ (Zgureanu-Guragata 
2008: 52). Drawing from this observation I argue that in the 2009-14 period national 
identity played a crucial role in the self-representation of political parties in Moldova, 
highlighting the way in which the political cleavage re-textualizes and reinforces this 
national identity divide (Figure 2). 
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Figure 4.1. The Moldovan Political Spectrum:  
Moldovan political parties plotted based on their 
attachment to national identity discourses 
(Romanianism/Moldovanism) and their left-right political 
orientation, in order to illustrate the correlation between 
the two criteria. The positioning has been determined by 
their own self-assessment of their policies and stance 
and the relationship with other parties ideologies - not 
on a statistical measurement, but on a discursive analysis 
of their own identity. Moreover, for a few parties, I have 
also noted their shift in policies (years attached) or their 
balancing act between two positions, where I have not 
made a mention of the years (e.g. Democrats and Liberal 
Democrats). 
Right 
Moldovanism
Left 
Socialists 2014 Communists 2009 Socialists 2012 
Romanianism 
Democrats 
Liberals 
National Liberals 
Liberal Democrats 
New Right 
Democrats 
Communists 2014 
Liberal Democrats 
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During this period the Moldovan political stage was occupied by four main 
parties, the Communists, Democrats, Liberals and Liberal Democrats. Nevertheless, 
other parties were also widely covered in the media and appeared across my 
interviews. The Socialists had some promising poll ratings across the period and got 
the most votes in the November 2014 parliamentary elections; conversely, the 
National Liberals have been extremely vocal across the media and by organising 
protests and marches through the Council of Unity (e.g Section 3.4). My analysis covers 
the national identity orientations of these parties, but also how they are represented 
by other political actors, in order to stress the essentialisation processes and 
dichotomous thinking existent across Moldova. Chapter 3 has already highlighted 
some of the parties’ views regarding language and history in Moldova and this chapter 
takes this further, stressing their views regarding othering in national identity 
discourses and, implicitly, their foreign policy orientation.  
Founded in 1993, the Communists were the main party of opposition 2009-2014, 
thus playing a key role in articulating ideas against the government in Chişinău. The 
party had electoral success with the 1998 election, being the party in power from 2001 
to 2009. Officially, the Communists are part of the European Left, composed of left 
wing, communist and even some anti-capitalist leftist parties. Nevertheless, the party 
is not communist, but rooted in capitalism (March 2007), nor is it a left wing party, but 
amorphous in terms of its ideology (Manifesto Project n.).  By and large, the literature 
on Moldova argues that the Communists’ Party are essentially Moldovanists (March 
2007; Danero Iglesias 2013a). Communist manifestoes since 2001 mention ‘developing 
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the Moldovan nation’ as one of their main priorities (PCRM Manifesto 2005, 2009, 
2010); they specifically focus on the nation’s multi-ethnic character (i.e. encompassing 
the Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, etc. minorities). March (2007) argues that the 
Communists are guided by the sole idea of Moldovan stateness. Nevertheless, the 
Communist articulation of national identity has not been limited to the civic 
representation suggested by the idea of stateness (and, for example, by their policy 
regarding the promotion of the Russian language); they also draw on ethnic elements. 
Zgureanu-Guragata (2008: 51) argues that the Communists’ attention to Moldovan 
historical heritage moved the focus from Moldovan political nationalism to Moldovan 
cultural nationalism. Similarly, Danero Iglesias (2013a, 2013b) concludes that 
Communist representations are essentially exclusivist, thus fitting more within the 
frame of ethnic national identity than its civic form. Furthermore, the Communists are 
widely seen as representatives of Moldovanism across all my interviews, even those 
with the (Moldovanist) Socialists, stressing the fact that it is not only the Communists’ 
self-representation, but also the way in which this is mirrored that highlights their 
association with this discourse. The Communists offer a fascinating case study for a 
future analysis of foreign policy articulations in Moldova. This is because their choice of 
foreign policy discourse. Their foreign policy whilst in opposition (2009-2014) oscillated 
between a balanced, multi-vector, policy and a pro-Eastern one; as such, it fits well 
within the wider framework of the national identity cleavage in Moldova. 
Nevertheless, from 2003 after the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum until 2009, 
Communist foreign policy was discursively pro-European and, thus, went against the 
natural orientation of Moldovanism towards the East. Hence, their foreign policy 
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arguments during this time challenged the societal representation of the link between 
national identity and foreign policy. Since an examination of official articulations of 
foreign policy lies outside of the scope of this thesis, I analyse this construction in the 
Conclusion and argue that the Communists detached Romania from the EU in their 
construction.  In this way, they maintained their rejection of the Romanian other, 
whilst promoting a positive relationship with the EU. In this way, they manipulate and 
adapt the chains of equivalence and difference around the Moldovanist representation 
of the nation. Despite this nuance within the Communists’ discourse, my interviewees 
represented their pro-European orientation as only formal.  Meanwhile, their actual 
foreign policy is represented as ‘standing still’, compromising Moldova’s European 
ideals and, even, pro-Russian in reality. In this way, through a process of 
essentialisation, the Communists are represented as pro-Russian Moldovanists 
notwithstanding the complexity of their discourse.  
The Socialists have been active since 1991 in various forms, but have become 
visible on the Moldovan political scene in 2011, when three Communists MPs left for 
this party. The Socialists also promote a civic national identity; they argue that it has 
the potential to solve the ethnic conflict in Moldova, as highlighted by their promotion 
of the theme of Moldovan stateness (PG3, PG4). Nevertheless, just like the 
Communists, their representations have been riddled with ethnic elements and 
divisive issues. An example of the first is their focus on Moldovan language and the 
Moldovan ethnie, as the basis for the Moldovan nation (Socialistii 8.09.2014). The 
second is represented through the Socialists’ 2014 electoral slogan ‘Better with Russia’ 
(whereas Moldovan society seems to be equally split regarding the country’s foreign 
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policy orientation). Moreover, the Socialists are represented, especially by 
Romanianists, as being at one with the Communists, essentialising the Moldovanist 
parties. A series of my interviewees (e.g. PG5) have either used the expression 
‘socialists and communists’ or as Tănase (12.04.2012) calls them, ‘Dodoni’ using the 
plural from Igor Dodon’s (Socialist leader) surname, to conceptually merge the two. 
Others have identified them all within the ‘patriots’, thus also including the radical 
‘Patriots of Moldova’ Party23. This phenomenon illustrates the way in which left-wing 
parties are essentialised and represented as one. This mechanism is not unique to 
Moldova, but has complex implications in terms of national identity and foreign policy 
discourses in this country. Lastly, both of the two main Moldovanist parties articulate a 
mixed, civic and ethnic discourse of national identity, stressing the utility of the thesis’ 
comprehensive conceptualisation of this discourse, as detailed in Chapter 3.  
The third arguably Moldovanist party is the Moldovan Democrats. Building on 
the previous existence of a democrat party in Moldova, the current party is was 
formed through a merger between a splinter group of the Communists, led by former 
Communist Marian Lupu, and the Social Liberal Party in 2008. Their leader, president 
of the parliament Marian Lupu, argues for a 
civic, political nation […] Some see themselves as Romanian. The majority see 
themselves as Moldovan. We also have Ukrainians and Găgăuz and Bulgarians 
and Russians – and this is why I talk about a political nation. We treat those that 
consider themselves Romanian with respect, this is their right as citizens and 
their decision (Mihalache 18.04.2012). 
                                                          
23 Radical Moldovanist and extra-parliamentary party in Moldova. 
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They have been more moderate on issues such as language, at times even 
arguing for a reference to the ‘Moldovan (Romanian) language’ in the constitution 
(Unimedia 25.9.2012). Nevertheless, most of their subsequent arguments have been 
for strictly for the ‘Moldovan’ language, highlighting a nuance of ethnic construction 
and drawing harsh criticism from Romanianist circles (Tănase 25.9.2012). On other 
occasions they have rejected any discussion on national identity, as was the case in the 
Parliamentary discussion on the events of 1940 discussed above; I have presented this 
in detail in Section 3.4.2 and highlighted both the lack of content in the Democrats 
representation and its rejection by both Romanianists and Moldovanists. Moreover, 
the Democrats are part of the Alliance for European Integration. As such, both the 
Democrats and AIE are usually essentialised as Romanianists and pro-European (e.g. 
PG3). For instance, Moldovanist newspaper Comunistul (17.06.2011) criticises Marian 
Lupu for claiming his party is pro-Russian whilst, they argue, supporting unionists and 
meeting with anti-Russian US Republican politician John McCain.  Thus, despite their 
nuanced construction, the Democrats are neatly grouped together with the rest of the 
Alliance; this illustrates the problematic character of the Democrats’ ‘empty’ (i.e. 
lacking content/avoiding any debate on national identity) middle ground 
representation on national identity in Moldova. On the opposite side of the spectrum 
from the Communists and Socialists there is the former Alliance for European 
Integration (2009-2014). This alliance is composed of three parties, with vaguely 
different political and national identity views, but united through their focus on 
European integration. In 2013, the Liberal Party was replaced with the Liberal 
Reformed Party, a faction of the Liberals that ultimately chose to support the AIE 
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government; nevertheless, due to their ideological similarities, especially in terms 
national identity and foreign policy, they are analysed as one. Hence, the first of the 
AIE parties is the Liberals (conservative liberals). They are a moderate Romanianist 
party, unlike the extra-parliamentary National Liberal Party (PNL). Then, the main party 
in the AIE is the Liberal-Democratic Party, a conservative party. The Democratic Party is 
the third partner in the coalition and claims to represent a civic and centre ground 
Moldovan national identity. All three of these parties are relatively recent in terms of 
their electoral success and current political orientation, only appearing on the 
Moldovan political scene after 2005.   
The Moldovan Liberal Party is arguably the most outspoken parliamentary 
Romanianist party. Their manifestoes are clear in arguing for the cultural, patrimonial, 
historical, language and traditions-wise unity between Moldova and Romania; they 
also note that this is the ‘truth’, an idea highlighted in Chapter 3 as a source of 
radicalisation vis-à-vis the Moldovanism-Romanianism cleavage (PL Manifesto 2009, 
2010). Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats are a bit more vague, arguing only for the 
‘maintenance, development and promotion of [Moldova’s] cultural identity’ (PLDM 
Political Programme 2011), but never actually noting what that is. Just like all other 
parliamentary parties in Moldova, the Liberals and Liberal Democrats do not challenge 
the idea of Moldovan independence and as such they can be portrayed as 
Moldovanist, as they support the existence of the Moldovan state. Nevertheless, both 
from the point of view of their cultural representation and their construction of 
otherness, they are essentially Romanianist. Nevertheless, this nuance is lost on those 
who portray the PLDM as Romanianist; a common argument raised in my interviews 
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with Moldovans studying in Romania has been that Vlad Filat, the leader of the party, 
was at university in Romania and thus, must acknowledge that he is Romanian24 (e.g. 
YL4). Moreover, the affiliation with the Romanianist national identity discourse is 
attributed to all in the AIE government, the Liberals, the Liberal-Democrats and even 
the Democrats, who claim to promote a Moldovan civic identity. For example, 
Communist Vladimir Voronin criticised the whole Moldovan government for its 
actions. For instance, a meeting with the Romanian government in March 2012 is 
depicted as proof of AIE’s steps towards reunification with Romania and, hence, of 
their Romanianism (Adevărul 10.06.2012). This type of thinking is also present in the 
Socialists’ discourse. For example, a high-ranking member of the party stressed that 
since the Democrats always vote together with the other Alliance parties, they are 
essentially the same as the PL (PG3). This essentialisation of the government in left-
wing representations illustrates how political actors are framed as one or the other 
side in a dualistic representation if national identity; consequently, those with 
moderate views are pushed towards the margins of the political and national identity 
spectrum. More specifically, by ignoring the differences within the Alliance for 
European Integration, they also ignore a party such as the Moldovan Democrats (part 
of the AIE) who represent themselves as a civic Moldovanist party and, thus, are part 
of the middle ground. This phenomenon can be described as ‘seeing the world in black 
                                                          
24 There is a twofold argument supporting this idea. Firstly, there is the idea that all my interviewees 
who had studied in Romania were convinced there that they are essentially Romanian. Secondly, there 
is a purely bureaucratic argument, based on the fact that Romanian scholarships are aimed at ethnic 
Romanians abroad (YL4).  
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and white’ and is essential in delegitimising any form of centrist thinking on the 
political scene in Moldova. 
Additionally, the political cleavage is further deepened through the assignation 
of different meanings to a nodal point such as democracy. Each side of the political 
spectrum has specific representations for their discursive other and democratic-
undemocratic is one of the main dichotomies employed. Democracy is a contested 
concept as commonly accepted criteria for it are weighted (or even accepted) 
differently by different parties (Connoly 1974). In Moldova, it plays a key role in 
constructing the antagonism between left and right-wing political parties. The 
Moldovanists, e.g. Communists’ Party, usually portray democracy as equivalent to 
minority rights or the people’s will, whilst Romanianists equate democracy with the 
practices linked to the European Union (EU) and different from those of the 
communist past (Cash 2008). Yet, most importantly, they use these multiple definitions 
of democracy to argue for their own side’s democratic character and the other’s lack 
thereof. For instance, the PCRM’s argument against the closure of NIT25, a communist 
supporting TV channel, in 2012 utilised a definition of democracy based on the criteria 
of freedom of speech and minority rights. Hence, they portrayed the government, 
widely seen as being the main actor in NIT’s closure, as anti-democratic (24h.md 
24.05.2012; Comunistul 19.10.2012). Lastly, the Communists do not hesitate to use 
terms such as ‘Nazi’ or ‘fascist’ in order to symbolise the lack of democratic character 
in the Romanianist side of politics (Şupac 2012; Unimedia 23.6.2012). Similarly, right 
                                                          
25 Rarely mentioned using its full name, Noile Idei Televizate [New Televised Ideas]. 
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wing parties widely employ the term ‘democratic’ when referring to themselves and 
their actions, as noted in Liberal Dorin Chirtoaca’s speech on the 2012 
commemoration of the Twitter Revolution in PMAN, Chişinău (OT). From this point of 
view, the mere name of the Communists’ party is the obvious argument for their lack 
of democracy. The Romanianist/right-wing press (e.g. Timpul, Adevărul, Jurnalul de 
Chişinău) also reproduces a narrative of ‘democrats versus the communists’. Thus, 
through the use of different definitions for democracy, the existing cleavage in the 
political system and the national identity divide help enforce and reinforce each other 
in creating an antagonistic construction.  
Bringing these together, the national identity divide is translated into a political 
cleavage between the right and left wing politics. The very fact that these concepts of 
‘left’ and ‘right’ have come to signify national identity orientations illustrates the 
crucial role played by national identity in Moldovan society. More importantly, the 
essentialisation of these actors as left or right-wing, glosses over the nuances in the 
Romanianist and Moldovanist groups. The next sections return to the discussion on 
national identity constructions, whilst also strengthening the argument regarding the 
opposition between the political left and right, Romanianism and Moldovanism, by 
adding extra layers of dichotomies. They analyse how national others are represented 
within societal and political discourse in Moldova. Contemporary articulations are not 
only a continuation of academic and historical national identity representations, but 
also re-textualise a great part of their discourses, from the external other to their focus 
on language. In this context, Section 4.2 reiterates the main themes of the historical 
narratives of Moldovanism and Romanianism, as presented in Section 3.4. 
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4.2. Continuity and anti-imperialism 
The two main themes of Romanianist and Moldovanist historical constructions are 
‘continuity’ and, respectively, ‘stateness’.  The former is summed up through the 
representation of Romanian resistance on Bessarabian26 territory, the continuity of 
their language and culture, as part of the Romanian one, irrespective of historical 
twists and turns. Similarly, the theme of stateness is focused around the continuity of 
the Moldovan state in its different forms, from the medieval Moldovan principality to 
post-1991 independence; it stresses the same idea of survival, but within the official 
borders of a political form of organisation. Both narratives revolve around a form of 
(arguably) primordialist view of the nation as withstanding the ages. Moldovan author 
Ion Druţă makes a very passionate point regarding this idea when arguing that survival 
is the biggest enigma of Moldovan history (Druţă 2006 [1987]). However, as post-
structuralists argue regarding the dual nature of our thinking, continuity, survival and 
even stateness have no meaning but for the possibility of an alternative state; the rest 
of the chapter argues that this state, be it occupation or Russification, is defined in 
relation to Moldova’s external others.  
This is illustrated in the analysis on key historical events. For instance, the events 
of 1812 (Section 3.4.2) are defined by assigning different meaning to the Russian other, 
its actions and their consequences, whilst 1918 (Section 3.4.2) is defined by two 
                                                          
26 As illustrated in the Introduction, Bessarabia and Moldova are not equivalents, but this thesis uses the 
former as an equivalent in historical contexts. 
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opposing views regarding Romania’s influence. Hence, Moldovan history can be seen 
as focused around the defiance of repeated occupations, as this land was always ‘at 
the cross-roads of empires‘(PG13). Thus, the two national identity historical narratives 
are constructed against an external other.  Additionally, the language criterion within 
these articulations is also defined through a negative set of characteristics, as being 
different from the language perceived as imposed by the external other, Russian or 
Romanian. Drawing from these findings, I define anti-imperialism as a construction 
that represents the nation in opposition to an external other; this external other is 
defined through a historical relationship of power, a former occupier/national centre. 
Furthermore, anti-imperialism draws consequences to the current day. 
The relationship with the external other is not limited to its role as a threat to 
the self. It also plays an important role in the mutual representation of the two main 
national identity discourses. Both Moldovanism and Romanianism are affected by the 
fact that they are to a certain extent imported concepts, especially when it comes to 
historiography (Ihrig 2006, 2008). Romanianism is contaminated through its link with 
Romanian ‘occupation’ and its promotion 1918-1940, whereas Moldovanism through 
Russian ‘occupation’ and a priori through its form (van Meurs 1998). In this way, 
Romanianism’s anti-imperialist rejection of Russia translates into its opposition to 
Moldovanism and reciprocally. In this manner, external othering reproduces the 
radical opposition between the two discourses.  But more importantly, the next 
section stresses that the anti-imperial character of the two national identity discourses 
is not only a historical construct but also present in contemporary representations.  
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The first note of anti-imperialism in current day discourses is its presence in the 
language used to represent the ‘others’. The words ‘empire’ or ‘imperial’ are used 
extensively to define external actors in Moldova. A very common example is the way in 
which, voluntarily or not, people slip into talking about the Soviet Union as the ‘Soviet 
Empire’ (e.g. PG7). A PNL member described the plans for the Euro-Asian Union as 
Putin’s ‘empire’ (PG2), as did a number of Moldovan journalists whilst discussing 
Russian politics in Moldova, from gas to cultural policy (e.g. Corai 27.09.2011; Damian 
10.10.2011; Şela 2011). Similarly, former president Voronin called Romania ‘the last 
empire in Europe’ (12.10.2007), whilst in 2012 he accused the EU of imperialism 
(Voronin 23.05.2013). Chapter 4 takes this analysis a step further, studying how the 
relations between these empires, or Great Powers, define Moldovan fate.  
Content-wise though, the historical theme of continuity is not really relevant to 
contemporary discourses. Hence, in order to bring the debate on ‘otherness’ up to 
date, the thesis focuses on how this idea translates to the current day concepts of 
sovereignty and independence and analyse their connection to the external other. 
Sovereignty and independence are analysed as equivalent throughout this section for a 
series of reasons, both theoretical and case-specific. Definitions used in the IR 
literature combine the two characteristics into one; for example, Cynthia Weber, in her 
study deconstructing sovereignty, argues that 
generally, sovereignty is taken to mean the absolute authority a state holds over 
a territory and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by 
other sovereign states as a sovereign state (1994: 1). 
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Thus, independence is subsumed and studied within the overarching concept of 
sovereignty. The other argument for this amalgamation stems from the use of these 
concepts together within Moldovan discourses. This is apparent in official documents, 
such as the Moldovan Constitution (1994) that mentions ‘sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity’ always together (in articles 2, 41, 77, 108 and 142). This 
mirrors the theoretical literature on these concepts. Drawing from Benoist (1999: 118) 
I employ sovereignty to mean the supreme public power that has the ‘capacity to 
impose its authority’.  Alternately, Weber (1994) stresses that sovereignty is a 
constructed concept in an exercise of ‘writing the state – with particular boundaries, 
competencies and legitimacies available to it’ (1994: 3); she also acknowledges that 
sovereignty is defined in opposition to intervention and threat. Based on the idea that 
in Moldova the two national identity discourses are essentially writing the state as 
belonging to a nation, this thesis employs Weber’s (1994) strategy of examining both 
sovereignty and the elements that threaten it.  
The idea of independence dominated Moldovan political debate in the late 
1980s and early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed and also features heavily in 
contemporary debates. The most relevant use of the nodal point of sovereignty lies 
not in its content, but in the way in which it comes to be defined as 
‘sovereignty/independence from someone/thing’, thus an important part in the anti-
imperial discourse. Although officially Moldova is an independent state, most 
representations challenge this status. Thus, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 employ this 
conceptualisation of sovereignty/independence as defined against an ‘other’. This is 
employed to argue that both Moldovanism and Romanianism are built around the 
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rejection of an external other, linked to an internal other and a conspiratorial one. This 
set of equivalences overlaps with the dual structure encompassing language and 
historical representations analysed in Chapter 3. In order to build this argument, the 
chapter discusses Moldovanist and Romanianist multi-layered construction of 
otherness separately. 
 
4.3. Moldovanist representations of otherness 
For Moldovanists, othering processes are organised around the nodal point of 
stateness. It is the central theme of historical discourses and ‘translates’ into the 
concepts of independence, together with sovereignty, as the main focus of 
contemporary debates.  
 
Stateness Test 
 
1. Protecting and affirming Moldovan stateness, territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
2. Respecting Moldova neutrality and not accepting the integration of the country in any 
politico-military block, whilst not accepting any form of troop or military objective 
deployment on RM territory.  
3. Respecting the constitutional norms in place and keeping the Constitution intact; not 
accepting the adoption of a new constitution.  
4. Ensuring Moldova stays as a member of the CIS. 
5. Maintaining a balance in political relations between East and West. 
6. Keeping the Moldovan language as the ‘state language’ of the Republic of Moldova. 
7. Ensuring civic peace rules in the country, by consolidating the Moldovan people and 
respecting ethnic minority rights in the Republic of Moldova. 
8. Protecting the autochthonous moral values and traditions, in the Christian spirit, whilst 
respecting the Republic of Moldova’s laic character.  
9. Keeping his political neutrality as a head of state, not becoming a member of any party; 
promoting political pluralism and acting as an arbiter in between the three main powers in 
the state and other political actors in Moldova. 
10. Having only one citizenship, the Moldovan one.  
(Socialistii 25.06.2013) 
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Stateness is defined as identification to the state. This stems from the definition of its 
opposite, the stateness problem, as the ‘profound differences about the territorial 
boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has 
the right of citizenship in that state’ (Stepan and Linz 1996: 16). Yet, this concept is 
studied here through the meanings attached to it in the Moldovan context. The theme 
of stateness has dominated political debates in Moldova since 2012 when Socialist Igor 
Dodon, used the ‘Stateness Test’ to decide whether his deputies would vote for 
Nicolae Timofti, the AIE candidate for the Moldovan presidency.  This test consisted of 
ten ideas the future president must adhere to and contains a wide array of criteria, 
from ensuring Moldovan independence, sovereignty and neutrality, to keeping the 
Moldovan language as the ‘state language’ (Socialistii 25.06.2013). The association of 
stateness with territorial integrity and sovereignty (no. 1 above) is key in 
understanding the representation of threat and the processes of othering in 
Moldovanist discourse. For instance, the association between these concepts is 
present in a law project put forward by the Socialists in 2012, providing for a ban on 
unionists meetings and rallies, as they are threatening Moldovan ‘sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity’ (Dodon 29.03.2012).  
These stateness criteria highlight the wide array of issues and actors that can be 
regarded as threatening Moldovan sovereignty, especially focused around the 
unnamed Romanian and Western influence. Building on these, the threat to stateness, 
sovereignty and/or independence functions on two levels, the external other and its 
internal ‘agents’. In this context, the framework for analysing nationalism should be 
expanded to encompass not only an internal and external ‘other’, but also a 
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‘conspiratorial’ other. This type of internal other is a representative of the external 
other and its will, but within the country, essentially a ‘fifth column’27. This 
conspiratorial ‘other’ is one of the main elements threatening Moldovan 
representations of independence. With this in mind, the next sections analyse the way 
in which Romania (Section 4.3.1) and the West/EU (Section 4.3.2) threaten Moldovan 
sovereignty within Moldovanist representations. 
 
4.3.1. The Romanian Threat 
The first threat to Moldovan sovereignty is Romania, as an external other, and 
associated with it the Romanianists political and academic elite, as conspiratorial 
others.  The most notable representations of this phenomenon appear on the occasion 
of historical commemorations. Lately, these occasions have been dominated by 
marches and protests, in the Romanianist case led by organisations such as Actiunea 
2012, the Council of Unity and the Liberal Party (Section 3.4.2). The actors involved in 
these protests are accused of threatening Moldovan sovereignty, whilst also having 
Romanian support or representing Romanian interests. These accusations can take 
various forms, but even centrist, moderate actors such as the Democratic Party are 
known to articulate this type of discourse. For example, democrat leader, Marian Lupu 
argued that 
                                                          
27 The concept of the ‘fifth column’ was first used during the Spanish Civil War, to define a group of 
people who undermine a larger group, a nation or a state, from inside.  
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I wouldn’t exclude the idea that behind these [protests28] there are extreme right 
parties, but also extreme left parties, as they only aid in polarising society […] I 
could not exclude, and I have no arguments at hand, but simple logic tells me 
that, without an outside influence, they just don’t happen (Ziarul de Iaşi 
10.09.2012). 
These protests are delegitimised through their association with extremism; more 
importantly, the unionists are portrayed as a ‘conspiratorial’ other, representing the 
wishes of the external other (the ‘outside influence’), in this instance Romania. 
Additionally, Moldovanists represent the parties in government through the same 
frame (PG4; Saptamana 18.04.2011). These constructions are most obvious in 
moments of radicalisation, such as the 2009 Twitter Revolution (see Introduction). The 
then president, Vladimir Voronin transferred the blame for the riots in Chişinău from 
Moldovan citizens to the external actor, Romania (BBC 9.4.2014). In this context, he 
argues that it is Romania who both inspired and provoked these protests. He 
associates the Romanian ‘other’ with the revolutionary internal ‘other’, externalizing 
the threat of the protests and constructing it as a threat against Moldovan sovereignty 
and independence. He also portrays Romania’s ‘historical issue’ vis-à-vis Moldova as a 
tendency that are ’both obsolete and anti-European’, that other ‘European states have 
long surpassed’ (Voronin 15.04.2009). Hence, Romania is represented through a series 
of negative characteristics, such as its underdevelopment and lack of European 
character. Lastly, both these conflictual situations present a portrayal of the self, be it 
the Democrats or the Communists as the agents of stability, maintaining the 
sovereignty and independence of Moldova against the Romanian ‘onslaught’ (Starîş 
26.07.2012). Communist deputy Grigore Petrenco summed-up this idea when he 
                                                          
28 Unionist protest organised by Actiunea 2012 in September 2012 in Chişinău.  
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declared that the ‘unionist’ protests in August 2012, controlled by the AIE government, 
are aimed at throwing Moldovan society into chaos, whilst the Communists function as 
a stabilising factor (Publika 5.08.2012). This last quote also highlights the way in which 
the AIE is essentialised together with the unionist parties/groups, emphasising the 
basic mechanism through which the radicalisation of the two discourses is achieved.  
Additionally, the Romanian ‘minority’ is also connected with the Romanian 
external other. The Moldovanists associate to the point of overlapping the internal 
‘other’, the Romanian minority, with the internal conspiratorial other and, hence, with 
the external other’s agency. The link in between these is apparent in representations 
of the corruption of the Moldovan leadership. Moldovanist discourse on the Romanian 
minority focuses especially on this perceived link between the leadership and this 
group, even equating the two, as 
We respect everyone, including the minorities. I appreciate ethnic minorities, but 
they need to be as minorities are in a democratic state, not try to rule everyone 
else, the majority. Here, the majority are Moldovans, not Romanian. There is a 
wide array of opinion polls, but the Romanians are about 10-12% and these 10-
12% have no right to run the country (PG3).   
The rejection of the Romanian minority’s perceived superiority, as ‘running the 
country’ reiterates the idea of hierarchy; moreover, it reinforces my argument 
regarding the moderate character of national identity discourses in current day 
Moldova. A radical alternative to this construction is summed up in the expression 
‘Romanians, take your luggage to and go to Bucharest!’29 (YL4), a Moldovanist 
invitation to all those who consider themselves Romanian to leave Moldova, thus 
                                                          
29 The direct translation is ‘Romanians, your luggage, Bucharest!’ but I have adapted the expression in 
order to clarify its meaning to a foreign audience.  
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excluding them from the nation and the country. The focus on minorities and political 
leadership stresses a secondary dichotomy within this discourse, that between the 
political leadership and the people of Moldova; this representation stands at the basis 
of the ‘democratic’ argument. This contention sums up the idea that Moldovanism is 
the will of the people, as highlighted in the 1994 referendum30, and opposed to the 
Romanianist elites. This dichotomy reproduces the cleavage in between the two 
national identity discourses, whilst also being mirrored within the Romanianist 
representation, as underlined below (Section 4.4.2).   
Thus, another conspiratorial other, accused of having betrayed Moldova’s 
independence are the actors that have the power to decide on Moldova’s fate, i.e. the 
Moldovan government. The main focus of Moldovanist recriminations are the 
Romanianist parties, especially the Liberals, but also the Alliance for European 
Integration in its entirety. For example the AIE is accused not only of promoting 
Romanian values, e.g. language, but being more radical and, even, unionists. Igor 
Dodon explains this idea quite clearly, bringing forward the issue of history teaching in 
Moldova:  
The governing alliance seems to be infected by the unionist bug. There is no 
other way of explaining why the pretend statists in AIE accept to apply 
propaganda instruments that threaten the independence and sovereignty of the 
Republic of Moldova. With their accord […] ‘Romanian history’ [school texbook] 
now divides our people (Dodon 20.03.2012). 
Hence, history is a criterion in constructions of independence. Moreover, the use of 
the word ‘pretend’ is an important cue for this research on the representation of the 
                                                          
30 When the Moldovans voted in an overwhelming majority (98%) for Moldova to remain independent.  
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self and the other, as it illustrates the way in which reflections of identity may be 
radically different from the intentions of the discourse constructing said identity; the 
AIE leaders may represent themselves as statists, but according to Dodon, they are just 
pretending and are actually unionists. Romanianists tend to be portrayed as unionists, 
essentialising that group and linking it directly to the external other, Romania. This is 
achieved by ignoring any occurrence of more nuanced versions of Romanianism, e.g. 
people that may support the idea of the Romanian language and the Romanian nation, 
but believe in the existence of Moldova as a second Romanian state. This is apparent 
in Igor Dodon’s argument that associates the AIE with unionism and ignores the 
nuanced Romanianism of the Liberal Democrats and the moderate Moldovanism of 
the Democrats. In this manner, essentialisation functions as the main mechanism in 
ensuring the radicalisation of the national identity debate, both by ignoring historical 
complexities within these discourses and my brushing over ideological/national 
identity differences between their supporters. 
Communist deputy Inna Supac (2012) also accused the Alliance for European 
Integration of promoting Romanianism and reunification with Romania. One of the 
arguments she brings to support this point is the lack of reaction to Romanian 
president Traian Băsescu’s praise for Marshal Antonescu’s call to the Romanian armies 
to free Bessarabia in 1941. As a follow up to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the 
Soviet occupation of Bessarabia, Romanian leader Antonescu made a famous plea to 
his soldiers to free this territory at the beginning of the anti-Russian campaign in 1941 
(Section 3.4.2). Hence, she positions herself both against the Romanian attitude 
regarding Antonescu and criticises the Moldovan government for not taking an anti-
178 
 
 
 
imperial stance. Even more evident through the choice of imagery, i.e. the idea of a 
colony, Voronin (30.10.2012) argues that their party, the Communists, is ‘the only one 
that fights for the country and the only who sees it among the other states of the 
world and not a colony of Romania’.  The same views were articulated in an interview 
with a member of the Socialist party. He criticised Romania’s attitude regarding 
Moldova, as to them 
with regret, beginning with Iliescu and all the way to Băsescu, we are the second 
Romanian state, which isn’t normal. Romania thinks and will think that Moldova 
is part of the Romanian space and this is not positive, progressive… (PG3). 
Moreover, the issue of language is brought forward to reject the perceived colonial 
position of Romania. The Communists acknowledge their image of being ‘anti-
Romanian’ and portray themselves as defenders of ‘originality’ and fighting against the 
imposition of Romanian linguistic standards (Voronin 2011). This highlights the 
rejection of Romanian superiority in terms of language and the power and hierarchical 
relationships intrinsic to these constructions. Additionally, Moldovan Ambassador to 
Bucharest, Iurie Reniţă was threatened by the Communists with being recalled after he 
had stated in an interview that he speaks Romanian and is Romanian. PCRM members 
even went as far as hinting at a concerted action from the Moldovan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to promote unionism (Unimedia 2.12.2011). Lastly, rounding up the 
discussion it is worth noting that these arguments also appear quite poignantly in the 
Socialists’ stateness criteria, i.e. points 6 and 10 regarding the Moldovan language and 
the president’s single citizenship.  
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4.3.2. The European Union as a secondary external other 
Next to Romania, the EU is the second threat to Moldovan sovereignty in Moldovanist 
representations. The main focus of this articulation is the effect of EU integration on 
national characteristics. However, very few Moldovanists mentioned the transfer of 
part of the member states’ powers to Brussels that would affect Moldovan sovereignty 
directly. Despite the somewhat improbable thesis of Moldova’s EU membership in the 
short term (see Section 5.3.4 for more detail), this threat is presented as current, not 
linked to a future scenario. For example, this idea comes across in discussions 
regarding the Law on Equality of Opportunity in 201231; the main arguments against 
the EU portrayed the law as undermining Moldovan traditions and Christian spirit as 
key elements of Moldovan national identity (Adevărul 28.05.2012). Hence, what could 
be considered as a foreign policy option is constructed around national identity ideas, 
highlighting the importance of identity in understanding contemporary politics in 
Moldova.  
Another layer to this Moldovanist argument pinpoints the fact that it is not the 
EU directly, but the AIE government that implements the EU’s wishes and functions as 
a conspiratorial other (Comunistul 13.02.2015). For example, the threat of the Law on 
Equality of Opportunity, a threat to Moldovan traditions, is attributed to both the EU 
                                                          
31 The Law on Equality of Opportunity, adopted in 2012 was perceived on the Moldovan political scene 
as a requirement of the European Union. More importantly, a clause regarding the equality of 
opportunity for people with different sexual orientations split the Moldovan society, with protests 
against what was perceived as a betrayal of Moldova’s traditions.   
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and the Moldovan political leadership, the AIE (Unimedia 25.04.2012). Similarly, the 
link between the EU and the current government is also present in the legitimation 
awarded by Brussels to the AIE or, as the Socialists and Communists would see it, in 
their lack of criticism of the AIE government (Flux 20.01.2012). They argue that the 
breaches in democratic rules in Moldova take place because of Europe’s choice to 
ignore the government’s corruption together with the EU’s unchallenged support for 
the AIE (Stati 12.11.2012; Voronin 7.5.3013). Within this discourse, the opposition is 
portrayed as resisting both threats to Moldova’s Christian character and the current, 
AIE, government. The discussion regarding the ‘corruption’ of elites is taken further in 
Section 5.2, discussing in more depth the way in which the Moldovan leadership is 
portrayed as representing either the threatening or the friendly external other.   
Additionally, a key criterion used by Igor Dodon to underscore the idea of 
stateness relates to Transnistria; according to him any form of secession on the part of 
the self-proclaimed republic would render Moldovan stateness null and void (Dodon 
20.6.2013). Chişinău has not exercised sovereignty in Transnistria since the conflict in 
the early 1990s, but Moldovanist discourses are very strict in considering the territory 
as part of Moldova. The threat to Moldovan stateness comes, in this context, through 
a specific EU policy; the EU requested enhanced border controls on the Nistru River32. 
Through this, both the EU and the Moldovan government, as the actor that 
implemented this policy, are portrayed as a threat to Moldovan stateness. Dodon 
(20.06.2013) also argued that there is a general view in Chişinău, stemming from 
                                                          
32 Transnistria is across the Nistru River from Moldova, as the name states (except for the town of 
Bendery/Tighina) (see Introduction). 
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Romanian opinions, that the EU integration can only be achieved by ‘leaving 
Transnistria behind’.  The idea of giving up Transnistria was put forward in some of my 
interviews, e.g. with a Moldovan columnist and a lecturer at the Moldovan State 
University (M1, EX1), but never in the official Moldovan discourse, which is committed 
to reintegrating the country. These examples highlight the representation of the 
Moldovan government as a conspiratorial other, threatening Moldovan sovereignty, 
through their position as an agent of the EU or for the purpose of EU integration; the 
depiction of the government is thus  imbued with the characteristics of the, so-called, 
extremist parties and groups. This augments the Moldovanist discourse regarding 
Transnistria, focused on the Romanian threat (King 2000) and, whilst underscoring 
their own role as key for the reintegration of the country. 
Lastly, in the representation of external others, the EU and Romania are equated. 
This is achieved by transferring Romania’s threat as a national ‘other’ to the EU as an 
actor and linking it to AIE’s pro-European foreign policy orientation. The Communists 
emphasised this in a statement made at the end of Dirk Scheubel’s, the EU 
representative in Moldova, mandate: 
Scheubel has done a lot of things against Moldova’s integrity. The fact that he 
has organised his farewell party at the Romanian embassy in Chişinău has 
showed everyone whose interests this politician actually promotes (Unimedia 
12.07.2013).  
The connection between the EU and Romania is not only achieved through the 
similitude in the threat it can pose to Moldovan sovereignty, but also through the 
direct contamination of EU officials with unionist thinking. The EU is represented as 
accepting Romania’s pro-unionist actions, not contesting their incompatibility with 
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international norms and values. One such example was the EU’s lack of reaction to 
Romanian Prime Minister’s, Emil Boc, refusal to accept the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
and, implicitly, its consequences; the agreement, signed 23 August 1939, defined Nazi 
Germany’s and Soviet Russia’s areas of influence, whilst also drawing the border 
between the two on the Prut River, between Romania and the current day Republic of 
Moldova (see Introduction). Thus, the rejection of this agreement is highly symbolic, 
being equated with a recognition of Moldovan independence, by recognising the 
partition of Moldova in the 1940s. This declaration, albeit not making any reference to 
the Romanian position towards the consequences of the Pact (i.e. Moldova’s 
independence) was received by the Communists as no less than a threat to Moldovan 
sovereignty and independence (PCRM 29.09.2010; Stati 12.11.2012). Concluding, 
Moldovanists represent the EU as an actor which should defend values such as 
sovereignty and democracy, but fails to do so. 
In the Moldovanist anti-imperial construction, the threat to Moldovan 
sovereignty is then multiple. It is represented firstly through external others, such as 
Romania and the EU, providing different challenges to the Moldovan nation and 
Moldovan sovereignty, but also amalgamated into a single menace. They are 
associated with internal and conspiratorial others, from the Romanianist cultural elites 
to the Moldovan government; these groups are accused of acting in the interest or as 
agents of these external others. In this way, Moldovanists weave a web of meanings 
that stress the multiplicity of threats and ‘others’ of the Moldovan nation; more 
importantly, these others are all equated with the discursive other, Romanianism, 
reproducing the cleavage between the two national identity articulations. 
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Furthermore, the multitude of examples utilised have illustrated the way in which 
stateness and, linked to it, sovereignty and independence, are fluid concepts. This is 
taken further in the next section by examining the way in which Romanianists 
represent sovereignty and independence. It argues that the Romanianist construction 
mirrors the Moldovanist representation of othering, whilst deepening the cleavage 
between the two discourses.  
 
4.4. Romanianist representations of otherness 
Romanianist constructions are very similar to the Moldovanist representation of 
otherness. It too focuses on the connection between the external other and the 
internal other as a representative of the external other’s agency. Additionally, the 
Romanianist construction is focused on its historical external other, Russia, and re-
textualises this discourse to explain contemporary events. This highlights the mirrored 
representations of the two discourses and offers the basis for the processes of 
essentialisation that inform the radical cleavage in between them.  
As seen above, sovereignty and independence take different meanings within 
the different national identity and political party discourses. The Moldovanists defined 
sovereignty as mainly associated with territorial integrity and against the Romanian 
unionist threat. Meanwhile, the Romanianists equate it with values and the events of 
1991, when the Republic of Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union. 
Moldovan Liberals represent independence as ‘freedom’ in the narrative of the 
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struggle for independence of the 1980-90s. In this manner, independence is defined as 
opposed to being ‘occupied, subjugated […] under the laws of other, Soviet, 
communist-totalitarian laws’ (PL 27.08.2010); they also claim that independence is 
associated with the defence of national characteristics, even by military means (PL 
17.12.2012). The Liberal-Democrat representation of independence is similar, also 
based on the historical moment of 1991 (PLDM 3.09.2012). However, ‘independence’ 
is not only defined in relationship to the events of 1991, but brought forward to the 
current day. In this context, a declaration by (then) interim president Mihai Ghimpu 
explains the current relationship between the external other and independence: 
we voted for independence in order to break away from the Russian empire. We 
were under the tsarist and Soviet [sic], and now we are under the Russian 
democratic empire. They recognise our independence, but have occupied a third 
of our country (PL 5.08.2011).  
The quote stresses the way in which at the linguistic and conceptual level, Russia is still 
portrayed as an imperial power, through its role in Transnistria. The role played by 
national identity in representations of sovereignty is highlighted through the 
reiteration of the historical narrative of Russian occupation. Unlike the Moldovanists, 
the Liberals focus on ‘independence’, not on sovereignty; yet they attach similar 
meanings to it, defining it as ‘independence from the external other’. This may be just 
a difference of nuance, but it illustrates the way in which the same idea is 
conceptualised differently by the two sides. With that representation of independence 
in mind, the next two sections argue that Romanianists associate the external Russian 
other with three internal others: the ‘separatist’ territories (Section 4.4.1), the Russian 
minority (Section 4.4.2) and the pro-Russian leadership (Section 4.4.3). Then, the 
‘Russian Threat’ sub-section (4.4.4) brings these together and highlights the nature of 
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the external ‘othering’ process, i.e. the representations of Russia in Romanianist 
discourses. 
 
4.4.1. The Transnistrian other 
The most obvious Romanianist threat to independence is the breakaway region of 
Transnistria. Whereas the very existence of Transnistria is a threat to Moldovan 
sovereignty over its whole territory, the representations of these circumstances are 
the focus of this analysis. I argue that the dominant representation of Transnistria is as 
an agent of Russian interests in Moldova, whilst have no agency or identity of its own. 
Thus, Transnistria is conceptualised as an internal other, whilst also being linked to the 
external other, Russia. Some of my interviewees portray it as ‘a Russian lynchpin and 
Russia will keep it, not necessarily for evil intentions, but, you know, just in case’ (OT6). 
In general terms, 45% of Moldovans think that both Moldovan and Transnistrian 
leaders follow external commands in regards to their relations (IIMD September 2014: 
152). It is notable that across my interviews, most of my respondents focused on the 
connection between Transnistria and Russia and only a couple on the leadership in 
Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) or the Trasnistrian people (EX1, YL3). It can be 
argued that, through an essentialising process, Transnistria is portrayed as a totality, 
from its government, the Russian presence there, all the way to its people33. For 
                                                          
33 A caveat must be made here, as there are certain discourses that represent the people of Transnistria 
through the people-government dichotomy (see Moldovanist representations – in this chapter), but 
under-represented both in the press and amongst my interviewees.   
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example Liberal/Reformed Liberal deputy Ana Guţu, in her report regarding Russian 
Deputy Prime Minister and  Representative for Transnistria Dmitri Rogozin’s34 April 
2012 visit to Tiraspol makes no mention of the Transnistrian’s leadership or people’s 
attitudes, focusing on the Russian agency and Transnistria as a whole (PL 26.04.2012).   
For Romanianists, Transnistria functions as a conspiratorial other by influencing 
Moldovan politics, e.g. by keeping Moldova from its path towards the EU.  More 
importantly, Transnistria is associated with the agency and the wishes of Russia, as 
explained by one of my interviewees, an entrepreneur in Chişinău 
‘[Russia] should recognise de facto the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Moldova over its whole territory, to withdraw its troops […] but they’re not 
doing this. Why not? Very simple, because through Transnistria they can 
influence the situation in Moldova, so this is what it should be and I don’t know if 
this is possible’ (OT3).   
Furthermore, the representation of Russian agency as opposed to the EU illustrates 
the dichotomy between the two. These views are also reflected on the political level. 
The same Ana Guţu portrayed the Russian attitude towards Transnistria as a threat to 
Moldova’s ‘sovereignty, independence and a manifestation of Russia’s continued 
imperial thinking’ (PL 26.04.2012). This sentiment is not limited to nationalist political 
parties, also expanding into civil society in Moldova; for instance, human right 
organisation Promo-Lex representative, Ion Manole, argued that the 2013 Trasnistrian 
civil society’s request for independence was an orchestrated move from ‘external 
actors’ (RFE/EL 2.07.2013).  Hence, there is an attempt to essentialise Transnistria, 
glossing over the multiplicity of opinions within the country and representing the self-
                                                          
34 He visits Moldova quite regularly, being quite a colourful presence. As a high ranking official, he has 
easily become a symbol of Russian foreign policy in Moldova for analysts in Chişinău. 
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proclaimed state is as a Russian agent. The representation of Transnistria as a 
conspiratorial other feeds into the negative portrayal of Russia. Moreover, the current 
issue of Transnistria enables the translation of the historical other into a 21st century 
issue: 
Russia is the secular enemy of the freedom of the Romanian people. Maintaining 
our territories under Russian occupation, the Russian refusal to withdraw their 
troops and armament from our territory is proof (Pavlicenco 30.06.2013). 
Thus, the very existence of Transnistria is portrayed as being nothing more than a 
Russian endeavour to continue its imperial rule in Moldova, whilst Transnistrian 
agency is ignored altogether. Nevertheless, an alternative to this essentialising 
discourse has been offered by a couple of my interviewees (YL3, EX1), who stressed 
the existence of a Romanian population in Transnistria. However, even with this 
nuance, their main concern would be to move this population back to the right bank of 
the Nistru and leave Transnistria to the Russians/Ukrainians. On a similar note, the 
Găgăuz Autonomous region35 is also portrayed as denting Moldovan independence, 
through their rejection of some of Chişinău’s decisions, such as language teaching or 
even foreign policy (e.g. PG5; Moldova Suverană 16.10.2014).  
 
 
 
                                                          
35 As a reaction to the Găgăuz will for independence in the early 1990s, the Moldovan government 
organised their territory in the form of an autonomous region (see Introduction). 
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4.4.2. National minorities – the ‘internal’ other 
The second internal other of the Romanianist discourses is represented by national 
minorities, as stressed in Chapter 3. These are essentialised, not only linguistically, but 
also by assuming their interests to be those of the Russian ‘other’. Additionally, the 
minorities are represented within a hierarchic construction and perceived as superior 
to the (Moldovan) Romanian ethnic group. The national minorities comprise of a series 
of ethnic groups, Russian, Ukrainian, Găgăuz, etc. 36, only slightly less than a third of 
Moldova’s overall population (Census 2004). By including the Găgăuz and to certain 
extent the inhabitants of Transnistria (roughly one third Moldovans, Russians and 
Ukrainians), they link the argument with the previous section.  But more importantly, 
throughout my interviews with Romanianists and the Romanianist press, the term 
used to define all minorities is ‘Russian-speaking’, illustrating the perceived linguistic 
dichotomy between the Slavic and the Latin languages (see Section 3.3). Even more, 
these minorities are represented as  
Very stubborn people, they believe themselves to be superior and for that 
reason they don’t learn our language, although they do understand. You go to 
the shop and they respond in Russian, you keep talking in Romanian, and he’s 
still speaking Russian. They should have learned in all the time they’ve been 
here, but they’re very stubborn and  they think themselves as some form of 
superior race, or at least a on a superior step (OT5). 
Thus, the linguistic otherness is augmented by the fact that these minorities refuse to 
learn the Romanian/Moldovan language, whilst the frustration presented above is 
stressed in the Moldovan representation of the self’s inferiority (see Ciscel 2007). The 
                                                          
36 According to Moldovanists, they include the Romanian minority.  
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hierarchical representation of the ethnic minorities is augmented through their 
portrayal as dominating certain power structures. The Găgăuz are argued to be over-
represented within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences (EX3, EX4), whilst the Russian 
speaking minorities are still running the Moldovan economy (YL2). 
But more importantly, the main criticism attached to these ethnic groups is the 
fact that through their votes for the Communists and Socialists they undermine the 
‘majority’ pro-Western foreign policy orientation. A youth leader in the Liberal Party 
explained this phenomenon very well 
The minorities should support the majority or to ask for some of their rights, in 
virtue of their position as minority, but not to derailing the course the majority 
wants. With regret here, the minorities, the Găgăuz, the Russian sometimes try 
to derail the majority. That is why here, even after 20 years, there’s still an ethnic 
vote, the majority still vote for the communists, seeing them as the only 
guarantee for their rights, but also their aspirations, to get closer to Russia (PG5). 
This is easily challenged by an expert on minority issues in Moldova who argues that no 
party in Moldova is actually oriented towards catering for the national minorities. 
Thus, their fear of other parties is the main reason why ethnic minorities turn to the 
Communists (EX8; see also Protsyk and Osoian 2010).  
Thus, these two internal others, Transnistria and the Russian ethnic minorities 
are portrayed by the Romanianists as both a threat to the totality of the nation and as 
a perceived ‘fifth column of Russia’, an internal arm of the external other. Moreover, 
through the representations of their interests as belonging to Russia, they have no 
agency in themselves, being just an extension of the external ‘other’s agency. 
Romanianists also extend this association to the political sphere, especially to the 
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Moldovan leadership (2001-2009, the Communists were in power), presented in the 
next sub-section and also discussed within the wider setting of Moldova’s ‘inferiority 
complex’ in Section 5.3.  
 
4.4.3. Leadership, the conspiratorial other 
In addition to national minorities, the Moldovanist leadership, as the actors that have 
the power to decide, are usually accused of having betrayed Moldova’s independence. 
Mirroring the Moldovanist articulation, the Romanianist political other spans from the 
parliamentary Communists and Socialists to the more extreme organisations such as 
the Patriots of Moldova or the Social-Democrat Party. These parties are not only 
depicted as pro-Russian, but as Russian agents, representing Russian wishes in 
Moldova. For instance, the Communists’ foreign policy for the eight years they were in 
power, 2001-2009, is summed up as ‘they did what Moscow said, there was no foreign 
policy, they went to Moscow and got direct orders from there’ (PG5). This portrayal as 
Russian agents extends to the wider group of Moldovanist parties and organisations, 
from the radical group the Patriots of Moldova and the Voievod Movement to the 
Communists and Socialists; this is highlighted in the representation of the Bălţi 
protests37 as Russian involvement in Moldova. Whilst Romanianist press covered this 
issue extensively, a brief conversation in Chişinău two months later illustrated this type 
of thinking very well: 
                                                          
37 An unionist march, led by Actiunea 2012, was confronted with a left wing Communist and Social-
democrat counter-march in Bălţi, May 2012. 
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R2: The Moldovan Patriots […] they didn’t gather because they think in this way, 
they gathered there because there was a political order. 
I: Whose order? 
R: The communists’, Russia’s area of influence… 
R2: The Russian secret services… 
R: The communists are a form of Russian influence in Moldova. The Patriots of 
Moldova are the same, they’ve been created to counter-balance the unionist 
organisations (YL1). 
Thus, all these Moldovanist actors are portrayed as representing Russian interests.  
More importantly, protests organised by the Moldovanists are moments in which the 
left wing parties can easily be essentialised as one. For instance, in an editorial 
covering the January 2012 protests in Chişinău38, Constantin Tănase (25.01.2012) does 
not even name the organisations and people taking part when he concludes that they 
are Moscow’s agents. This highlights the press’s reproduction of the representation of 
Russian power in Moldova. Furthermore, declarations made by political actors (from 
the same camp) are rarely questioned or assessed critically, being taken as ‘truths’ as 
shown in the excerpt from a Timpul editorial: 
Something sounded very dark in Mihai Ghimpu’s speech. The reference to 
Moscow: “We don’t want offices. I knew I wasn’t going to be speaker. Moscow 
doesn’t want Ghimpu to be speaker. And the two, with Dodon, were in 
Moscow.” It would seem that Moldovan independence is only on paper, that it is 
still a Russian gubernya [Russian region] and everything is decided in Moscow. 
Embarrassing and humiliating, as if we were a nation of slaves – Russian slaves 
(Vakulovski 15.02.2012).  
The quote highlights the association between political decisions, anti-imperialism and 
the nation, not the state. But more importantly, it stresses an important element in 
the evaluation of left-wing parties as conspiratorial others – their visits to Moscow. A 
                                                          
38 Romanianists groups were celebrating the day when in 1859 the Moldovan and Wallachian 
Principalities untied to become Romania (see Introduction). The Moldovanists organised a counter 
protest.  
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Romanianist interviewee explained that ‘every time an important decision needs to be 
taken […] and this information isn’t official, but there are people who know that two 
days before, they are in Moscow’ (YL7). Special attention is awarded to this topic in 
newspapers, with Timpul covering both Igor Dodon’s visits to Moscow (13.04.2012) 
and, rather mockingly, his visits to Brussels running the title ‘Dodon tries to put horse 
shoes on dead Moldovan horses’ (8.02.2012). Lastly, columnist Petru Bogatu 
(2.07.2013), does not hesitate to argue that the Socialists and the Social-Democrats 
‘seem’ to be Moscow’s agents, albeit admitting that there is little proof for it. 
Nevertheless, even whilst not having a clear argument, this type of presentation still 
reinforces the link between these political actors and the external other, Russia. All 
these internal others are represented as Russian ‘fifth columns’ in Moldova and thus, 
the Romanianists represent Russia as the actor they resist, as the actor that threatens 
their sovereignty. In this context, the next few paragraphs analyse the way in which 
Russia is portrayed in relation to the Moldovan state and nation. 
 
4.4.4. The Russian Threat 
Based on its historical othering (Section 3.4), Russia represents the main external 
‘other’ of Romanianist discourses. Building on representations of key events in 
Moldovan history and their consequences, Russia is represented as a largely 
threatening other. The first explanation for this phenomenon is Russian national 
characteristics. A common theme in my interviews in Chişinău (PG5, PG13, YL6) is the 
representation of Russia as dominated by nationalism, also called velikorusism [big 
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Russian-ism]. Velikorusism is portrayed as a form of extremism focused solely on the 
advancement of the Russian nation and its historical position within the world system. 
Additionally, Romanianists fail to see any nuance in this essentialist representation and 
ignore the fact that a great part of Russia may not subscribe to these ideas. Relating 
this to the situation in Transnistria, the Russians are represented as  
 [Velikorussian] all of them are that. I was in Minsk where I met with a very 
colourful Russian group, representatives from different political parties: liberals, 
Zhirinovsky’s extremists, etc. And although they were so different we started 
talking about what’s happening in Georgia, Moldova, Russian policies towards 
Europe, especially gas policy. And when it came to national interest they would 
not budge, not even on the level of mentality… they were convinced it was 
supposed to be as it is. They have horse glasses: How could we withdraw our 
troops? Who’s going to protect these people?’ But protect them from whom? 
That’s how the Russians think, fixated on one idea... it’s this feeling of 
velikorusism and not accepting Russia to be marginalised in any way (YL5). 
This construction aims to totalise the Russian people and their government through 
the idea of velikorusism.  
This representation pervades into the foreign policy domain in the portrayal of 
the Russian post-imperial complex; moreover, it also offers an explanation for Russia’s 
actions in regards to Moldova. Declarations and actions within the Russian space are 
reflected quite well in the Moldovan media. One such example was the publishing in 
Moskovskie novosti [Moscow News] newspaper of a list of ‘enemies of Russia’, 
containing names from Mikhail Saakashvili, John McCain and Mitt Romney to Mihai 
Ghimpu, the leader of the Moldovan Liberals. Reports on this newspaper article in 
Moldovan media generalised this ‘under siege’ thinking to the whole Russian society, 
especially, to the Russian government (Bogatu 3.04.2012). Quite the opposite, Moscow 
News is not one of the biggest or most circulated newspapers in Russia, changing 
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format frequently in recent years, being reinvented by its different owners; thus, its 
ideas cannot really be generalised to the whole of Russia. This essentialised 
representation of the other creates a frame of thinking that legitimises the other’s 
actions, but more importantly, legitimises the self’s rejection of the threatening other 
and its contemporary anti-imperial discourse.  Moreover, responsibility and blame is 
assigned to the Russian other, both historically and in contemporary issues. 
Newspapers illustrates this tendency very well through headlines such as ‘Russia is 
guilty of everything that happens in Transnistria’ (Damian 22.10.2012) or ‘Russia must 
ask for forgiveness to the whole Romanian nation’ (Tănase 26.04.2012). More 
importantly, these negative characteristics are essentialised and responsibility is 
assigned to the entire Russian nation and its leaders. Thus, irrespective of who makes a 
statement regarding Moldova, whether official or marginal political representatives, it 
is represented as the will of the entire Russian nation. For example, a statement by 
Aleksandr Dugin regarding his analysis of Russia’s willingness to react militarily in 
Transnistria was translated into an article entitled ‘Russia is ready to invade Moldova, 
how will the government react?’ (Timpul 18.06.2013), suggesting both the official 
character of this position and the generalisation to the whole of ‘Russia’. 
Moreover, Romanianist anti-imperialism is characterised by its resistance to a 
hierarchical view of the external other. In a post-colonial frame, this reflects the 
colony’s voice attempting to challenge the centre’s superiority and to achieve some 
form of equality. A very subtle example is former Moldovan president, Liberal and 
Romanianist Mihai Ghimpu’s, appeal to the new Russian ambassador to Moldova, Farit 
Mukhametshin. Ghimpu asked Mukhametshin that Russia treats Moldova ‘with 
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respect’, thus criticising what he perceives as an imperial attitude on Russia’s part 
(Unimedia 19.06.2012). This representation mirrors the hierarchical portrayal of ethnic 
minorities analysed in the previous chapter; in this way, it reinforces the argument 
regarding Romanianism’s moderate character – its othering through a rejection of 
hierarchy. Similarly, in an interview with Timpul (Ghimpu 21.05.2012), the Liberal 
leader discusses the rest of the Alliance’s opposition to declaring 16 May39 as a day of 
national mourning, whilst stressing his own party’s anti-imperialist stance. The 
expression he uses to describe the Moldovan attitude towards Russia, i.e. keeping 
‘your head down’ was used repeatedly throughout my fieldwork and illustrates the 
perception of Moldovan submissiveness. Therefore, the Romanianist anti-imperialist 
representation draws from its historical narrative of Russia as its threatening other.  
Concluding, in the Moldovan case, sovereignty, independence and stateness are 
largely equivalent, whilst also being articulated quite differently by the two national 
identity discourses and the political sides they represent. Sovereignty is threatened 
both by the external other and by the agency of the internal others. Yet, at the same 
time, the articulators of these discourses portray themselves as resisting these threats 
on sovereignty. Furthermore, in their representations the two national identity 
discourses both focus on the way in which their external others are associated with 
internal, conspiratorial others. Conspiratorial others are a version of the internal other. 
They are portrayed as having no agency of their own, but acting as agents of the 
external other. The actor criticised for representing the interests of the external other 
                                                          
39 The Treaty of Bucharest (1812) which officialised Tsarist occupation of Bessarabia was signed on this 
date (see I.2). 
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is usually the Moldovan government, the political party or alliance in power; this 
challenges the very centre of Moldovans agency, the existence of an independent 
executive Moldovan will.  This idea is taken further in Chapter 5, arguing that the 
Moldovans represent themselves as lacking agency on the international scene. From 
this point of view, anti-imperialism is highlighted through either criticism of the other 
political actors as being the agents of an external ‘other’ or their policies as ensuring 
the country is under the control of said ‘other’; thus anti-imperialism is articulated 
both against the external other and against the perceived corruption of the self/the 
political and discursive ‘other’. 
Romanianists represent Russia as their external other and, linked to it, the 
national minorities and autonomous regions and the left wing parties. Meanwhile the 
main Moldovanist external other is Romania, associated with right wing parties and 
cultural elites. Stemming from this, together with the left-right political cleavage, it 
becomes apparently that Romanianists are expected to have a pro-Romanian foreign 
policy, whilst Moldovanists a pro-Russian one. The parallelism between the two 
representations stresses the importance of the research focus on mirror images of the 
self and their role in the perpetuation of the cleavage between national identity 
discourses in Moldova. Additionally, within these representations, there are clear 
attempts to essentialise these elements and actors, from the portrayal of left or right 
wing parties as one to the generalisation of characteristics to the Russian nation.  
Essentialisations together with the wide array of equivalences between internal 
and external others create a web of meaning that divides Moldovan discourses into 
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Moldovanist and Romanianist from their views on language, to their political 
orientation and all the way to their representations of national minorities and external 
others. This construction leaves very little space for any of the nodal points to move or 
reconstruct their identity, thus ensuring the radical opposition between the two 
discourses. The next section expands this set of equivalences by discussing the East 
and the West as geopolitical spaces.  
 
4.5. The East – West Geopolitical Divide 
The last section of this chapter analyses the way in which, through the existence of 
external others, the national identity antagonism translates to a geopolitical and 
civilizational cleavage between the East and the West. The argument brings together 
the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 and builds on the elements that form part of the 
national identity discourses. Its argument is, thus, based on the chains of equivalences 
and differences constructed by the two discourses around representation of 
‘otherness’; however, it also brings forward national identity elements such as 
language to define the two spaces. But more importantly, the fact that the Moldovans 
see the foreign affairs world divided between East and West is one of the two 
elements that feed into a geopolitical view of the world, the main argument of this 
thesis; the second, the representation of the Moldovan self as passive, lacking agency 
is discussed in depth in Chapter 5.  
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Moldovans’ opinions regarding foreign policy, in general, and the East-West 
cleavage, in particular, highlight the importance of the themes analysed in this thesis. 
The high percentages of Moldovans with clear options regarding these issues highlights 
the importance of the topic, whilst the nature of survey questions underscores the 
means through which discourses regarding the opposition between the two spaces are 
reproduced. For instance, an IMAS (2012a: 128) poll asked the Moldovans whether 
they believed ‘Moldova is a European state that should sooner or later be part of the 
EU’ or that ‘Moldova belongs to the Russian area of influence and should stay there’. 
The question suggest both the cultural/civilizational association with foreign policy, 
emphasising national identity’s importance for foreign affairs, and the oppositional 
character of the two spaces, through the imposition of choice. A percentage of 44 of 
the sample surveyed chose Europe, 39% chose Russia and only 18% ‘Do not know/Not 
answering’; these numbers highlight the high percentage of people interested and 
making a choice in between these two spaces. Statistics also stress that whereas the 
Moldovans may not be that concerned with national identity issues (e.g. King 2000; 
Section 2.1.1), the equivalences drawn all the way to foreign policy bring these themes 
to the forefront of Moldovans concerns, through their links to day-to-day 
developments.  
On that note, Moldovan polls only very rarely frame questions regarding foreign 
policy to contain an option that is neutral or multi-vector, perpetuating the 
representation of the East-West cleavage. The opposition between the two spaces is 
also notable in other surveys, especially when discussing specific details of foreign 
policy. For instance, 52% of Moldovans think EU association will mean losing the 
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Russian market and 53% think it will mean losing the CIS market (IPP 2014: 80). 
Similarly, the second most popular theme attached to the EU in IPP poll is ‘worsening 
relations with Russia’ (28%) and the fourth the EuroAsian Union was associated with is 
‘worse relations with the EU’ (21%) (IPP 2013: 75, 84). This highlights the superficial 
reproduction of the cleavage through surveys. Meanwhile, the rest of this chapter 
focuses on the meanings attached to these spaces in order to understand the 
resilience of this construction. 
 The approach to analysing these two spaces must though first take into 
account their structure, as this determines the way they are employed conceptually 
within discourses. Thus, the next pages argue that the two spaces are both focused 
around Moldova’s external others, each being connected to one of the national 
identity discourses, the East to Moldovanism, the West to Romanianism. Based on this, 
I provide an assessment of the criteria employed to define these spaces and argue that 
the historical, cultural and religious dichotomies together with the normative one 
deepen the cleavage between West and East and, implicitly, between Romanianism 
and Moldovanism. 
The Eastern space is centred around Russia, being composed of ‘Russia: Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan…’ (PG3). Continued emphasis upon Russia 
illustrates the way in which this space is essentialised through its equivalence with 
Russia, as illustrated by the Socialist quote above. The Romanianists reproduce the 
same essentialisation process, casually referring to the space as ‘the East’ or ‘the post-
Soviet space’ (EX6). Additionally, whereas Russia is the nodal point around which this 
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space is represented, equivalence is usually constructed through the interchangability 
of the terms used to define it, such as: the East, the Community of Independent States, 
the Euro-Asian Union, etc. (e.g. OT1, OT5, PG11).  
Meanwhile, the Western space is built around two nodal points: Romania and 
the EU. Hence, there are two essential dichotomies when talking about the East-West 
divide, one between Romania and Russia and one between the EU and Russia and how 
these are constructed is essential in understanding the way in which foreign policy is 
legitimised in Moldova.  A third nodal point also appears within the representations of 
the Western space, the United States and NATO, albeit more rarely. A focus on the US 
as one of the poles of the Western space is usually centred on ideas of NATO 
membership, working on the perception that EU and NATO memberships are 
inextricably linked. Lastly, these two/three nodal points do not subsume three 
different representations of the West, but the same one, albeit prioritising different 
characteristics; for instance, a focus on Romania prioritises national identity, whereas 
concentrating on the EU focuses more on democracy and economic development. The 
Western space too is essentialised. A Moldovanist argument is that NATO and the EU 
are inextricably linked in terms of foreign policy; for them, it was inevitable that 
Moldova’s EU membership would lead to NATO membership (PG4). Thus, Moldovanist 
representations of foreign policy present the Western space as unitary, ignoring the 
differences and divisions within it. Nevertheless, the thesis largely equates the West 
with Europe, as this fits with foreign policy discussions in Moldova. This is due to the 
fact that Moldova is marginal to the concerns of NATO and the US and, consequently, 
the Moldovans rarely mention these actors in their foreign policy representations. The 
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essentialisation of the Western space is also present across my fieldwork, especially in 
discussions with Romanianists. The recurrent idea that integration into the EU can be 
achieved by unifying Moldova to Romania augments the simple equivalence between 
Romania as an EU member and the Union; this is a common theme in my interviews 
with Romanianists and not only them. Romania also constructs equivalence between 
the Romanian and European space and within a ‘mirrored’ identity construction 
(Wendt 1999) this representation feeds into the Moldovan one. The Romanian 
ambassador in Chişinău, Marius Lazurca, argued in an interview that 
anti-Romanianism is not only a (vaguely) masked form of racism, but also the 
most clear expression of anti-Europeanism. Let no one be fooled: the promoters 
of anti-Romanianism want an Asian Republic of Moldova, not a European one 
(Timpul 2.4.2012).  
This excerpt highlights the way in which the Romanian official in Chişinău links a pro-
Romanian stance with a pro-European one and argue that it is impossible to be pro-EU 
whilst by-passing Romania. But more importantly, the paragraph stresses the two self-
excluding options for Moldova: Europe and Asia. Lastly, the use of the term ‘racism’ in 
a case which can only be deemed as xenophobia aids the condemnation of anti-
Romanianism and the rejection of the Eastern, Asian space, by assigning it this reviled 
characteristic.  
 
4.5.1. East and West: characteristics 
This section delves into more detail regarding the way in which the two spaces are 
portrayed as both equal and opposing. The parity between the two is illustrated in the 
202 
 
 
 
way in which both spaces are commonly constructed, although not perfectly 
symmetrical, around the same pillars: a central actor (Romania/EU and, respectively, 
Russia) and an organisation (EU and, respectively CIS/the Eurasian Union). But more 
importantly, my interviewees illustrated this equivalence through an anecdote: 
I: Do you believe Russia should be part of the EU? 
R: You know, Putin said some time ago: Russian being part of the EU? Why – 
when will the EU be part of Russia? (OT4) 
Thus, some Moldovans adhere to Putin’s view that the two, Russia and the EU, are 
essentially equal, being interchangeable in a discussion regarding integration. 
Furthermore, the East and the West are represented as equally valid options in terms 
of foreign policy orientation. This enables them to form the basis for the articulation of 
dichotomous constructions around them and start off on an equal footing in the 
foreign policy legitimation game. This is apparent in the way in which survey questions 
regarding foreign policy are asked in Moldova, especially in questions such as ‘Do you 
think Moldova should get closer to…’ with the options Russia and the ‘West (Europe)’ 
(IMAS 2014). As already noted, these spaces are represented through their 
equivalence with the two external others and, through this, associated with the two 
main national identity discourses. This enables equivalences to be created all the way 
through Moldovan society, from language to party politics and geopolitical spaces. 
Moreover, the dichotomies analysed below change focus based on the nature of the 
criterion, some opposing the whole region, others focusing on their main actors. The 
multiplicity of foci of the West together with a diverse range of characteristics 
attached to it leads to multiple ways of constructing the East-West divide. 
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The first of such constructions is the historical one, based on medieval 
constructions of the Occident and the Orient. A few of my interviewees have used the 
same example for this representation: the legitimation awarded by Western powers to 
different Romanian/Moldovan princes in the 15th-16th centuries. Their iterated the 
case of Ştefan cel Mare (see Introduction and Section 3.4). According to them, he was 
recognised as a leading European figure through a letter from Pope Sixtus VI’s calling 
him the ‘true Champion of the Christian Faith’. He and other Romanian Medieval 
princes40 are portrayed as protectors of Europe from the Ottoman Porte, whilst these 
lands stood ‘at the gates’ of Europe (e.g. OT1, OT7, EX11). Through the nature of these 
narratives, the West is constructed as Christian and opposed to the Muslim Turk. At 
first sight, this dichotomy of Christian – Muslim cannot be used to exclude the Russian 
other from the Occident, as Russia is majority Christian. Moreover, Moscow has long 
claimed to be the third Rome, a beacon of Christianity, here in its Orthodox form. 
Huntington’s civilisational divide (1993, 1996) is not reiterated in the Moldovan case 
either, most likely because Moldova is Orthodox and part of the same civilisation as 
Russia, raising issues in terms of legitimising a pro-Western policy. Nevertheless, some 
Moldovans have brought the civilizational and religious argument into representations 
of the East-West dichotomy. The central point of this articulation is the power and the 
demographics of the Muslim minorities in the Russian Federation. More specifically 
Moldovans either stress the power of the Tatars, the higher birth rate of the Muslim 
                                                          
40 ‘Romanian’ is a reference to the territorial positioning of their principalities, two examples being Iancu 
of Hunedoara and Vlad Tepes, princes of Transylvania and, respectively, Wallachia. 
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population in Russia or the perceived historical origins of the Russian people (i.e. the 
Mongol hordes). The excerpts below illustrate this sentiment very clearly 
all the internal problems the Russians have [...] there’s Tartarstan, the muslim 
are very strong and there are tartars even in the Russian government because 
the are the second nationality after the Russians (PG2) 
The Russians have the nomadic spirit in their blood, even Engels said that is you 
scratch a Russian you’ll find the Tartar inside (M2). 
Moreover, the equivalence between being European and Christianity was repeatedly 
stressed, one interviewee remarking ‘If we are not European, what are we? Do we 
belong to the Arabic or Islamic world?’ (EX8). Thus, in the reiteration of a historical 
discourse, through the Tartar argument Russia becomes an epitome of Islam, of what 
is not European, characterised by its nomadic spirit and perceived violent character 
and non-Europeaness.  
Linked to the idea of a common history is the linguistic definition of Europe 
constructing the two spaces as opposing – one represented by the Slavic languages 
and the other by, arguably, Latin ones. In this context, prime-minister Filat argued that  
Moldova is the only country from the Latin areal that is outside of the European 
space. It has no alternative but European integration (quoted in Adevărul 
25.04.2012). 
Filat’s construct clearly contradicts the reality of Europe, given the number of 
Germanic and other languages spoken across the continent and, even, within the EU. 
Nevertheless, this representation highlights the importance of a radical constructivist 
approach for this analysis. Another theme emerging from his statement is the 
assimilation between the EU and the European space or, to be more specific, Europe. 
This phenomenon is widely acknowledged all across discourses on the EU and 
205 
 
 
 
especially during my interviews, enabling the cultural portrayal of this space. Thus, 
speaking a Latin language is perceived as a cultural and linguistic characteristic of 
Europe. Similarly, a Moldovanist has employed the Slavic term to define the CIS as ‘the 
Slavic world to the East’ (PG3), highlighting the importance of the linguistic argument 
in defining the two spaces. 
Moreover, the idea of speaking a Latin language intrinsically reiterates the 
Romanianist discourses of national identity. Romanianists, such as journalist and 
author Stela Popa (2010), argue that ‘We are European and we speak an official 
language of the EU!’ thus connecting language and (Romania’s) belonging to 
Europe/EU. This approach takes for granted Romania’s European character (e.g. OT1, 
YL7). Moreover, (Romanian and) Romanianist discourses hold that the Romanian 
people are a Latin nation surrounded and threatened by Slavs, highlighting the 
importance of the ‘Slav’ as the Romanians’ ‘other’ (e.g. EX3, OT1, YL4) (Section 3.3). 
Through these equivalences and oppositions, the Romanianists represent the Western 
space, defined through language, as opposed to the Slavic, Russian space. Counter-
discourses also exist on the cultural level - arguing for Russia’s Europeaness. The East-
West divide may be bridged through modern culture – ‘arts, literature, music, theatre, 
architecture, through all these I believe Russia, at least its Western side, to be 
European’ (EX4). Nevertheless, cultural, linguistic and historical differences are some 
of the sources of the dichotomy between the East and the West. 
Lastly, the East and the West are also constructed through a normative, value 
based representation. Good governance and democracy are employed to stress the 
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cleavage between the two spaces. This representation, relatively independent from 
cultural nuances, is generalised across both national identity discourses in Moldova. 
The idea of the East (the Orient, the Ottoman Empire or Russia) as underdeveloped 
and undemocratic has been present in European writings since early modernity 
(Neumann 1999). These narratives have also been utilised throughout the ‘return to 
Europe’ discourse in the Baltics and Central and Eastern European States (Kuus 2007). 
Thus, in Moldova, the most common representation of Europe is as a normative space. 
From politicians to grassroots, everyone in Moldova mentions European values. These 
values ensure that ‘the European culture and civilisation is net superior through its 
value system to all other continents’ (YL2).  This is congruent with a multitude of 
studies underscoring the EU’s focus on a normative approach to foreign affairs (e.g. 
Manners 2002). In the Moldovan case ‘European values’ takes on a whole range of 
meanings, from democracy to development. For example, Moldova is represented as 
democratic and European all the way through its historical development, from the way 
in which in 1918 reunification was accomplished through a democratic vote to the way 
in which governments have changed peacefully in the past decades (PG5). References 
are made to ‘the European value space’ identified as one of ‘pace, democracy and 
prosperity, […] democracy, pluralism, a developed economy and free citizens’ (Filat 
2.11.2012). For Filat, the quest for European integration is one of modernising the 
country and this both emphasises the backwardness of Moldova and its transition 
towards Europe. Within that context, Romania is usually represented as more 
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democratic, as a member of the EU41. On the other end on the spectrum, Vitalie 
Ciobanu presents Russia’s lack of democratic values and, through it, Moldova’s 
problems with democracy. He states  
the reality of Ghimpu’s words describe the Euro-Asian world, to which Moscow is 
insistently inviting us together with satellites […] Russia embraces us as we are – 
corrupt, underdeveloped, with a problematic democracy – because we’re like 
her, with the same problems  as the Russian state and society, where the 
disregard for the law and governments abuses have become ‘trademarks’ 
(4.07.2012). 
The excerpt underlines the idea of Russia at the centre of the Eastern space, embracing 
its Euro-Asian neighbours in a space defined by corruption, underdevelopment and 
lack of democracy. Thus, European values can be subsumed within the general idea of 
democracy and good government, highlighting the differences in between the two 
spaces. Moreover, this construction stresses the way in which Moldova and, through 
it, the East itself can be represented as backward. Backwardness is illustrated both 
through concepts such as poverty (see below) and within a dichotomy of past versus 
future. This latter relates to the Romanianist narrative of Moldovan development, 
moving from East to West in the ‘return to Europe’ (Kundera 1984). Romanianists 
represent the Moldovan past as belonging to the East, from the Tsarist occupation to 
the Soviet regime, whilst the ambition of European integration places Moldova’s 
future within the Western space. Thus, the democratic versus undemocratic 
dichotomy is augmented by a dichotomy organised around the idea of development, 
                                                          
41 Counter-discourses exist, the period in which I was doing interviews being one of tumult on the 
Romanian political scene and was presented in a few of my interviews as being just as bad as the 
situation in Chişinău. Interestingly enough, they also noted that the political ‘mess’ in Bucharest and 
Chişinău is further proof that the Romanians and the Moldovans were brother (e.g PG5, OT). 
208 
 
 
 
as presented in the next paragraphs, in order to support the opposition between the 
two spaces. 
The argument of development builds on the historical representations in 
Moldovan society, as 
R: To say Russia is European is forced. They tried to be European in the tsarist era 
and this was the whole idea with Saint Petersburg and European, German 
names. They tried because up until then they were just a nation, like many 
others in Asia. 
I: And did they succeed? 
R: No. Mentally, conceptually, in terms of civilisation …no. And history confirms 
this: the greatest genocide ever committed was in the Soviet Union (M2). 
This exposes how Russia’s lack of Europeanness throughout its history impacts on 
current developments. Thus, a central point of the narrative is the equivalence 
between the Russian space and the Soviet regime with its horrors and repressions. The 
idea that Russia has never been historically European and, if it has, this was limited to 
the Russian leadership42 and thus does not share the cultural and value system of 
Europe is a recurrent theme in interviews (e.g. YL1, YL5). Similarly to the cultural 
arguments, counter-discourses rarely go all the way to consider Russia European from 
a normative points of view, but present it as an ‘in-between’, encompassing people 
who look43 and think like the Europeans and people with ‘purely Asiatic values’, a 
transitional space (YL7). Thus, the cultural and civilizational divide discussed above 
translates into a values oriented dichotomy, with the Asian opposing the European. A 
very similar point also brings in the poverty of Russia, alcoholism and laziness in order 
                                                          
42 e.g Peter the Great’s Europeanising reforms. 
43 There were hints at racial categorising in some of my interviews. I would argue it is an effect of the 
distinctiveness of the Tartars in this case. Nevertheless, the argument also appears in distinguishing 
between the Romanians and the Russian, the latter being described as having blue eyes (OT).  
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to argue for Russia’s underdevelopment and lack of Europeaness. However, the main 
thread is, again, that of governance and the values that cause this phenomenon:  
Russia is barbarian, it is not European. Their leaders’ behaviour, their standard of 
living outside of Moscow and the great cities… It’s a mess, alcohol, no money, 
under-fed, over-authoritarian…and this is not Europe. They don’t really like 
working, just like any empire (YL3; see also Conţiu 29.01.2015). 
My interviewees often blurred the borders in between different types of criteria in 
defining the Eastern space, as we can see above, merging the lack of democratic values 
within the political leadership with poverty and the negative characteristics of the 
population as a whole. This highlights the equivalence in between economic 
development, a good standard of living and good governance, as essential elements in 
the dichotomy in between East and West. Lastly, the West is represented as 
individualistic, as opposed to the collectivist Soviet mentality, an element common to 
Moldova and the rest of the post-Soviet states (e.g. PG10).  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Through a set of equivalences around the external others of the two main national 
identity discourses, the Romanianism-Moldovanism antagonism translates into an 
East-West cleavage in foreign affairs representations. This is augmented through a 
series of dichotomies, ranging from democracy to civilisation and, even, racial origins. 
This argument builds on the assessment of the two national identity discourses as 
being built around a complex othering system. Both Romanianism and Moldovanism 
reject an external other, whilst associating it with internal and conspiratorial agents 
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within the country. More importantly, the Moldovan political system is divided not on 
ideological, but on national identity and foreign policy lines, adding an extra layer to 
the antagonistic construction of the two national identity discourses. This multi-
layered set of equivalences and dichotomies reproduces a complex and wide-ranging 
cleavage across Moldovan discourses. Reciprocally, through the equivalences created, 
the cleavage between East and West, right and left, augment the divide between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism. 
Thus, Moldovan national identity discourses reproduce a geopolitical East-West 
cleavage. This is the first part of the wider argument of the thesis, that national 
identity discourses in Moldova perpetuate a Cold War view of international affairs. 
Moreover, the two spaces are not only opposed through the dichotomies attached to 
them, but also through the fact that they are presented as in conflict over Moldova. 
The most obvious type of antagonism is the military one, a construction built around 
the Cold War scenario, including NATO. Yet, the conflict in between the two is also 
focused on an issue closer to home, Transnistria. This is illustrated in the way in which 
certain actors are represented as being critical to solving this issue:  
We had, once more, a confirmation that the Transnistrian problem is a part of 
the Russia-West conflict and, thus, can only be solved with the involvement of 
NATO, the US and the EU (Caşu 24.04.2012). 
This idea is analysed in more depth in Section 5.3, whilst discussing the basis for the 
Great Power Complex and the Moldovan representation of the self as inferior to tis 
external others. The discussion of agency, as detailed in Chapters 4, supports the 
second part of the thesis’ argument regarding the Moldovans’ geopolitical 
representation of international affairs. It highlights the means through which the 
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Moldovans, from the individual to the state level, represent their identity as passive 
and lacking agency. 
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5. Problematizing Moldovan Agency 
Moldova is in my opinion, like an orphan who has been abandoned by his family and has no 
sense of direction. He wants to do something positive, but in the end is left with his wish, but no 
concrete actions, because he is not sure where to go and is not ready to take responsibility for 
what he wants. (School essay quoted in Korosteleva 2010: 1285) 
 
While Chapters 3 and 4 highlight the means through which national identity discourses 
reproduce the opposition between East and West, this last chapter shifts the focus to 
representations of agency. This chapter argues that Moldovan discourses portray both 
their leadership and their state, as an international actor, as passive and lacking 
agency. In contrast, this agency is awarded to external actors such as Romania, Russia 
and the EU. Thus, the analysis highlights the themes present in the quote above 
(Korosteleva 2010) from the lack of action to the expectation for someone else to ‘take 
responsibility’. In this endeavour, agency is defined as the capacity and willingness to 
act and attributed to both individuals, i.e. political leadership, and to states (Section 
1.4). 
Section 5.1 begins with an analysis of the ways in which Moldovan agency is 
problematized by historical representations. It argues that the Moldovans portray 
themselves as passive through the representation of victimhood as the main element 
of their historical narratives. It also acknowledges the importance of the structure 
formed through the interaction between different others, e.g. the relations between 
Germany and Russia. This structure is where Moldovan narratives place agency. 
Named the Great Power Complex, this phenomenon is not limited to historical 
articulations, but very common in contemporary understandings of international 
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affairs too. The last two sections of the chapter turn to representations of 
contemporary agency. The former (5.2) argues that Moldovan political leadership lacks 
agency in Moldovan societal constructions. This is achieved through a series of 
discursive mechanisms e.g. the perception that Moldova is just a territory and not a 
country and depictions of the Moldovan elite as corrupt. Lastly, Section 5.3, ‘The 
agency of the other’, argues that Romania, Russia and the EU are awarded agency and 
have the power to make decisions and act on the international stage. Moldovans 
transfer agency to them through the assignation of responsibility, both historical and 
geopolitical, and through the representation of the inferior Moldovan self.  
This phenomenon is not limited to representations of history. In a related project 
I have argued that other Moldovan symbols, such as the ballad Mioriţa, also 
perpetuate Moldovan passivity (Humă 2015). Mioriţa is a ballad collected in Vrancea, 
the Southern part of the Romanian region of Moldova. The story revolves around an 
enchanted ewe who informs her shepherd that two of his colleagues are plotting his 
demise. The shepherd’s response to the ewe’s revelation is to accept his own death 
and as his testament to ask her to let his mother and his flock know he married a 
princess in a celestial wedding. Through the testament, the crime is translated into the 
main theme of forgiving and an ultimate understanding of the inevitability of death 
through the idea of communion with nature (Husar 1999). Nevertheless, the 
shepherd’s testament represents his passive stance in relation to his attackers and 
resignation in the face of his destiny. This has inspired the association between the 
ballad and fatalism as a national characteristic of the Romanians (Michelet 1854).  
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Mioriţa is a central part of Moldovan identity. It lies outside of the opposition 
between Romanianism and Moldovanism, whilst also being adopted by supporters of 
both discourses. It is also a banal presence across Moldova and it is promoted by 
cultural elites such as novelist Ion Druta (Humă forthcoming). Mioriţa is also associated 
with religion and hospitality as other elements of Moldovan national identity (Cash 
2011, 2013). Through this, the characteristics attached to Mioriţa, more specifically 
passivity, are generalised to the Moldovan nation (Humă 2015). 
 
5.1. Agency in Historical Narratives  
This section argues that the depiction of Moldovan victimhood across historical 
narrative(s) is the main resource for a representation of Moldova as devoid of agency. 
By definition victimhood involves a victim and a perpetrator, a passive agent, here the 
Moldovans, and an active one that is able to decide on Moldova’s fate. Consequently, 
the Great Power Complex pin-points the agents that decide on Moldovan history and 
fate as the empires and states surrounding it and, to a great extent, the external 
‘others’ identified in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Lastly, the section brings these debates to 
the current day and argues that the Moldovans still employ these frames of 
understanding to argue for their lack of agency in the 21st century.   
Most Moldovan discourses, as noted throughout my fieldwork, represent their 
history through a narrative of victimhood. The contention here is that in the case of 
Moldova we encounter a case of national victimhood. Studying East Asia, Lim (2010) 
has theorised that national victimhood is not only a generalisation of individual 
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victimhood to the whole nation, but also transcends through generations. Moreover, 
Renan notes that ‘shared suffering unites people more than common joy, and 
mourning is better than victory for the national memory’ (2002 [1882]: 81). This 
highlights the importance of representations of victimhood for nationalism in general 
and, I argue, for the Moldovan case, in particular.   
For instance, museum exhibits, as part of an official historical narrative, 
encompass an important narrative of victimhood. Some exhibitions focus extensively 
on the Moldovans as victims of their destiny. The 1940s section at History and 
Anthropology Museum emphasises this. With very little explanation in the general 
notes regarding the room, all the objects exhibited are personal items that focus on 
the plight of the Moldovan Jews in concentration camps and, more generally, on the 
Moldovan plight during Soviet and Nazi occupation during the Second World War. This 
generalises individual experiences and suffering to the whole of the nation. Thus, 
instances of collaboration or any form of Moldovan agency during the Second World 
War are ignored altogether in a museum that is focused more on representations of 
Moldovan suffering and victimhood (Rabinovich 2012: 30-31). 
Depictions of victimhood and its perpetrators differ depending on the external 
‘other’ in each national identity construction. However, both Romanianist and 
Moldovanist narratives agree on the ‘terrible’ history of the Moldovans/Romanian on 
this territory. The idea of ‘survival’ (Section 4.2) is linked with ‘victimhood’ and the 
very idea of the nation is defined by these two themes. They are presented together, 
as 
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despite historical circumstances, political and ideological factors have negatively 
influenced the ethno-cultural development of the Moldovans […] they have kept 
their ethnic sentiment, the consciousness that they are Moldovan and belong to 
this community, that Moldovan is their maternal language (Stepaniuc 2005: 262). 
Both historians (e.g. Stepaniuc) and contemporary politicians and journalists employ 
the theme of victimhood extensively on both sides of the national identity cleavage. 
The Moldovanist academic focus on Moldovan stateness leads to the neglect of other 
events of Moldovan history e.g. the Russian invasions of 1711 and 1739, but also on 
wider periods, such as 1918-1940 and 1944-1991 (Stepaniuc 2005). Nevertheless, the 
depiction of these eras, albeit succinct, is focused on Moldovan victimhood. For 
instance, Stati portrays the Moldovan situation in the 17-18th centuries through the 
anti-Moldovan policies of the Ottoman and Tsarist empires, the poverty of the 
Moldovan peasants and notes the ‘terrible pains of the Moldovan people’ (2002: 309-
324, 395). Similarly, Stepaniuc argues that the decline of the medieval Moldovan 
principality was due to its  
geopolitical situation – at the border between the Western and Eastern 
civilisations, between the Eastern side of the Roman [sic] world and the Slavic 
one – both threatened by the Ottoman empire in the 16th-18th centuries made 
the Moldovan [principality/]state pass through dark times, its existence being 
threatened (2005: 435-6).  
Academic Romanianist examples that support the idea of Moldovan victimhood are 
also extensive. For instance, Gheorghe Ghimpu’s monograph on Moldovan history 
describes 
brutal Russification tendencies and denationalisation through colonisation and 
deportations, […] great suffering at the hand of the Russian barbarism, the 
Romanian people in Bessarabia [were] enslaved by Russia (2002: 514). 
He also quotes Alexei Mateevici’s statement that ‘Here in Bessarabia, you get goose 
bumps when you start the tale of our suffering’ (Ghimpu 2002: 430). These are just a 
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few illustrative examples of articulations of victimhood across academic and historical 
studies.  
The theme of victimhood is even stronger in my interviews, official declarations 
or newspaper articles where the space awarded to this theme relative to the length of 
the speech is larger. For instance, Communist former president Vladimir Voronin 
argued that ‘We have a tumultuous history and throughout the centuries our fate has 
been painful’ (15.4.2009) and, on another occasion, remarked that ‘the era of Ottoman 
rule stopped Moldovan development [whilst writers] were recording, page by page, 
our terrible history’ (30.1.2009). Adjectives such as ‘terrible’ and ‘tumultuous’ are 
employed as the main descriptors of the Moldovan experience. The same themes and, 
even, the same adjectives and expressions are used across the political (and national 
identity) spectrum. Liberal Mihai Ghimpu talks about the ‘tumultuous, many times 
tragic destiny of this nation, its hunger for the truth and justice despite all the 
vicissitudes of time’ (20.10.2009).  
This construction is also generalised in day-to-day articulations and most of my 
interviewees noted the ‘suffering of the Moldovan people’ in their short summary of 
Moldovan history (e.g. YL3, PG5, PG7). One interviewee detailed: ‘we’ve had a 
troubled history, we’ve been under Russian occupation and, then, Soviet occupation 
and the population had the misfortune to be subjected to an intensive Russification 
process’ (PG1). Moreover, this interviewee assigns blame not only to Russia, but also 
to the Romanian ‘other’ as ‘[you] Romanians, you’ve given us up and we suffered and 
we struggled’ (YL1). Similarly, the name Bessarabia and the whole period from 1812 
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onwards is associated with suffering (PG5). More importantly, interviewees employ 
the theme of victimhood to make sense of their current poverty and 
underdevelopment (e.g. YL3, OT6). Then, victimhood is also widely associated with the 
assignation of blame to another actor as 
you go to the country side and the people, they keep looking for the source of 
the problem, for example: the state is guilty, and … the problem is everyone is to 
blame but him and he only suffers (EX4). 
 
Building on this representation of Moldovan passivity, Moldovans employ the 
Great Power Complex to assign agency to external actors. I define the Great Power 
Complex as the representation of, so-called, great powers as the central decision-
makers in international affairs. This is corroborated with a depiction of Moldovan 
history as ‘under the ages’ and of Moldovan fates as determined by the empires and 
conquerors around them (Stati 2002: 12). Geographical positioning is portrayed as the 
source of this dramatic situation, as 
our space is by definition defined by diabolical human experiments […] from all 
sides. We are in a buffer zone and in the Soviet period the most terrible 
experiments were here, because we were a borderland and we needed to be the 
lesson in violence and purification (EX3). 
Moldova’s position as a borderland is associated with national victimhood and 
highlights the unlikelihood for the Moldovans to change their fate and, implicitly, to 
exert agency. Moreover, the representation of Moldova’s position at the ‘crossroads of 
empires’ highlights the role of the ‘empires’ that took decisions among themselves 
about Moldova’s destiny. A parliamentary deputy’s assistant in Chisinău (PG13) argued 
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that ‘we’ve been punished by fate, taken and passed around from one empire to 
another’. Another interviewee illustrates the historical Great Power Complex as  
the great empires fought to conquest territories and to expand, and through this, 
they ended up fighting for this piece of land, either taken by the Ottoman Empire 
or by the Tsarist one. We’ve been at the borders of these empires who wanted 
to expand. And we’ve been unlucky because in between the wars between these 
empires, the Tsarists won and they split this land in two and then there was the 
creation of the Soviet Union […] This is our history, we never had the choice to 
change anything (PG1). 
The one point in history when the discussion on empires applies is the 1812 Treaty of 
Bucharest when, arguably, the territory of Bessarabia was transferred between the 
Ottoman and the Russian empires. All other key events in Moldovan history, as 
highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, are defined by one ‘empire’, the Russians, and the 
Romanian state in its various forms. Nevertheless, this generalisation highlights the 
importance of the ‘crossroads of empires’ metaphor together with the constructed 
nature of Moldovan victimhood.  The Great Power Complex is also illustrated in 
museums through the way in which next to a map of the Romanian lands there are 
maps of the ‘Turkish’ empire and of Russia (HAM); this framing emphasises the 
elements considered important by the museum’s curators.  
Similarly to the theme of victimhood, the Great Power Complex also transcends 
history and is employed to frame contemporary politics, e.g. in portrayals of Moldova 
as ‘a battlefield between the great powers, between the US and Russia’ (RFE/EL 
23.12.2013). Moldova is not very high on the US’s list of priorities, which underscores 
the constructed nature of Moldovan representations of foreign affairs. Moreover, the 
contemporary version of the Great Power Complex draws from the opposition 
between the two geopolitical spaces discussed in Chapter 4. A PLDM MP’s assistant 
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argued that ‘Moldova is defined by a clear confrontation between East and West […] 
there are a lot of strings pulling Moldova in different sides, right or left, up or down’ 
(PG13). Meanwhile, unionists acknowledge that ‘Russia or someone else will decide 
Moldova’s and Romania’s fate. […] The others, the governments that stand in the 
shadow, the great powers that will decide (PG2). Lastly, more than 50% of respondents 
in a 2010 Moldovan survey thought that Moldova is a pawn in international games 
(O’Loughlin et al. 2013: 251).  
In this context, the great powers consist of Russia, the US, EU and its member 
states, as illustrated by a discussion with two foreign policy experts in Chisinău: 
Besides the EU, there are Romania and Germany that are at play here. Romania 
comes here with clear geopolitical interests. The Germans have a series of 
agreements with the Russians and are interested in this area to satisfy their own 
interests […] So, the Germans, the Romanians, the Americans are all here with 
their ears peeled, even the Poles who want to keep the Russians away (EX9, 
EX10). 
Thus, a multiplicity of actors is part of the Great Power Complex. An important case 
study, both historically and contemporary in Moldova is the Russian-German 
friendship. Germany’s interest in Moldova is somewhat limited; thus, the case-study 
highlights the disconnect between reality and Moldovan representation of foreign 
affairs. The key historical event defining this case study is the year 1939-40, when the 
territory of the Republic of Moldova became part of the Soviet Union, as a result of the 
1939 Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement). My 
interviewees portrayed the agreement through the image of two external agents, 
Germany and Russia, deciding Moldova’s fate (YL1, YL4). More importantly, the ‘great 
power’ theme is employed as a frame of understanding contemporary events: 
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In ’99, there was the decision in Istanbul [to withdraw Russian troops from 
Transnistria] but Europe isn’t interested in reminding Russia about it. Yet again 
the great powers, Germany, Russia are weaving their own [interests], because 
they have great economic interests (PG1). 
This idea of a German-Russian agreement was a dominant theme in the first half of 
2012, culminating with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Chisinău in August 2012. 
Based on a problematic44 Stratfor analysis (Unimedia 5.03.2012a), journalists and 
bloggers in Moldova developed a theory of conspiracy focused on the implications of a 
(possible) agreement between the two countries (RFE/EL 22.06.2012; Bogatu 
24.08.2012). An important element in these representations was the idea that 
Germany, and implicitly, the EU, would agree to maintain Russian influence in 
Transnistria and sell out the Moldovan people, just as they had done in 1939 (EX1, 
EX11; RGN 1.06.2012). Additionally, some bloggers have even asked Angela Merkel to 
apologise for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and drew a parallel between Germany’s 
actions then and now (Gandrabur 13.08.2012). 
Hence, the idea of the ‘great powers’ as defining historical and contemporary 
Moldovan fate dominates Moldovan societal discourses, both on a general level and in 
more specific framings, such as the German-Russian relationship. This highlights the 
way in which national identity and historical representation of Moldova’s lack of 
agency translate into contemporary arguments and position Moldova as a passive 
actor on the international stage. 
  
                                                          
44 see Unimedia (5.03.2012b) for a critique regarding its veridicity and importance. 
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5.2. Representations of contemporary agency 
Moving away from history, the rest of the chapter turns its attention to contemporary 
representation of Moldovan agency. It strengthens the main argument of the chapter, 
i.e. that external actors are portrayed as possessing agency in the detriment of the 
Moldovan self. The discussion starts off with a study of the ways in which Moldova, as 
a country and through its leadership, is portrayed in a passive way. This is achieved 
discursively through a series of mechanisms, from the direct construction of inaction 
and corruption to indecisiveness and the idea of a split leadership pulling into different 
directions. This is followed by a larger section (5.3) that attempts to resolve the 
question ’If not Moldova, then who is an agent?’. The answer stresses the importance 
of the external others, such as Romania, the EU and Russia, as saviours and 
emphasises the importance of historical and geopolitical narratives for their 
legitimation in this role. The reality of the Moldovan state and its potential agency 
cannot be denied. The discourse of independence is almost hegemonic in Moldovan 
society and allows a certain power to act to the Moldovan self. This chapter stresses 
the challenges brought to this construction and offers a nuanced approach, focused on 
certain areas or events where agency is transferred to other actors. 
The first argument supporting the representation of Moldova’s lack of agency in 
foreign affairs holds that Moldova cannot have ‘a proper foreign policy, because 
Moldova is not a country, but a territory’ (YL2; Bulat quoted in Druta 2011). The idea 
that ‘Moldova is not a natural state, there is no essence to it, so it has no direction’ 
was noted across all my fieldwork (EX2). The ongoing conflict between the two 
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national identity discourses problematizes both the legitimation processes of the 
Moldovan state and the consistency of its foreign policy, since  
You cannot have a foreign policy without an internal policy, there is no national 
ideal, no national project so what foreign policy can we even talk about. If you 
have a national ideal, a national project and a national idea you can go out into 
the world and find partners, supporters and you could have a foreign policy’ 
(M1).  
Moreover, the conflict between Romanianism and Moldovanism and, implicitly, the 
opposition between a pro-European and a pro-Russian orientation (Chapter 4) is the 
basis for the idea of a ‘null vector’ foreign policy. Romanianists employ the idea of 
‘multi-vector’ as equated with ‘no vector’ to evaluate the Communists’ foreign policy. 
The PCRM themselves stressed that their 2005-2009 foreign policy was aimed at 
cooperating with both the Eastern and Western spaces, an idea reiterated in 2014 
(Unimedia 22.5.2014). Romanianists represent this orientation as standing still, not 
going anywhere or just going backwards, then forwards repeatedly (e.g. EX1, EX2, PG2, 
M3). The idea of ‘standing still’ clashes with the Moldovan view of foreign policy as a 
‘vector’, which implies movement. In this way, this depiction of foreign policy as going 
nowhere is essentially a representation of no (action in regard to) foreign policy. 
Others are more moderate in their evaluation and note the extreme slowness of 
Moldova’s foreign policy (e.g. PG13).  
Furthermore, the challenges brought to the idea of Moldovan agency are 
augmented through three ‘sins’ of the Moldovan leadership: indecisiveness, foreign 
agency and corruption. The first is the portrayal of the Moldovans and the Moldovan 
leadership as indecisive, described as 
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I think we lack decisiveness, confidence. We are always waiting for approval from 
either left or right, up or down. There are things that are right, which we should 
do … take the risk [and, in terms of foreign affairs, our leaders avoid] clear and 
univocal responsibility and taking a stand (EX1). 
Furthermore, indecision is equated to someone else deciding on Moldovan fate, as 
we Moldovans should […] be more decisive in what we do, because we are very 
hesitating, we are a nation just waiting for others to come and solve our 
problems (RFE/EL 8.02.2014). 
In this way, Moldovan indecisiveness is associated with lack of action and highlights 
how external help is presented as essential for Moldovan development and agency is 
awarded to external others.  
Building on this last finding, the construction of Moldovan leadership as 
‘conspiratorial others’, i.e. representing the will of the external other, is the second 
element employed to explain Moldova’s lack of agency. This is a dominant frame of 
thought in regards to external others and encompasses both the imperial and the 
friendly one(s), being independent of national identity orientation. A columnist in 
Chisinău argued that ‘the people here need someone to tell them what to do, be it 
Bucharest or Moscow’, whilst the New Right leader in Chişinău compared Moldova 
with a ‘whore that depends on who gives the most money, the Russians or the EU’ 
(M1, PG9). A slightly more moderate view is that 
We [the Moldovans] are being led by some clans financed from outside. Even 
AIE, well, a part of it is influenced by Russia, another by Romania and the third 
get money from the EPP (European Popular Party) and they all need to have a 
common course, but they end up pulling in totally different directions (YL7).  
The last element feeding into the representation of Moldovan agency is the 
corruption of the Moldovan political class (EX1, EX6). They are portrayed as only 
interested in money and their wealth is used to explain Moldova’s problems from 
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poverty to lack of action in international affairs (EX2).  This view of Moldovan 
leadership is generalised across the Moldovan population, with 84% of Moldovans 
noting that corruption is widespread in their government (Gallup 2013). This is 
presented as betrayal (Saptamana 12.12.2011), whilst the Moldovan leadership as 
hypocritical, both in their relationship with the people and in foreign affairs, and 
duplicitous in their positions in Brussels and Moscow (PG5, YL2; Comunistul 
19.07.2012). Concluding, Moldovan agency is challenged through a problematisation 
of Moldova as a state and the perception of foreign policy as going nowhere. 
Moreover, the Moldovan leadership is portrayed as equivocal and corrupt and is 
accused of representing foreign interest. 
 
5.3. The Agency of the ‘Other’ 
The last part of this chapter argues that contemporary Moldovan agency is not only 
‘lacking’, but is transferred to Moldova’s external others that act as saviours, ‘big 
brothers’ or teachers. The section stresses the means through which Romania, Russia 
and the EU are represented as Moldovan saviours. I highlight two main articulations 
that inform their portrayal: the representation of Moldovan inferiority and the 
geopolitical representation of foreign affairs. Moreover, this depiction of external 
others builds on a construction of the Moldovan self as lacking agency and draws from 
Moldovans’ current feelings of victimisation and unhappiness, as highlighted above (in 
‘Representations of contemporary agency’). 
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Sections 4.3 and 4.4 examined the way in which Moldovan thinking depicts the 
external other as superior, through a construction that echoes post-colonial thinking. 
The superiority of Russia, Romania and the EU impacts on Moldovan agency on two 
levels. This is achieved, firstly, through the continuation of their historical imperialism 
(i.e. ‘ordering Moldova around’) and secondly, through the representation of 
Moldovan elites as conspiratorial others, representing the external other’s will. 
Through these two mechanisms, agency within national identity constructions is 
awarded to the external other. Chapter 4’s analysis is limited to the ‘threatening’ 
external other, but othering processes also encompass positive others, be they internal 
or external, in mutually useful relations or supporters of the ‘self’s ambitions (see 
Petersoo 2007; Therborn 1995). Additionally, a national identity argument against an 
‘other’ can be seen as an argument for another ‘other’ (e.g. Reicher and Hopkins 2001: 
84). This is precisely the case in Moldova, as through the mirrored image between 
Romanianism and Moldovanism, one discourse’s friendly other (e.g. Romania for 
Romanianism) is the other’s threatening other. Thus, the existence of a saviour is 
apparent in the very structure of Moldovan historical narratives, with one power as 
the occupier and the other, as a liberator (Section 3.4). For instance, Romanianists see 
Romania as a saviour based on their perception of the radical change between the 
poverty and persecution of the 19th century and the joy of reunification in 1918, whilst 
Moldovanists portray Russia in this position based on their common experience of 
friendship within the Soviet Union (1944-1991) (see Ihrig 2007). Hence, the idea of 
Romania or Russia as ‘game-changers’ is, to a certain extent, inspired by the 
representation of these historical shifts in terms of Moldova’s fate. Drawing from these 
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historical narratives, the Moldovans reiterate the idea of the saviour, teacher or helper 
in contemporary discourses.  
From the point of view of relations with external others, agency is 
conceptualised in two ways. Firstly, it is defined as the power to choose and the 
possibility to act on that choice and secondly as the responsibility to do so. In this way, 
a transfer of agency translates as Moldova allowing or, more commonly, demanding or 
expecting an external other to act. Both processes are based on the ‘inferiority 
complex’ the Moldovans have in relation to their external other(s). The inferiority 
complex leads to the acceptance of help or of an external narrative of development. 
This problematizes Moldovan choice and, through it, Moldova’s agency in certain 
areas. Moreover, Moldovan inferiority legitimises discourses that allow and even, asks, 
the external other to act in order to solve Moldova’s problems; thus, it enables a 
portrayal of the external other as a saviour, responsible for Moldova’s wellbeing or for 
Moldova as a geopolitical buffer zone. More importantly, a part of these 
representations are not Romanianism or Moldovanism specific, but more generalised 
within Moldovan thought, as is the case with the Great Power Complex. This is 
stressed through the way in which respondents relate in the same way to all external 
others, especially to both those belonging to the Eastern and Western spaces.  
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5.3.1. The myth of the saviour 
The myth of the saviour plays a crucial role in the Moldovan narrative regarding its lack 
of agency. The concept of myth is a simplification mechanism: a naturalised story that 
provides guidance for Moldovan thought and actions (Section 1.2). The saviour is 
represented by another state/nation or through the portrayal of their political leaders, 
e.g. Romanian president Traian Băsescu or Russian PM/president Vladimir Putin. This 
latter conceptualisation builds on the work of Girardet (1986) on the myth of the 
saviour as an individual in French history and politics. The Moldovan myth of the 
saviour draws from the representation of the self as passive, ‘lazy, and expecting gifts 
from other places. Even now with the European Community, we all expect… […] many 
don’t understand that movement must start here’ (RFE/EL 23.12.2013). The 
importance of the myth of the saviour is emphasised in an interview with an 
anthropologist at the Natural History and Ethnography Museum: 
[it’s all explained by] the myth of the saviour … someone must save us, we can’t 
have it any other way. We work, but we have nothing, we labour but we are 
poor. Someone will one day come and make things right for us. It’s the saviour 
myth … someone has to come, the Americans, the Romanians or Moscow to help 
us (EX3). 
The narrative of victimhood is directly linked to the representation of an ‘other’ that 
plays the role of the saviour and is not limited to Romanianism and Moldovanism. In 
this way Moldovan development is portrayed as dependent on other countries, as ‘All 
roads are built from borrowed money. Foreign countries build them’ (RFE/EL 
18.01.2014). In this way, the saviour is represented not as a Messiah, but an almost 
indispensable helper or model that takes responsibility for Moldova’s future and has 
sole agency in certain areas.  
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The idea of the saviour resonates with the Moldovan hopes for a better future and 
disappointment with their current circumstances (see Figure 5.1, IPP 2015).  
 
The perpetuation of the theme of the saviour is also achieved through the way in 
which political parties promote their own foreign policy orientations as the solution to 
‘all evils’. In these representations at least part of this solution lies outside of the 
country, not within the agency of the state or its political leadership. One such 
example is the Socialist plan to have a referendum in 2014 based on the question ‘Do 
you think integration in the customs union [the predecessor to the EuroAsian Union] 
space would solve your socio-economic problems?’ (JC 10.02.204). Through its 
ubiquity in mottos or party symbols, this myth of the saviour has the potential to have 
an impact on grassroots. Accordingly, the portrayal of foreign policy as the solution to 
Moldovan problems stresses the impossibility of the Moldovans themselves to achieve 
these objectives and offers a problematic view of Moldovan agency. Moreover, these 
articulations overlap with the national identity discourses regarding positive and 
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Figure 5.1. Responses to the survey question ‘Do you think Moldova is headed in the right/wrong 
direction?’ 1998-2015 
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negative others and augment their discursive power. Analyst Doru Petruţi explains 
Moldovans’ attitude towards foreign policy as  
most respondents want Moldova to be part of an union, either the EU or the 
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Union. It’s important to be somewhere, to belong to 
someone, doesn’t really matter to whom (RFE/EL 29.12.2011; see also Ciornei 
12.09.2012). 
Iurie Rosca (18.11.2011) underscores this point, in a critique of the current Moldovan 
political class and their dependence on external solutions. Mihai Conţiu (1.06.2015), 
writing for Moldova Suverană, argues that '[the Moldovans] are always in search of 
"elder brothers” and help, without being able to help themselves!". Building on this, 
the next sections look in more depth at the mechanisms through which the myth of 
the saviour is articulated and focuses separately on each of the external others, 
Romania, Russia and the EU.   
 
5.3.2. Romania  
The dominant position of the saviour is occupied by Romania. Romania is depicted 
through the metaphor of the saviour both historically, in events such as the 1918 
unification, and in contemporary representations. Firstly, through the construction of 
historical debt, Romania is portrayed as responsible for Moldova and the Moldovans. 
This phenomenon is summarised in the depiction of Romanian citizenship policy for 
the Moldovans. Secondly, Romania, in itself and as a member of the EU, is depicted as 
superior to Moldova. This inferiority complex feeds into the Moldovan transfer of their 
agency to their Western neighbour and its leadership. Lastly, this section focuses on 
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the way in which all these ideas come together in the portrayal of the Romanian 
president, Traian Băsescu.  
Moldovans represent Romania as key to ensuring that they become European, 
not through EU integration, but by becoming Romanian citizens. Romania offers 
citizenship to any Moldovan who can prove their ancestors were Romanian citizens 
(from 1918-1940). Romanian citizenship and passports are presented as an open door 
to the West and, symbolically, as a rejection of the Moldovan situation and Moldovan 
poverty. Through this policy, the Romanian other is responsible for Moldovan welfare 
and is portrayed like a saviour (EX2, YL3, YL4). The main element in this depiction is the 
transfer of responsibility for the Moldovans’ welfare to the Romanian other based on a 
representation of historical debt. This debt is constructed around the historical 
experience of the 1940s and 1990s. The reference to the 1940s relates to Romania’s 
lack of action after the Russian occupation on 1940 and the developments of the 
Second World War that led to Moldova becoming a Soviet republic. Meanwhile, the 
1990s refer to Romania’s recognition of Moldovan independence, but with very little 
support (or interest) offered afterwards (Chapter 3). Both are represented as moments 
when the Romanians have ‘left’ the Moldovan people behind, as highlighted by a PNL 
member: 
Romania will have us, that isn’t the issue, because we are its citizens. My parents 
were born Romanian citizens and are asking themselves why we were left in 
1940 to two bandits, Hitler and Stalin […] and then in the 1990s we were 
abandoned again (PG2). 
Another interviewee described the events of 1940 as 
233 
 
 
 
You… with Greater Romania gave us up and we suffered and were tormented, 
whilst you moved forward and advanced and now you don’t want us? I hate this 
type of thinking (PG5). 
Based on these arguments the Moldovans stress their right to their ‘lost’ citizenship 
and the Romanian responsibility to help. Agency is, then, associated with the allocation 
of historical blame to the Romanian ‘other’. Moreover, Romania’s representation as a 
saviour is directly linked to its past inaction. Additionally, Romania’s ‘historical debt’ 
towards Moldova is presented as a ‘duty’, ‘sacred thing’ or something that belongs to 
the ‘conscience’ (YL3, YL6, EX3, EX6, PG1).  
The second argument for the transfer of power and responsibility to act to 
Romania is the self-representation of the Moldovans as inferior to their neighbour. 
Inferiority is built on two main bases: national identity characteristics and Romania’s 
membership of the EU. As a neighbour, the Romanian case is special through the 
constant contact between the people on both sides of the Prut River (i.e. the border 
between the two states). Through this, the perceived Romanian superiority is felt on 
an individual level and draws from day-to-day national identity elements such as 
spoken language. The most common difference between Romanians and Moldovans 
noticed by my interviewees is the linguistic (see Ciscel 2006). Section 3.3 highlighted a 
series of distinctions between Romanian and the language spoken in Moldova in terms 
of vocabulary (Deletant 1996, Dyer 1996). Interviewees argued that this difference is 
achieved through a contamination of their language with Russian terms and 
expressions or, to be more specific, with elements that belong to the national other, 
the Russian/Slav. The Moldovans translate this Russian influence as ‘incorrectness’. 
They argue that they ‘have a different dialect, [we] speak like a Moldovan, not 
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correctly Romanian with all the notions and correct expressions’ (PG1). This 
construction appeared all across my fieldwork through comparisons with the language 
I speak, a rather accent-free Romanian. Most interviewees picked this up as foreign 
and argued that ‘we [the Moldovans] speak a more Russified dialect, whereas you [the 
author] speak a polished/beautiful Romanian’ (e.g. PG6).  These circumstances mirror 
the direct contact Moldovans have with Romanians once they cross the border. 
Additionally, even those that argue their language is Moldovan make a note of its 
inferiority: 
we call ourselves Moldovan because we speak Moldovan, which isn’t as 
cultivated as Romanian language. We think Romanian is something above, more 
beautiful, more special (OT). 
This is one of the ways in which the Moldovanist discourse takes root at grassroots 
level, through a conceptualisation of Moldovan as incorrect Romanian. But more 
importantly, it highlights how the Moldovans, Romanianists or Moldovanists, portray 
themselves as inferior to Romania through the medium of language representations.  
Inferiority also extends to other cultural endeavours. Romanianists criticise the 
Moldovan consumption of ‘entertainment’ in Russian and from Russian sources (YL3). 
This in perceived as inferior to the Romanian one, and associated with negative 
behaviour, e.g. explaining violence as a consequence of Russian TV shows (YL4). 
Furthermore, Russia’s role in Moldova’s inferiority complex is also direct, through the 
elimination of a generation of intellectuals in the 1950s. This has created a sense of 
marginalisation, periphery and inferiority (to both Romania and Russia) which 
continues to affect Moldovan cultural creations to this day (M3; Conţiu 4.02.2013, 
4.03.2013). Hence, the Moldovan cultural scene portrays itself as inferior to its 
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Romanian counterpart as an effect of the Soviet policies on this territory. Soviet 
influence is not limited to the cultural domain, the persecution of the Soviet years is 
also blamed for the current lack of a competent political elite (YL1). 
Based on this representation, Romania is portrayed as enabling the Moldovans 
to overcome their deficiencies/inferiority. In particular, Romania aids the Romanianists 
to become (more) Romanian and, thus, European. But more importantly, this transfer 
of agency is represented as Romania’s responsibility and through the expectation that 
Romania will solve these problems. In terms of language, Moldovans articulate 
expectations from Romania to provide programmes to teach Moldovans and, 
especially Moldovan teachers to speak ‘proper’ Romanian (M1); this sentiment is not 
limited to Romanianists (M3). Moreover, constructions of responsibility go hand in 
hand with blame in this case; according to Moldovans, the current situation in 
Moldova is due to the lack of proper Romanian policies in Moldova since 1991 (EX2, 
M2). Consequently, Romania is expected to act, whereas the Moldovan people are the 
space ‘being acted upon’ and lack agency even in terms of language correctness and 
reform. Some of these representations, especially the cultural ones, are limited to the 
Romanianists in Moldova. Nevertheless, the sense of inferiority, especially in relation 
to language, is more widespread.  
Nevertheless, the Romanian obligation is not limited to cultural or citizenship 
policies. There is also a more general view that expects Romania to solve Moldovan 
problems, mentioned in almost all of my interviewees. One of them explained that 
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The Romanians have their own problems and then we come with ours. And what 
can they say: do we need the Moldovans with their issues? We must solve them 
ourselves, not ask others, it’s not good (PG5). 
Symbolically, the very fact that the Romanian flag flew above the Moldovan Parliament 
in the 7 April 2009 street protests (see Introduction) highlights the role awarded to 
Romania as a supporter of the ‘revolution’ and saviour of the Moldovans. Romania’s is 
also linked to Moldova’s European aspirations. In this context, they represent the 
Moldovan-Romanian relationship as 
[should be] brotherly, as we’ve had the situation when Romania wanted to 
integrate in NATO and the EU and then, its relationship with Moldova was not a 
priority. And Moldova should be a priority for Romania, there should be a 
mechanism to promote investment, because of economic ties [Why would 
Romania do that?] It’s only natural, we had a common past so it’s normal for 
these bonds to exist in the present and to create some sort of perspective (EX1). 
Similarly, a MP’s assistant (PG13) argued that Romania ‘should’ develop policies 
ranging from support in the EU to the promotion of economic ties with Moldova, 
based on the existence of a common past (see also RFE/EL 21.02.2014). Hence, there is 
a certain expectation on the part of Romania to aid Moldova on its European path. 
Based on this expectation for help, the Moldovans transfer at least part of their agency 
to their Romanian ‘other’ in certain areas, as highlighted in the quote above.  
This argument is focused on the portrayal of Romania as European, democratic 
and, accordingly, superior to Moldova. From this position, Romania takes the role of a 
teacher, of an older brother who is more experienced and knowledgeable. As opposed 
to Moldova, Romania is represented as a state with a historical experience and 
maturity that should act as an arbiter of Moldova’s EU integration and a teacher that 
can help overcome the problems of the Moldovan political elite (PG1, PG2, PG4). The 
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problems that plague Romanian leadership and politics, especially the second 
referendum to dismiss president Traian Băsescu45 (summer 2012) highlight the 
constructed and idealised nature of this Moldovan representation and the usefulness 
of a constructivist approach for this analysis. Based on this construction, Moldovans 
argue for a ‘stronger rapprochement with Romania and the transfer of Romania’s 
experience vis-à-vis integration, a better collaboration’ (YL4). Some interviewees 
argued that the EU itself should recognise Romania’s role and use it as a middle man in 
communications with Chişinău (YL5, EX6). This ensures Moldovan agency (and elites) 
are removed in their entirety from the process. Through this construction, Romania’s 
lobby would help Moldova become a member of the EU before its ENP colleagues, e.g 
Ukraine (PG7). More importantly, the diversity of sources for this data stresses the 
widespread representation of Romania as a helper, even relevant amongst 
Communists. This articulation is a reflection of the Romanian discourses of hubris 
regarding Moldova, their pride for help they give Moldova on its European path (RO1, 
RO2, RO3). Bringing together the idea of the ‘teacher’, as determined by Romania’s 
‘European’ character, with the national identity argument, I conclude that the 
portrayal of Romania in Moldovan thought can easily be described through the 
metaphor of the ‘elder brother’, more knowledgeable but also responsible for its 
younger sibling.  
                                                          
45 A referendum on the impeachment of president Traian Basescu was held in Romania in July 2012. 
Despite an overwhelming majority voting for his suspension (88%), the referendum was declared invalid 
by the Romanian Constitutional Court; this was due to the turnout not reaching 50%, as required by 
Romanian referendum laws. These events divided the Romanian political class, leading to harsh 
accusation of anti-democratic behaviour across the political spectrum. 
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Thus, Romania is represented as a benefactor. Additionally, there is a 
representation of Romania providing Moldova’s ‘salvation’; this stresses the 
indispensable character of its help and the complete removal of agency from the 
Moldovan self on certain issues. For instance, an interviewee in Chişinău described 
Moldova’s ideal foreign policy as: 
We must be closer with Romania, only with Romania, this is our future. We must 
do our best so that relations between Moldova and Romania are the best 
because in case something happens Romania will help Moldova (PG5). 
This sentiment is even more relevant in discourses of reunification with Romania, 
presented as a fast-track solution to a perceived long-term European integration 
process (Publika 26.11.2013). Nevertheless, most interviewees, especially moderate 
Romanianists, argue unification ‘would be very good, but it’s not going to happen’ 
(OT). Thus, unification is deemed to be the ‘ideal’ solution, as opposed to the realist 
ones (M3; Conţiu 4.09.2014). This is the most relevant case of the myth of the saviour 
being tempered down through a series of mechanisms and discursive articulations. The 
first is the tendency across my interviews to only discuss Moldova’s short-term future, 
almost as an acknowledgement of the volatility of the current political consensus46. 
Secondly, unification is a marginalised option in Moldova discursively through the 
dominance of the independence discourses and through the economic and political 
realities it faces. This issue is highlighted through the Great Power Complex, as ‘we 
won’t be united and you know why? Because the great powers’ interests are too great 
in this area’ (PG12, YL4). There is some truth is this statement, but there are also 
                                                          
46 political and foreign policy orientations have shifted repeatedly since 2000, for example in the 
Communists pro-European shift or the protests of 2009 (Section I.2) 
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alternative discursive articulations that underscore the constructed nature of these 
arguments. For instance, certain unionists argue that Romania should follow the 
example of its agency in the unification of the Romanian principalities in 185947. The 
press also portrays Romania as a solution to all Moldovan problems, from poverty to 
the democratic deficit (Publika 26.11.2013).  
More importantly, the idea of unification (e.g. Lulea 14.11.2013) discursively 
challenges the ability of the Moldovan government to achieve the ultimate outcome of 
European integration. This feeds into the lack of trust the Moldovans have in their 
political leadership and their actions. Moreover, agency in the process of unification is 
awarded to Romania. For example, the idea that Romania should change its 
constitution in order to mirror the German situation of the early 1990s is further 
evidence of a disjuncture between reality and perceptions of it: 
If Romania would introduce in their constitution a point that would suggest it 
wants reunification, things would move a lot faster […] they started off on the 
wrong foot with the idea of promoting Moldova’s integration in Brussels, 
Moldova will take at least 15-20 years to be in the EU and we cannot afford that, 
we may end up in Putin’s Euro-Asian Empire in the meantime (PG2). 
Then, agency is attributed to the Romanian leadership, considered responsible for 
unification by a plurality of Moldovans (CRSS 2014: 5). Thus, the Moldovan wider 
public articulates a view of unification that goes beyond the rational arguments, a 
representation that strengthens Romania’s portrayal as a saviour. 
                                                          
47 Arguably, in 1859 the so-called great powers did not consent, but through the support of the French 
leader, left an open door for the Moldovan and Wallachian principalities to unite. This was achieved by 
electing the same prince, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, by taking advantage of the fact that the Treaty of Paris 
(1856) did not forbid this.  
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Furthermore, drawing from the historical representations of their national 
identity articulation, Romanianists stress Romania’s position as a saviour of Moldova 
on a wider scale. For instance, Lulea (31.05.2013) argues that Romania has repeatedly 
saved Moldova in the past years, from its scholarship programme for Moldovan 
students to its support for a pro-Western government in Chisinău. This type of ‘saving’ 
is based on the Romanian Europeanisation of Moldova and, implicitly, on Romania’s 
superiority from this point of view. Lastly, Romania does tend to have an almost 
mystical symbolism attached to it, an ideal, similar to a heaven long lost for 
Romanianists. Moldovan national poet Grigore Vieru’s words ‘If some wished to go 
into space, all I wanted all my life was to cross the Prut’ are illustrative from this point 
of view; some of my interviewees also described the Moldovans’ longing to see 
Romania at least once (OT5). Based on this idealised version of Romania, the greatest 
wish of Romanianists is to (re)become Romanian.  
Concluding, Romania is seen as a saviour, as taking responsibility for Moldova, a 
phenomenon even more poignant in radical national identity discourses. Shifting the 
focus to individual agency, Romanian president, Traian Băsescu, is also represented as 
a saviour of the Moldovan people. This is due to his role in easing citizenship 
procedures for Moldovans during the late 2000s (OT5). This depiction of Băsescu as a 
saviour of the Moldovans (i.e. giving them the opportunity to travel and work in 
Romania and Europe) is reiterated throughout my interviews (e.g. OT5, YL5, YL6). One 
noted that ‘Băsescu made me a Romanian with proper documents’ (OT4), whilst others 
named him ‘the president of the Romanians [not Romania]’ (YL1). As of November 
2014 the Moldovans were allowed to travel, but not work, in the EU without visas. 
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Thus, Romania’s policy of citizenship for Moldovans still offers more than any 
Moldovan agreement with the EU has obtained in terms of free movement of people; 
this stresses the tangible base for Romania’s portrayal as a saviour which challenges 
both the agency and the very utility of the Moldovan leadership. Băsescu’s 
representation extends to other endeavours, from the donation of a wooden church to 
the town of Soroca to the promised 100 million euros48 of aid from the Romanian 
budget (Turcanu 17.07.2013). Additionally, Băsescu declared that he would apply for 
Moldovan citizenship once his presidential mandate in Bucharest finished. Some 
Moldovans reacted along the lines of: ‘Come, Mr Băsescu, you can take us to Europe!’ 
(ProTV.md 17.07.2013), as he was president in 2007 when Romania became a member 
of the EU (OT4). Consequently, as a nation and through its leader, Romania is seen as 
the saviour through the idea of reunification, but also as a teacher and elder brother 
that helps Moldova and solves its problems.  The imagery of the saviour is present in 
both extremist, pro-reunification discourses, and more moderate ones. 
 
5.3.3. Russia  
Then, the Russian other is also presented as a saviour, though based on different 
criteria. I argue that Vladimir Putin is represented as a solution to Moldovan political 
instability and Russia is portrayed through its contemporary aid for Moldova and the 
memory of the Soviet ‘golden age’. The Communists even portraying it as essential for 
                                                          
48 Only part of which had materialised by 2014. 
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the ‘modernisation of our country in principle’ (Comunistul 24.06.2011), but Russia’s 
appeal is widespread across Moldovan society. This is highlighted through the 
presence of this theme all across my data, mainly collected in right-bank Moldova. This 
is likely to be an effect of positive Soviet memories that colour Moldovans’ perceptions 
to this day (O’Loughlin et al. 2013).  
Firstly, Russian leader Vladimir Putin is portrayed as a saviour; he is credited with 
the power to solve the issue of instability and corruption across Moldova. This stresses 
the recognition of solutions to Moldova’s problems outside of the country itself. Putin 
is represented as a saviour in contrast to Moldova’s political chaos: 
[Do you think the Russian example would be a solution for Moldova?] I think it 
would be, 100%. A Putin for Moldova would change the whole situation, for long 
term, 8-10-12 years. It may be dictatorship, but it would be better and he would 
hold the country together from every point of view (OT6). 
More than 80% of Moldovans want a Putin-type leader (Geopol 2012: 12). In 
November 2013 Putin had 55% of Moldovans’ trust, whereas the highest ranking 
Moldovan politician, Vladimir Voronin, barely got 43% (IPP 2013). Additionally, Putin’s 
support is widespread across all ethnic groups in Moldova, as 77% of the 
Moldovan/Romanian ethnic group and 85% of the Russian ethnic group have a positive 
view of him (IMAS 2012a: 68). In this way, the Moldovans recognise another country’s 
‘path’ of development, attempt to copy it and hence, remove their freedom of choice 
and agency in the matter. But more importantly, the existence of an external solution 
through the image of Putin challenges the effectiveness of the current Moldovan 
leadership and the potential Moldova has to produce a leader such as him. Lastly, 
Putin is also portrayed as an ‘acting’ agent and as a friend of Moldova; for instance, 
243 
 
 
 
Moldovans residing in Russia voted for him with the hope that he would enhance 
Russian-Moldovan relations (RFE/EL 5.03.2012). 
However, ‘democratic stability’ is not the only element where Russia is perceived 
as superior and, therefore, able to aid Moldova. Interviewees have mentioned areas, 
from technological development to financial aid, where Russia can play a direct helping 
role. The first was presented by a Moldovanist, who argued that 
We can do a lot with Russian help […] we have had cultural and scientific 
exchanges. It is clear that from a scientific point of view our possibilities of 
working with Russia are incomparable and through previous and current 
experience our perspective is huge. I'll give you a great example very few people 
know about: there is a state program called Moldovan Satellite. This program 
was initiated some time ago, but not currently functioning. Not all EU countries 
are able to develop and produce space satellites. We basically have done this 
with our domestic possibilities: workers, engineers, scientists, including 
programming. Yet, the problem is simple but costly as one must have a rocket to 
launch it. And there are two options: European Cosmic Agency or the same 
agency from Russia. In the first case you pay a lot of money, but in the second 
Russia gives us the opportunity to use their rockets for free. And we think about 
it: would it be better with Russia or Europe? What sort of stupidity is this... 
(PG3). 
Previous ‘cultural and scientific exchanges’ stand at the basis of current and future 
relations; thus, historical experience and national identity narratives are employed to 
portray the relationship with the Russian ‘other’. Moreover, the constructed nature of 
the argument is highlighted in a press statement noting that the European Space 
Agency may launch the satellite for free, as it would be on a research mission (Yupi n.). 
More importantly, Russian aid is represented as indispensable and a part of the 
Russian responsibility towards Moldova. Similarly to the portrayal of Romania, this 
representation is based on the construction of historical responsibility. The articulation 
of historical arguments emphasises the importance of national identity constructions 
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for the contemporary portrayals of the other and how past experience dictates 
contemporary actions. This idea is reflected in 2001 Communist electoral campaign 
focused on the ‘friendship of peoples’ and the ‘[Soviet] golden age’ (Suhan 2006). 
Reiterating some of these themes, a Communist local councillor argued in a 2012 
interview 
All we have here has been built with Russian support or contribution [...] They 
built ‘Thriving Moldova’ and brought in wagons of concentrates, grains, wheat, 
barley, peas, and here they built many animal farms, the workforce, everyone 
had work. Moreover, they sent specialists because we had none, they sent 
20.000 specialists from Russia who came here and organised us (PG7). 
The myths of the ‘golden age’ and of the ‘friendship of peoples’ are based on the 
memory of Russian aid for Moldova; moreover, they support the idea of agency 
transfer to this external other. Thus, even as the Communists portray themselves as 
the saviours in the 2001 electoral campaign, the in-depth narrative stresses the crucial 
role of the Russian other as the main agent. Communist leader Vladimir Voronin also 
highlights Russia’s role as a helper in 2010; this argument is also based on an 
articulation of Moldovan history, but going back to the Middle Ages. He contends that 
Moldova’s relations with Russia 
are historic. There have been no cases, from Ştefan cel Mare and Dimitrie 
Cantemir and to the present day, that Moldova didn’t benefit from the 
assistance and support of Russia (Comunistul 21.05.2010). 
This is essential for understanding the Communists discourse vis-à-vis Russia’s financial 
aid to Moldova. For instance, the aid Vladimir Putin put aside for repairs to the 
Moldovan Parliament building after the violence of April 2009 was represented as 
crucial for Moldovan development. This was achieved by linking the aid with the 
symbolic importance of the Parliament. More importantly, the Communists subtly 
245 
 
 
 
suggested that the Moldovans could not have fixed the damage themselves in a 
critique of AIE1’s failure to capitalise on the aid after they came to power in late 2009 
(PCRM 25.06.2009; 6.07.2009). Building on the historical experience of cooperation in 
the Soviet Union, the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan and the 
EuroAsian Union are also portrayed as a solution and salvation for Moldova by 
Moldovanist parties (Voronin 5.07.2012; Dodon 16.6.2014). The former is presented as 
a positive other, an anti-crisis option (Comunistul 27.05.2014). Meanwhile, Communist 
Mark Tkaciuk (27.12.2012) argues that the EuroAsian Union is ‘Moldova’s only chance 
to survive the crisis’. He sees it as crucial for the consolidation of Moldovan society by 
overcoming the perceived geopolitical polarisation of society. Thus the theme of 
Russia as a helper extends into a representation of the EuroAsian Union (and the 
Customs Union) are essential for Moldova’s development.  
  
5.3.4. The European Union  
The last case-study with regard to ‘the transferal of Moldovan agency’ is the EU. Due 
to its absence in historical narratives, the nature of the EU’s portrayal is somewhat 
different from those of Romania and Russia. The EU functions as an external other 
which can take the form of an indispensable aid or a saviour based on its superiority 
and on its geopolitical position. Moldova’s representation of the West is not unique, 
mirroring articulations present all across central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Kuus 2007). 
The representation of the EU as a helper and saviour is mirrored in surveys, with more 
246 
 
 
 
than 46% of Moldovans associating the EU with the sentiment of ‘hope’ (Opinia 2013: 
11).   
Moldovans reproduce a somewhat naïve discourse regarding their chances of 
becoming members of the EU in the short term. This articulation is perpetuated 
through official discourses, such as the Moldovan government’s political promises of 
EU membership by 2020 (Adevărul 17.10.2014). But more importantly, this wishful 
thinking is reflected in grassroots opinions, as 32% of 2012 respondents think 
Moldovan would become part of the EU within the next decade in 2012 and 46% in 
2011 (IMAS 2012b: 132; 2011: 17). In this way, the representation of Moldova’s 
European aspirations and hopes contradicts the reality of the process. This is due both 
to the length and the multiplicity of criteria Moldova would have to comply with and 
the EU leaders’ hesitation in regards to the very process; up until late 2014 they had 
not presented Moldova with the prospect of membership. This disconnect highlights 
the importance of a constructivist approach for this analysis and the power political 
discourse, coupled with hope, has in reproducing the image of a saviour.  
The inferiority complex towards the EU is based on the Moldovan depictions of 
the West as superior to the East and its own position as in-between the two spaces. 
The Moldovans employ two main characteristics to portray the European space: values 
and development (Section 4.5.1). Based on this superiority, the EU is represented as a 
teacher and an aid. More than 70% of Moldovans believe they can learn a lot from the 
EU on issues such as democracy, good governance, economy, security, etc. (Opinia 
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2013). They also think the EU perceives them as friendly (90%), peaceful (86%), but 
also laggard (75%) and weak (82%) (Opinia 2013: 8), stressing their own deficiency. 
The EU’s superiority is transferred to its member states, as illustrated in the 
representations of Romania as European. The Moldovans portray themselves as 
inferior not only to the ‘big brother’, but also to other post-communist countries in 
Eastern Europe, especially the Baltics. This leads to Moldova’s acceptance of these 
countries’ paths of development (e.g. EX2, YL2). The existence of these states and their 
success stories forms the basis for Moldova’s adoption of their paths and creates the 
sense of inevitability, thus removing choice and, therefore, agency from the Moldovan 
self. The most obvious example is the rapprochement with Romania in order to 
promote EU integration. Yet, this acceptance challenges the idea that reforms should 
stem from the needs of the state and becomes problematic when certain decisions are 
contested by the Moldovan population. This was the case with the equality of rights 
law, which was widely rejected across Moldovan society, due to its mention of sexual 
minorities. Nevertheless the government argued that Moldova should be in line with 
other European countries, whilst the opposition stresses that Christian Orthodox 
members of the EU such as Greece and Bulgaria have not implemented such a rule 
(PG3).  
The EU’s superiority legitimises the transferal of agency to the Union through a 
series of mechanisms, from the recognition of Europe’s development and legitimacy to 
impose these rules to an image of Europe that dictates to Moldova’s leadership. The 
former is a teacher-pupil relationship, very similar to that with Romania, whilst the 
248 
 
 
 
latter was covered extensively in Section 4.3.1, in the discussion external and 
conspiratorial others. In the former case, Moldova is portrayed as a ‘child of Europe, 
although not the most loved one’ (PG5); this reiterates the family metaphor used to 
describe Moldova’s relation with Romania. Korosteleva (2010: 1283-4) also highlights 
the Moldovan sentiment of inferiority and, linked to it, the representation of an 
unbalanced relationship within the European Neighbourhood Program.  Another 
interviewee was a lot more specific in terms of his ideal EU policy towards Moldova: 
I am a pro-European so I think their policy should be something along the lines 
of: come to us and in a year we’ll solve all of your problems, you’re only 3 million 
[Moldova’s population] anyway and next to all of the EU’s population. 33.000 
square kilometres, three million people, in one year you will have motorways, 
jobs, you can live decently (YL7). 
The argument of Moldova’s smallness and, implicitly, the ease with which the EU could 
solve Moldova’s problems either through aid or by making it an outright member of 
the EU (and then ‘pouring money into it’) appeared in a few of my interviews (M1, M3, 
EX1). A vox populi contribution also described the EU as ‘these 28 countries are like a 
family. In hard times, they help each other, they support each other financially. 
Moldova needs something like this’ (Unimedia 7.11.2014). Moreover, the EU’s help is 
presented as truly indispensable, not only for Moldova’s European aspirations, but also 
for its survival, as 
the EU has the right policy through the aid it’s giving us, keeping Moldova afloat. 
Without it, Moldova would be bankrupt. [….] So we have this support and … I 
don’t think there is an alternative (EX2).  
ence, the EU’s role is essential to Moldova’s development, partially inspired by its 
superiority and through its resources (Mihail 9.04.2012).  
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Lastly, the image of the EU and its leadership as a helper and aid is augmented 
through the representation of the EU as a geopolitical saviour, within the 
representation of the East-West cleavage (Section 4.5). Similarly to Russia, the EU is 
portrayed as interested in its own area of influence. In this articulation the  
EU wants to extend its influence […] It’s already lost the Ukraine, as there are 
Russian military bases in Sevastopol, they’ve already signed a contract for 
decades. The EU is interested to extend its own space, its area of stability in the 
east (PG13). 
Across surveys, Moldovans consider that the three main reasons for the EU’s actions in 
Moldova are to enhance the populations’ living standards, expand the EU’s territory 
and increase the EU’s influence in the area (Opinia 2013: 7); the first reason links into 
the depiction of the EU as a saviour, whilst the latter two stress the representation of 
the EU as a geopolitical actor. In this manner, both the EU and Russia are represented 
as thinking in geopolitical terms, which strengthens the representation of their 
opposition (Section 3.5). More importantly, this offers the basis for a portrayal of their 
role as saving Moldova from the threat of the geopolitical ‘other’. Through the very 
nature of the geopolitical conflict and the interests of each side to expand their area of 
influence, this help is a sine qua non action - a ‘must’ for Moldova that has the 
‘fortunate’ position in between the two spaces. With this in mind, the EU is repeatedly 
criticised for its lack of involvement in Moldova on a whole range of issues regarding 
Russia. A columnist highlighted this in an interview:  
I think that the EU should be involved more actively in solving the Transnistrian 
conflict, not only as an observer, but as a mediator […] It should oppose Russian 
power in this area, but it’s not very successful at it right now, although it should 
be (M3). 
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Accordingly, the EU has the potential to be represented as geopolitical saviour, albeit 
on a more limited scale; additionally the repeated use of the modal ‘should’ [ar trebui] 
suggests obligation as well as expectation. One practical example is the case of 
Moldova’s gas resources. In this context, the EU’s power as a geopolitical actor is 
stressed in terms of its power to negotiate directly with Russia on certain issues as 
We cannot have relations of equality with such a big partner like Russia, only as 
part of the EU would we be able to have more proportional relations. […] We 
can’t negotiate with Russia in terms of energy security because we don’t count 
[…] they won’t give us what we ask for, because they are in the dominant 
position. But the EU could shift the balance… (YL6) 
Thus, the same perception of Moldova as a small, insignificant country feeds into a 
representation that gives the EU the power to decide over Moldovan issues, such as 
gas prices. This depiction draws from the anti-imperialist narrative described in Section 
4.2 and it denies any power to the Moldovan elite who negotiate on energy issues with 
Moscow. Contrary to this discourse, the Moldovan government has even managed to 
ensure gas prices went down in previous years (e.g. Adevărul 5.09.2011).  
This example strengthens the importance of a more nuanced representation of 
the saviour, as a helper not a messiah. It enables Moldova to retain a certain amount 
of agency, but also fall into the trap of giving up some or all of it in certain situation. 
However, the more extreme portrayal of the saviour as indispensable is still present 
amongst certain groups, e.g. unionists. PNL leader Vitalia Pavlicenco (21.06.2013), 
despite using the term ‘aid’, sees no hope for Moldova to stand its ground in face of 
Russian threats without Western help. This illustrates how receiving/asking for ‘help’ 
actually represents this aid as indispensable and paints a picture in which Moldova has 
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no agency whatsoever; this offers a different take on what was perceived before as a 
nuanced myth of the saviour. 
 
5.4. Conclusion   
This chapter argues that the Moldovans construct themselves as lacking agency and 
award agency to their external others. In contemporary articulations, representations 
of agency are challenged through portrayals such as the high level corruption of 
political elites or the depiction of Moldovans as generally indecisive.  In addition my 
interviewees also brought forward the idea of Moldova as a ‘non-natural’ state and, 
drawing from that, concluded that it cannot have a foreign policy. Meanwhile, the 
representations of external others as agents on the international stage is focused 
around the legitimising power of history.  This is achieved through the reiteration of 
historical themes such as the Great Power Complex and historical debt; these enable 
the Moldovans to transfer responsibility and the power to act to external others. Yet, 
the geopolitical divide (Chapter 4) also plays a crucial role in the representation of the 
external other a as a saviour in Moldovan consciousness and, thus, in the transfer of 
agency to them.  
Lastly, as noted in the chapter, some representations have tangible bases, but 
most are essentialisations of the current situation. One example of the former is the 
fact that Romanian citizenship policy can be far more valuable to the Moldovan citizen 
than their own government’s attempts to move closer to Europe. Nevertheless, the 
way in which Romania is framed as a saviour illustrates a deeper need in Moldovan 
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society for someone to take this role and augments the reality of the Romanian-
Moldova relationship. At the opposite end of the spectrum, constructions, such the 
prospect of EU membership for Moldova either as an independent state or as a result 
of unification with Romania are in stark contradiction to the current Moldovan reality. 
They illustrate the power of political discourse and grassroots representations to 
perpetuate an illusory representation of foreign affairs.  
Moreover, the chapter also highlights the far-reaching influence of national 
identity articulations in Moldovan society. Even as the analysis seems to have moved 
away from national identity discourses, most of its arguments still employed them 
extensively. The very few that could not be strictly related to them (e.g. leadership 
corruption) are studied in order to offer a comprehensive analysis of the context 
within which national identity discourses function and the other constructions they 
interact with.  Hence, the analyses of historical narratives and external others are 
based on the national identity structures that define these. Furthermore, national 
identity also creeps in other arguments, from the idea of indecision as part of the 
national character to the legitimation of Romanian and Russian policies through the 
representation of a community of identity.  
The analysis of constructions of agency is crucial for the discernment of the way 
in which the Moldovans depict international affairs through a Cold War lens. The first 
two chapters of the thesis focused on the way in which the Moldovans see the world 
as divided on geopolitical lines, between East and West. This chapter sets the basis for 
understanding the portrayal of the Moldovan state as a country that does not have a 
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say on the international stage, a state that cannot or will not act. Consequently, the 
Moldovans represent themselves as passive through a whole range of mechanisms and 
involving both internal and external characteristics. This portrayal acts as a discursive 
constraint that limits the discursive possibilities and credibility of dissonant foreign 
policy representation. For instance, it problematizes the credibility of foreign policy 
discourses that argue for Moldovan action and not for external solutions. This offers an 
explanation for the multitude of references to external others is electoral campaign, 
from the Socialists’ banners with Putin to the PLDM’s slogan ‘Forward, towards a 
European Future!’ (see Section C.2 for a more in-depth discussion). Therefore, the 
construction of the external saviour, be it Romania, Russia or the EU, functions as a 
discursive resources for foreign policy articulations to build on. 
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Conclusion 
The main finding of this thesis is that in the Moldovan case, national identity 
discourses produce and reproduce a representation of international affairs through a 
Cold War lens. This construction is defined by two main elements, the representation 
of the civilizational and geopolitical cleavage between East and West and the lack of 
agency awarded to the Moldovan self (state or leadership). These discourses are the 
means through which the Moldovans rationalise the world; they act as a filter for 
understanding contemporary events, from the Ukraine crisis to Moldovan poverty. 
Due to the geopolitical construction’s widespread usage in political, media and elite 
discourses, it becomes very hard to think outside it. By reiterating these constructions, 
the Moldovans help perpetuate the idea of their own passivity and lack of agency 
together with the East-West cleavage. Through its focus on representations of foreign 
affairs, this geopolitical representation functions as both a resource and a constraint 
for foreign policy discourses in Moldova and their legitimation process. 
The thesis also draws a series of conclusions vis-à-vis the national identity debate 
in Moldova. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight that Moldovanism, as a corroboration between 
a civic and an ethnic discourse, functions in very similar ways to ethnic Romanianism, 
almost mirroring it. This sheds light on the fact that despite the perceived theoretical 
differences between ethnic and civic identities, Moldovan national identity discourses 
are organised on the same matrix. In order to cater to the same discursive needs of 
society and offer a comprehensive alternative to each other, Romanianism and 
Moldovanism mirror each other in content. Moreover, these two constructions of 
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national identity are articulated consistently across Moldova. The same themes are 
presented uniformly from the academic to the political, media and grassroots levels; 
this suggests that the national identity cleavage has led to a pillarization, a vertical 
division, of Moldovan society.  
Additionally, the thesis stresses that the dichotomy between Romanianism and 
Moldovanism is not necessarily black and white. In most cases this dichotomy is a 
nuanced construction. For instance, whereas a radicalised Moldovanist discourse 
excludes the Romanianists entirely from the Moldovan polity, most current 
articulations focus on a rejection of the power relationship that portrays the 
Romanians as somehow superior or in charge of Moldova. I contend that the main 
promoters of Moldovanism and Romanianism have adapted the discourses to take a 
more moderate stance in contemporary Moldova. These constructions do however 
become radicalised in situations of conflict, such as the accusations of coup and 
extremism raised during the Twitter Revolution (BBC 9.4.2009). 
 
C.1. Original contribution and Importance of Study 
This thesis contributes to existing scholarship in two main ways: to the literature on 
Moldovan national identity and to the analyses of Moldovan foreign affairs. Firstly, it 
augments the literature on Moldovan national identity by bringing the debate up to 
the current day. This is achieved through the data collection process which covers 
2009-2014. Moreover, the unique focus of the analysis has also led to a broadening of 
the data collection process to encompass topics previously under-researched. In this 
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manner, the first two chapters build on the existing literature; they enhance it in terms 
of their analysis and they also bring it up to date, i.e. 2009-2014. More importantly, 
this thesis also opens up new areas of research through its focus. For instance, Chapter 
5 brings a new perspective to studies of Moldovan national identity through the 
analysis of agency in historical and contemporary representations; it highlights the 
importance of ideas such as the Great Power Complex for elucidating Moldovan 
history and the Moldovans as a nation. This stresses the importance of a different 
research focus in order to obtain original conclusions for the thesis. 
The thesis’ second contribution to knowledge is achieved through its post-
structuralist, discursive approach to the issue of Moldovan nationalism. Although not 
strictly post-structuralist, the literature on Moldovan national identity has touched 
upon the idea of discourse. Yet, these research pieces are somewhat limited in their 
focus. For instance Cash (2009) concentrates on the meanings attached to the idea of 
Europe, whilst Danero Iglesias (2013a) pinpoints the inconsistencies of the 
Moldovanist historical discourse. This thesis takes this further and provides a 
comprehensive analysis of Romanianism and Moldovanism, their basis and main 
arguments. It systematises the main tenets of the two discourses and highlights the 
importance of equivalence and difference in their construction.  In this way, it 
develops the existing literature, such as the historical analyses of Danero Iglesias 
(2013a), Ihrig (2006, 2007) and sociological ones such as (Protsyk 2006b). Hence, the 
thesis underscores the discursive connections between the different aspects of 
national identity constructions and the way in which they reinforce each other and 
ensure Romanianism and Moldovanism’s dominance across Moldovan society.  
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Nevertheless, the main contribution of the thesis is through its post-structuralist 
perspective on representations of foreign affairs in Moldova. This discursive approach 
enables the thesis to link national identity to foreign policy discourses and conclude 
that national identity helps perpetuate the view of international affairs through a Cold 
War lens. Most of the existing research on Moldova’s foreign relations, especially by 
Moldovan and Romanian authors, focuses on a geopolitical understanding of the 
world, in general, and the region, in particular (Dungaciu 2005, 2009 etc.).  This thesis 
is the first study that applies a critical approach to the analysis of Moldovan foreign 
affairs. This approach offered me the opportunity to study the assumptions and 
‘common knowledge’ at the basis of representations of international relations. The 
thesis highlights the means through which the Cold War view of the world is 
reproduced in Moldovan discourses and offers a different way to conceptualise 
Moldova’s foreign relations. 
This research also fulfils the purpose of critical theory and offers alternatives in 
thought and action. By stressing the discursive constructs that limit present patterns of 
thinking, the thesis highlights the means through which these can be changed and 
their bases challenged. This is especially relevant in the chapter on agency (5), which 
stress the means through which inaction is legitimated in Moldova. This part of the 
analysis comes as a response to a dominant view among laymen and columnists that 
the Moldovans should do more by themselves and for themselves. This underscores 
the nature of this part of the research as a response to current concerns within 
Moldova. Thus, the thesis not only brings a new approach to the analysis of foreign 
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policy representations in Moldova but, more importantly, it challenges the dominant, 
geopolitical view of international affairs and offers avenues to dismantle it.  
It also offers an explanation for the persistence (to the point of obsession) of the 
idea of geopolitics in Moldova. The term is very common and it appears in almost all of 
my interviews. The idea of geopolitics is also widespread across the media 
(newspapers and online blogs). It is a sort of ‘go-to’ explanation, widely employed to 
make sense of Moldovan foreign affairs both in academic circles and across Moldovan 
society. Geopolitics’ ubiquity is also reflected in Moldovan bookshops: a central one in 
Chişinău had a dedicated display shelf with books on this topic; these comprise of titles 
from geopolitical analyses and studies of the idea of Occident and Orient to national 
identity and historical studies, stressing the links between these themes (Appendix 2). 
Reinforcing their importance, a good part of my interviewees mentioned reading some 
of the books on geopolitics from the shelves (e.g. Dan Dungaciu’s Moldova ante portas, 
2005) (YL1, YL3).  Thus, the importance of the study stems from both its relevance to 
current affairs, through the way in which the analysis extends all the way up to the 
Moldovan elections of November 2014 and for its usefulness in making sense of day-
to-day elements of Moldovan life, such as the contents of a book shop window.  
From a practical point of view, the study offers a perspective on the means 
through which foreign policy articulations are legitimised beyond economic and 
instrumentalist reasons. It stresses the importance of national identity, as a discourse 
that can be more resilient in defining people’s attitudes in the face of changing 
economic circumstances. This is relevant with the shift in Moldovan economic 
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relations with Russia and the EU in the recent decade and, especially, the Euro Crisis. 
Ultimately, the analysis offers a perspective for the Moldovan government and elites 
to attempt and change these views across society. It can aid the pro-European 
supporters to promote their ideas and stresses the limitations they face both in terms 
of discursive continuity, consistency and the persistence of geopolitical patterns of 
thought.  
Additionally, the Moldovan case offers insight into the narratives of other post-
communist countries, for instance Ukraine. For example, the myth of ‘two Ukraines’ 
mirrors the national identity cleavage in Moldova. Mykola Ryabchuk (1992) defined 
the idea of the ‘two Ukraines’ as the cleavage between the Western, nationalist and 
pro-liberal, and the minority Eastern, Russian-speaking population. Recent political 
discourses in the Ukraine have also articulated ideas similar to those analysed in this 
thesis, e.g. associating the conspiratorial and external Russian others. Moreover, just 
like in Moldova, ‘the two Ukraines’ is an essentialisation, as the realities on the ground 
are a lot more complex. This is very important and should warrant further research, 
especially as a comparison between Moldova and the Ukraine would shed light on the 
importance (or lack thereof) of the ‘small country’ theme in these articulations. 
Furthermore, the current interest in the Ukraine has also increased the importance of 
this research and highlights its relevance to understanding the mechanics of national 
identity in the region. 
The Ukrainian comparison emphasizes the commonalities in terms of national 
identity constructions and their consequences. For instance, the myth of the ‘two 
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Ukraines’ can be employed as a mechanism to legitimise failure. This is the failure of 
the Kiev government to appeal to the Eastern, Russian-speaking, part of the country, 
which is explained through cultural, national and ultimately, civilizational arguments. 
Thus, its very perpetuation helps reproduce the idea of a divided country. In the same 
way, in Moldova, the Russian-speaking minorities are portrayed as uncooperative, as 
Russian agents and as bad citizens (Chapters 3 and 4). This legitimises Chişinău’s failure 
to engage these groups into the wider polity and create a common Moldovan identity. 
Moreover, the Huntingtonian divide that overlaps with this essentialised view of 
national identity in Ukraine is very similar to the representation of the East-West 
cleavage in Moldova. This illustrates the means through which a narrative such as 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ has been applied to fit Moldova, despite its 
inconsistency with the case study (religiously, Moldova belongs entirely to 
Huntington’s Eastern space). Thus, such representations across the post-communist 
world are to a great extent constructed and this underscores the importance of a 
poststructuralist approach to analyse them as discourses, together with their 
discursive sources.  
 
C.2. Consequences for Foreign Policy  
The importance of this analysis stems from the implication of its conclusions for the 
study of foreign policy in the Moldovan case. The scope of the thesis is a 
comprehensive analysis of the societal system of symbols and narratives that offer the 
framework for official foreign policy discourses. In order to stress the impact of this 
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framework, this section is an exploratory study of the means through which 
geopolitical discourses are reproduced and challenged on the official level and some of 
the consequences stemming from these patterns of thought for the Moldovan public; 
it brings together the points made throughout the thesis regarding foreign policy 
articulations and gathers further evidence to emphasise the importance of societal 
geopolitical representations in Moldova. Three main types of national identity 
influences are noted throughout: the direct usage of national identity narratives, the 
reproduction of the East-West divide (Chapter 4) and the representation of Moldovan 
agency (Chapter 5). The importance of the societal discourses analysed across the 
thesis is marked on two levels. Firstly, they are almost ubiquitous across articulations 
of foreign policy and are employed to augment instrumentalist or economic 
arguments, but also trump them in certain situations. Secondly, national identity based 
arguments are more resilient than economic and instrumentalist ones as they are 
imbedded in the national consciousness of Moldovans.  
 
C.2.1. National Identity 
Even as Moldovan foreign policy has been repeatedly argued to be pragmatic and 
multi-vector, balanced in its relations with the Western or Eastern geopolitical and 
civilisational spaces (e.g. King 2003), the link between national identity and foreign 
policy is pertinent.  Foreign policy in Moldova reproduces at least discursively elements 
of national identity, especially Romanianism/Moldovanism’s interest for one 
geopolitical space over the other.  
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The first element pin-pointing the influence national identity discourses have on 
foreign policy articulation is the reproduction of the cultural and linguistic tenets of the 
two national identity constructions. For instance, the Communists have argued that 
their pro-Russian foreign policy is based on the historical experience of Ştefan cel Mare 
(Introduction), whilst Vlad Filat’s argument vis-à-vis Moldova’s Europeaness is based 
on the country’s Latinity (Section 3.3). This idea is reiterated across 2009 to 2014. One 
of the latest examples of this argument is Prime Minister Iurie Leanca’s statement to 
Frederica Mongherini (EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy) in September 2014. 
He stressed Filat’s idea of Latin origins as a reason for stronger ties between Moldova 
and Italy and to legitimise Moldova’s European aspirations (Unimedia 1.09.2014). The 
association between being Latin and European, raises questions over the linguistic 
definition of a continent that comprises of a wide array of linguistic families (Section 
4.5.1). Nevertheless, my interviewees suggested that the linguistic cleavage in 
Moldova, between Romanian/Moldovan as a Latin language, and Russian, as a Slavic 
one, reproduces the border of Europe and, implicitly, the cleavage between East and 
West (Chapter 4).  
Additionally, other parties have also articulated elements of national identity 
that go beyond the two main discourses, such as religion. The religious argument was 
at the centre of the Socialists’ rejection of the European Union, with the support of the 
Moldovan Orthodox Church leaders. It was focused on the opposition between the 
cultural and religious characteristics of the Moldovan people and the liberal (and, 
even, immoral) European Union; this was due to the EU’s requirement for Moldova to 
adopt the equality of rights law, a measure that includes references to ‘sexual 
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minorities’ (Section 5.3.4). Thus, the theme of identity, traditions and religion was 
employed to reject the European Union. This construction is based on the Moldovan 
identification with its religion (Cash 2011). Moreover, across Moldova religion is widely 
linked to national characteristics such as ‘bunatate’ [kindness] and hospitality (OT). The 
Socialists’ ambition was, through this discourse, to unite the whole of Moldova against 
the government. However, this attempt led to further divisions within Moldovan 
society; e.g. in response to a protest organised by these groups, one of my 
interviewees outright rejected this identity and the political action associated with it 
(EX4). Thus, radicalisation can lead to different levels of engagement and, even, to the 
rejection of a ‘Moldovan’ identity, Christian Orthodox religion in this case. In this way, 
the politicisation of national identity produces and perpetuates, in a vicious circle, 
societal cleavages.  
 
C.2.2. East and West 
The second element that has the potential to be translated into foreign policy 
discourse is the opposition between East and West. This is achieved through a choice 
for one and against the other of these spaces, e.g. pro-EU, against Russia. The idea is 
stressed through the very way in which foreign policy in Moldova (2009-2014) is 
represented as a ‘vector’, which suggests some sort of movement in a singular 
direction (Section 5.2). This conceptualisation is employed by leaders across the 
Moldovan political spectrum. Democrat Marian Lupu discussed the Moldovan ‘vector 
of European Integration’ (RFE/EL 18.05.2013) and similar ideas were put across by the 
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former Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004-9), Andrei Stratan (RFE/EL 
18.03.2013) and former PLDM MP, Ion Ciontoloi (RFE/EL 8.02.2014).  Moreover, 
foreign policy is depicted as single vector, or for this period, as pro-European, as the 
name of the governing coalition, ‘Alliance for European integration’, suggests. 
Romanianist parliamentary parties take this even further when they stress this 
element in their visual representations. For instance, the Liberal Party has a map of 
Europe on its website header, with arrows from Chişinău to Brussels, whilst the Liberal 
Reformists have chosen an eagle that is ‘headed towards Europe’ as their emblem 
(Publika 14.09.2013). This theme is even more relevant in electoral campaigns, where 
messages tend to be short and where one side is clearly chosen over the other. For 
instance the PLDM’s 2014 slogan was ‘PLDM for Europe’ and they were committed to 
fight for ‘A European future for Moldova’. These discursive mechanisms promote the 
representation of foreign policy as leading somewhere, towards one and only one of 
these spaces, i.e. East and West. This construction perpetuates the incompatibility 
between East and West and highlights the incongruences of a multi-vector policy.  
Moreover, the reproduction of the East-West dichotomy is not limited to these 
communicational strategies; it is also present in the discursive constructions of the 
opposition. For instance, an interview with a Socialist party leader highlighted this 
perception of East-West relations as a zero-sum game in 2012 (PG3). He argued that 
the government’s EU aspirations have severely damaged Moldova’s relations with 
what described as a crucial and strategic partner, Russia. The Communists’ echoed this 
construction in an appeal to Moldovan president Nicolae Timofti and described the 
2009-2014 period 
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The previous path of internal reform and European modernisation was changed 
to one defined by the imposition of a Romanian protectorate on our country, 
with limited sovereignty, a bankrupt economy, villages destroyed and an 
aggressive anti-Russian policy (PCRM 14.05.2014).  
Through their criticism, the opposition parties perpetuate the idea that it is impossible 
for the government to have good relations with both Eastern and Western actors and 
thus strengthen the societal representation of the East-West dichotomy.   
The very name of the AIE suggests the preferred foreign policy orientation of the 
government. Yet, their discourse is a lot more docile, very similar to a multi-vector 
foreign policy at times. The Moldovan government has managed to bring the pro-
Western and pro-Eastern orientations together by employing a series of mechanisms. 
The approach the Democrat party, a member of the AIE, but a promoter of good 
foreign relations with Russia, has taken is to differentiate between foreign policy and 
internal modernization. They portray foreign policy as cooperation and good 
diplomatic and economic relations with countries all over the world; in this way, they 
challenge the East-West divide through the focus on specific countries and not 
geopolitical spaces. More specifically, Marian Lupu (3.11.2013), the Democrat Party 
leader argued that 
we don’t want to be isolated from the rest of the world. Our country will be a 
strong bridge between East and West. We are and we will be in good relations 
with Ukraine and Romania, with Russia and Germany, with Belarus and Italy, 
with China and the US. Moldova is an open house! 
Meanwhile, internal modernization is represented as the process of Moldovan reform 
through the application of European norms and values; Lupu defines these as ‘a 
system of political, democratic, economic and social values and human rights […] 
associated with Moldova’s future’ (RFE/EL 18.05.2013). Thus, the two concepts are 
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constructed around the difference between values and economic interests, somewhat 
between idealism and pragmatism. This enables the Democrat foreign policy 
articulation to reproduce the normative cleavage between East and West and maintain 
a pragmatic (and untainted by values, norms or national identity predispositions) 
relation with Russia. This differentiation between foreign policy and internal 
modernisation also enables analysts to evaluate the two ‘foreign affairs’ endeavours 
separately, through different criteria; this ensures that a multi-vector foreign policy 
would be free of any national identity, historical or ‘otherness’ based criticisms. 
A very similar case is that of the Communist government’s 2005-9 foreign policy. 
Despite their pro-European slogans in the 2005 election, Communist foreign policy 
shifted in between pro-European articulations and one of balancing East and West. 
According to the Communist leadership, a ‘balanced’ foreign policy draws benefits 
from both the Eastern and Western spaces, like a good calf milking two cows. Despite 
their ambiguous foreign policy, the Communists implemented a moderate Moldovanist 
project throughout the period. They promoted Moldovanist policies and positioned 
leading Moldovanists in the party and official structures (March 2007). Hence, on a 
superficial level, their declared pro-European foreign policy (strand) clashed 
discursively with their national identity views. This mismatch was solved by disrupting 
the discursive link between Romania and the European Union; more specifically, the 
Communists promoted good relations with Europe, whilst maintaining the 
Moldovanist dismissal of the Romanian other. Romania is portrayed not necessarily as 
the enemy (until the events of April 2009, as discussed below), but through a rejection 
of hierarchy. Former Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin, explained this as 
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We can’t talk about our relations with Romania in epithets – a brotherly or 
privileged relations, but about bilateral relations in between two states […] We 
cannot accept neither elder brothers nor sisters. As long as Bucharest does not 
understand this, we cannot talk about relations (Adevărul 21.12.2006) 
Additionally, he argues that Chişinău can have a relationship with Brussels without 
Romania as either an intermediary or helper; this stresses the rejection of a 
hierarchical construction of the Romanian external other (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Thus, 
by disconnecting the European and Romanian others, the Communists have both 
reproduced the Moldovanist discourse vis-à-vis the representation of external 
otherness and legitimised a pro-European foreign policy. Hence, the current and last 
government in Moldova highlight two mechanisms employed within official foreign 
policy discourses to work around the national identity determined societal 
construction of foreign affairs. The first is a different conceptualisation of foreign 
policy and the second consists of breaking some of the links within the network of 
equivalences created around Moldovanism. This stresses both the power of these 
discourses in Moldovan society, their adaptability, the means through which chains of 
equivalences can be built and reorganised in order to be taken into account in official 
foreign policy articulations. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the official and the 
opposition foreign policy arguments in Moldova. This difference lies in the level of 
radicalisation of othering processes within these discourses and, implicitly, the degree 
to which they retextualise national identity constructions. The opposition’s freedom to 
articulate more radical discourses (2009-2014) is partially due to them not being 
subject to diplomatic rules of engagement or other official constraints. Additionally, 
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the political cleavage between left and right is an important factor in the creation of 
these radicalised representations. This adds an extra layer in the opposition-
government comparison; the former does (or should) not have a politicised view, in 
contrast with the opposition who ‘live to criticise’ the government. Thus, a wide array 
of criteria differentiates the official, i.e. government (president, prime minister or 
minister of foreign affairs) from other political articulations, but these require further 
research. Stemming from this notable difference, the main focus of additional research 
is a comprehensive analysis of the content of foreign policy articulations across 
Moldova, especially focused on a comparison in between electoral promises and ‘in 
government’ discourse. This would enable us to grasp which additional elements need 
to be taken into consideration within a wider analysis of foreign policy. One of these is 
the limitations set by the diplomatic rules (or the fears of actual repercussions) or 
democratic legitimacy (i.e. voting behaviour).  
Thus, societal discourses are to a great extent tempered within political and 
especially official (i.e. the parties in power and government officials) articulations. The 
very fact that some national identity elements still come across even in these 
circumstances is proof of their power in Moldovan society. The importance of these 
discourses also becomes apparent with the radicalisation of articulations in situations 
of crisis. For instance, whilst the Communist discourse regarding Romania was 
somewhat tame during its ‘pro-European’ years (2005-9). However, the Communists 
radicalised their representation of the Romanian other during the 2009 Twitter 
Revolution; this was achieved through claims of espionage, violations of Moldovan 
sovereignty and independence and accusation of organising a coup d’état. Thus, 
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national identity articulations form the matrix of resources employed to make sense of 
different situations, especially those of crisis, in a more or less radical ways.  
Lastly, the discussion on national identity and foreign policy discourses suggests 
that the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy has limited popularity amongst national 
identity supporters, as it clashes with their representations of otherness. For instance, 
the credibility of the Communists’ pro-European foreign policy is problematic for a 
Romanianist. A range of my Romanianist interviewees noted retrospectively that 
Moldova’s foreign policy between 2005 and 2009 was not even remotely pro-
European (e.g. OT3, EX1, YL4, YL5). This view is strengthened by constructions such as 
those of the Liberals, who argue that a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy is the same as no 
foreign policy and represented by its critics as standing still (Section 5.2). This was 
illustrated across interviews in Moldova, but also in newspaper columns, e.g. ‘during 
the Communist regime, we weren’t going anywhere’ (PG5, YL2). Moreover, Moldovans 
portray the current government as betraying the European ambition of the 
Moldovans, by cooperating with Russia. A particular case of this was the concession of 
the Chişinău airport to a Russian agent in 2013, presented in Jurnal de Chişinău 
(8.10.2013) as the government and Moldova being at Moscow’s ‘mercy’. Moreover, 
the oppositional representation between East and West and the need for Moldovan 
parties to make a choice between the two became very poignant for the Communists 
in the 2014 parliamentary elections. A series of analyses conducted after they slumped 
from being the biggest party in Moldova to third have blamed for this failure (amongst 
other reasons) the Communists’ lack of a staunch pro-Russian position in the electoral 
campaign, somewhat wavering between East and West (RFE/EL 1.12.2014; Infotag 
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1.12.2014). Taking this into account, the ultimate problem is that a Moldovan 
government can find it somewhat hard to legitimate its ‘all appeasing’ foreign policy. 
This leads to lack of confidence in the government and the Moldovan political 
leadership amongst certain groups and, ultimately, a lack of interest and trust in 
politics.  
 
C.2.3. Agency 
The thesis concludes that Moldovan societal discourses represent Moldovan identity 
as passive. The Moldovan lack of agency is not one of the discourses that permeates to 
the official level, as it would challenge the very relevance of the Moldovan 
government, as part of the political structure of the state. Quite the opposite, one of 
the discursive mechanisms the governments since 2009 have employed to challenge 
the representation of Moldova’s lack of agency is based on the EU principle of ‘more 
for more’. Through this, the government measured its effectiveness through the 
external evaluation and the rewards the European Union awards it. This stresses the 
importance of the external actor for the representation of Moldovan foreign affairs. 
More importantly, this ‘step-by-step’ approach enables to Moldovan government to 
break up the comprehensive ideal of ‘European integration’ and avoid general criticism 
regarding its European reforms.  Most importantly, the use of this articulation allows 
the Moldovan government to assert its own achievements in terms of reform, thus 
portraying it as an actor in terms of both internal and external affairs.  
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Therefore, the wider discourse on Moldova’s lack of agency is limited to 
Moldovan society; this is also largely due to the alternative sources of these discourses 
such as the lack of trust in the Moldovan political leadership (Section 5.2). 
Nevertheless, certain elements of the passive representation are reiterated by some of 
Moldova’s leaders. The theme of external help is one of the most common topics that 
appear in these articulations. Such an example is the statement made by Moldovan 
president Nicolae Timofti during US secretary of State, John Kerry’s, visit to Chişinău in 
late 2013. On this occasion he asked the US Secretary of State ‘to pay very close 
attention to Moldova’s problems’, especially any form of provocation from Transnistria 
(Unimedia 4.12.2013). Similarly, Minister for Youth and Sport, Octavian Ticu, argued 
that Moldova needs the European Union ‘in order to obtain a viable and functional 
state’ (RFE/EL 15.12.2013). Another layer to this construction is the expectation for 
external actors, especially the EU, to promote their own values and take decisions 
regarding Moldova’s path of reforms, the laws that need to be adopted and 
implemented. This representation draws to a certain extent on the societal 
representation of the saviour, but more importantly from the sentiment of inferiority 
in contrast with the external other. In the literature, Korosteleva (2010) noted that her 
interviews with both analysts, political and official elites illustrated a sentiment of 
inferiority towards the European Union and, linked to it, an over-reliance on EU orders 
and directives. This challenges the principle of partnership that stands at the basis of 
the EU’s approach in Moldova and problematizes Moldovan agency and long term 
foreign policy ambitions. In this way, the thesis strengthens Korosteleva’s (2010) 
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argument and also goes into more depth by illustrating some of the mechanisms 
behind this type of thinking. 
Lastly, the passive representation legitimises a situation whereby Moldovan 
officials do not take responsibility for their actions or the future. This is due to the fact 
that a lack of agency is something society may expect of them and also because they 
have the means to pass blame onto external actors such as Russia and the EU (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). This phenomenon is not limited to Moldova, as the currents events 
in Ukraine highlight the same behaviour in Kiev. Leonard (2014) stresses the courage of 
the Ukrainian protesters and Maidan leaders and contrasts it with the leadership, who 
‘have built an entire political and foreign policy machine to avoid’ responsibility. He 
also notes that the elites tend to load this responsibility and blame for the country’ 
issues onto either Brussels or Moscow and play the two geopolitical actors against 
each other (Leonard 2014; Holland and Friedman 2014). His argument is very similar to 
the Moldovan case, where high level corruption played an important role in the 
termination of the first pro-European coalition, AIE1. Meanwhile, both national 
identity supporters (Romanianists and Moldovanists) and other officials have 
repeatedly attributed blame to external actors, historically and in contemporary 
circumstances. This illustrates the impact of a national identity inspired discourse on 
elite articulations.  Hence, a passive identity can lead to a lack of responsibility on the 
international stage, e.g. expecting help and/or direction from an external other. But 
more importantly, the presence of this type of thinking at societal and elite level and 
within official discourse raises questions from foreign actors vis-à-vis Moldova’s 
commitment to its European aspirations or other foreign policy endeavours.  
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Then, the lack of continuity and consistence between the government’s multi-
vector foreign policy and societal constructions can lead to the delegitimation of the 
Moldovan leadership, problematizing the trust the Moldovans have in them (Section 
5.2). This is also stressed through the representation of the external ‘helper’. More 
specifically, this government propensity to ask for help and, in some cases, 
subservience towards external actors damages their credibility in the eyes of the 
public; this leads to a vicious circle in which this representation of passivity is enforced 
and reinforced. Moreover, in order to stress their achievements and agency, the 
Moldovan government responds by issuing bigger promises. For example, they have 
pledged Moldova will be a member of the EU by 2020 and such (unachievable) 
promises reinitiate the vicious circle of disappointment and lack of agency in foreign 
affairs. In this way, the government’s attempt to portray itself as efficient reproduces 
the problematic lack of confidence in the Moldovan official institutions and their 
representatives. Thus, beyond the implications for foreign policy, the problematic 
alignment between government and societal discourses also has an impact on the trust 
in political leadership in Moldova. Lastly, this phenomenon can even challenge the very 
legitimacy of the Moldovan state and its institutions.  
 
C.3. Further research  
The scope of this research is to analyse the influence of national identity on societal 
conceptualisations of foreign policy. Nevertheless, beyond this main focus, it has also 
touched upon a series of other topics, which in turn have highlighted more gaps in the 
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literature and avenues for further research. The first was the analysis of official foreign 
policy discourses, which was touched upon in the exploratory analysis above.  Then, 
the discussion on national identity emphasised the practical importance of an all-
encompassing identity in Moldova, one that could bring together all of its ethnic 
groups in their allegiance to the Moldovan state. Thus, given the focus of the thesis, on 
Romanianism and Moldovanism, a point for further research is the comprehensive 
study on the possibility of a civic, middle ground national identity discourse in 
Moldova.  
Another element that would require further research is the popular appeal of 
these national identity discourses and of the different foreign policy articulations. The 
thesis has built on the recent research of Eleanor Knott (2014) on grassroots attitudes 
in Moldova; yet, I have also circumvented this issue by analysing data that has the 
potential to have an impact on the Moldovan citizen, due to the authority of those 
articulating it. For this reason the main data employed in the thesis consist of official 
declarations and interviews with high-ranking party members, statements from 
academic and intellectual elites and columns in the most read newspapers in Moldova 
(Section 2.1.2). Additionally, the thesis has captured a glimpse of this phenomenon, 
through a relatively small set of layman interviews, largely in order to test the 
presence of media and official discourses at this level. Nevertheless, further research 
on this topic would shed light on the popularity if these ideas and illuminate us 
whether the reason for official engagement with these discourses is as a response to 
their popularity amongst the Moldovan masses or an act of elite national identity 
promotion.  
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Moreover, these discourses, both at society level and official articulations, do not 
exist in isolation; they are created in relation to Russian, Romanian and EU 
articulations. In this way, identities are created through a dialogical process (Wendt 
1993). Russia, the EU and Romania are some of the most important actors who have 
articulated ideas vis-à-vis the relationship between East and West and should be 
studied further. These discourses have the potential to both strengthen and challenge 
Moldovan representations. This is even more relevant with the shifts within the EU’s 
and Russian discourses, from a zero-sum game to cooperation, based on the 
circumstance. For instance the EU’s discourse was one of cooperation with Russia and 
a rejection of the zero-sum game thinking up until 2012 and 2013. In 2012, 
Commissioner Stefan Fule articulated a series of radical criticisms of Russia’s 
commercial bans against some of the post-Soviet countries. Russia’s discourse too has 
shifted, albeit somewhat more radically, from a non-zero-sum game situation before 
2012 to a radical articulation in late 2013 and 2014. But more importantly, an analysis 
of Romania, Russia and the EU’s discourses can highlight the differences in between 
the different conceptualisations of foreign affairs and stress their constructed 
character. 
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Appendix 1: Banal Nationalism 
 
Figure A1.1 Chişinău 1 (5th April 2012 - photo taken by the author: Love your language! Love your 
country!) 
278 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1.2 Chişinău 2 ('Moldova is Romania!' written and then covered on a wall in Chişinău, July 
2012 – photo taken by the author) 
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Figure A1.3 Chişinău 3 (Moldova Suverană Lobby, str. Puşkin, 22, Casa Presei, et.3 - photo taken by 
the author, July 2012: Stickers with ‘This is Romania!’ on the sign for a former Communist and 
Moldovanist newspaper, tellingly titled ‘Sovereign Moldova’) 
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Appendix 2: Geopolitics Shelves 
 
Figure A2.1 Libraria din Centru 1, Chişinău, June 2012; Some of the books in the shelf are Frederic 
Encel’s Geopolitical Horizons, Oleg Serebrian’s About Geopolitics, Politics and Geopolitics and, The 
Geopolitics of the Pontic Space and Geopolitical Dictionary) 
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Figure A2.2. Libraria din Centru 2, Chişinău, June 2012; Valeriu Pasat – The Moldova SSR in the 
Stalinist Era, Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenegier – Does Russia Threaten the Occident, Ion Turcanu – The 
Description of Bessarabia and Dan Dungaciu’s Bessarabia is Romania?) 
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